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ABSTRACT
INVESTMENT, GROWTH AMD GOVERNMENT POLICY IN AN ECONOMY CHARACT: 
BY OLIGOPOLISTIC AND COMPETITIVE SECTORS.
CIARAN DRIVER
This thesis investigates the theoretical coherence and empirical va- 
lidity (in the UK context) of the economic school whose main proponent 
is Alfred Eichner. The main questions addressed concern (1) the 
duality of pricing, savings and investment behaviour between com- 
petitive and oligopolistic sectors and (2) the implications of the 
cyclical financial surplus that emerges in the oligopolistic sector 
during the upturn. The cycle is explained as the outcome of government 
reaction to the consequences of this financial surplus, rather than as 
a reaction to capacity or trade constraints. The thesis investigates 
the role and effectiveness of policy instruments aimed at strengthening 
and prolonging the cyclical upswing so as to achieve an upward revision 
to the secular growth rate.
The thesis makes original contributions by extending the formal 
treatment of the effect of the oligopolistic financial surplus. It 
also locates the theory in its historical theoretical context and 
demonstrates that it can apply also to the case of an open economy. 
It collates evidence on capacity and trade constraints on the UK economy 
to support the argument that they do not constitute sufficient reasons 
for government deflationary action.
The duality of the UK economy is demonstrated in respect of pricing 
behaviour by collating the results of existing studies. Duality in 
respect of savings and investment behaviour is confirmed by an original 
study of Company Accounts data. Investment duality is confirmed as a 
by-product of two further studies which have the main aim of establishing 
that traditional investment-directed instruments are not effective in 
the short-run(-for the oligopolistic sector and thus cannot be relied 
on to reduce its financial surplus. These studies are supplemented 
by a survey of existing literature on investment. Finally, the role 
of heterodox policy instruments in prolonging a cyclical upswing is 
examined in the context of the theoretical approach adopted.
- 11 -
INTRODUCTION
'The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk. 1
(Hegel : Philosophy of Right)
Oligopoly is a 'characteristic feature in the British Economy 1 . 
This official view, expressed in a government report is hardly novel 
or disputable. (HMSO 1977a) Yet, the implications of oligopoly 
for macroeconomic policy have not often been explored. The compe- 
titive model of the economy not merely dominates, it also circumscribes 
other models by admitting them only as aberrations from the competitive 
norm. But oligopoly is more than a marginal anomaly of competition; 
it needs to be studied sui generis in relation to the macroeconomy.
This thesis sets out to investigate policy options for faster growth 
in an economy exhibiting both oligopolistic and competitive features. 
Its starting point is the analysis of one of the few theorists in this 
field - Alfred Eichner.
Alfred Eichner f s book The Megacorp and Oligopoly was published 
in 1976. The focus of the book was on macroeconomic policy in an 
economy dominated by oligopoly. This topic was not exactly novel, but 
previous writers had approached the subject with a view to appending 
it to an existing body of theory. Orthodox economists approached it 
in terms of anti-trust policy, i.e. in terms of ensuring that the 
economy did not deviate too far from the competitive model. (See 
Mitnick 1980 for a survey). More radical theorists found oligopolistic 
behaviour a useful ingredient in constructing a model of underconsumption 
and stagnation that was more robust than previous generations of political 
economists had been able to fashion (Kalecki 1971; Sweezy 1939? 
Steindl 1952; Cowling 1982).
/The .....
The essential novelty of the Eichner approach was the articu- 
lation of a micro-economic theory of growth maximising, largely self- 
financing firms, with a macroeconomic representation of growth cycles. 
The microeconomic theory shows how savings and investment are planned 
to "be equal to each other on average over the cycle; the occurrence of 
macroeconomic cycles ensures, as a consequence, cyclical surpluses and 
deficits. In Eichner f s argument, each time a surplus appears it 
represents an opportunity to shift the secular growth path upwards.
While the focus of Eichner 1 s book was macroeconomic policy, this 
aspect was virtually ignored in reviews and in subsequent literature 
referring to the book. Almost without exception it was the micro- 
economic theory that was criticised and discussed. The review in 
the Economic Journal (Swann 1977) spoke of the book's 'one novel idea 1 
- the determination of the mark-up - an aspect which had, in fact, been 
outlined in an article in the Economic Journal four years previously 
(Eichner 1973)- The four-page review in the Journal of Economic 
Literature (Marris 1977) devoted only one paragraph to the macro- 
economic aspects of the book.
This unbalanced preoccupation with microeconomic foundations was 
also manifest in respect of a parallel work to Eichner's book - A Theory 
of Profits by Adrian Wood, published in 1975- The microeconomic theory 
in this work, similar in many respects to that of Eichner (with which 
it is compared in Chapters 1 and 2) received attention at the expense 
of the macroeconomic conclusions. The term 'Eichner-Wood Theory' 
became accepted in the literature (e.g. Moss 1981) without anyone 
apparently noticing that the macroeconomic theories of the two works 
referred to were strikingly different.
/The ..... 
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The microeconomic foundations of Eichner's theory are important 
but they are not ends in themselves. They are intended, rather, to 
support policy prescriptions. There are three basic points that are 
defended at the microeconoroic level.
* A dual economy exists in terms of different behaviour patterns 
of firms in the oligopolistic and the competitive sectors of the 
economy. This duality manifests itself mainly in terms of pricing 
and investment behaviour.
* For oligopolistic firms, savings and investment are jointly 
planned i.e. they are equal ex ante. This equality does not operate 
at all points in time but must rather be thought of as operating for 
average levels of savings and investment over a complete cycle in 
economic activity, or at any rate over the period up to the firms 
planning horizon. Thus the oligopolistic firm forecasts and plans 
for short-run cyclical surpluses and deficits.
* Investment policies of oligopolistic firms are relatively 
insensitive to monetary policy instruments (especially interest rate 
movements) and to instruments aimed at changing other components of 
the cost of capital, such as investment incentives.
Each of these points has implications in terms of macroeconomic 
policy.
** The dual economy proposition directs attention to a study of the 
oligopolistic sector which is bigger by any size criterion and which 
is also growing faster than the competitive sector, given the weight 
of declining industries in the latter.
** The occurence of cyclical surpluses underpins the argument, 
discussed in Chapter 1, that opportunities for raising the secular 
growth rate are squandered. The reason is that the defence of these
surpluses tends to spark off a. wage-price spiral.
_ 3 _ /** The .....
*"* The inability of government to influence seriously the level of 
oligopolistic investment means that the cyclical surpluses of the 
oligopolistic sector are impervious to corrective action by traditional 
policy instruments. This gives rise to a debate on alternative forms 
of control and intervention.
It is these macroeconomic policy questions that are addressed in 
this thesis. In Chapter 1 below the issues raised in Eichner's book 
are introduced. Some attention is also given to locating them in the 
context of a more open economy than that of the United States with which 
Eichner has been particularly concerned.
This initial focus on macroeconomic questions is felt appropriate 
given the direction that this thesis seeks to pursue. The microeconomic 
theory on which the macroeconomic conclusions are based is discussed in 
Chapter 2. Supporting evidence for the theory is collated in that 
chapter, where the three propositions above are discussed and defended 
at a microeconomic level in the context of UK industrial behaviour.
Chapter 3 presents the results of a number of empirical studies 
carried out by the author to test, for the UK case, the existence of 
a dual economy in terms of savings and investment behaviour. The 
occurence of cyclical surpluses is also examined and discussed in this 
chapter.
Chapter l\. reviews the problems involved in testing propositions 
on the insensitivity of oligopolistic investment behaviour to changes 
in the cost of capital or liquidity. By surveying previous (mainly 
econometric) work, much of it at an aggregate level, it aims to
identify the problems of and to show the limitations of this kind of
- 1; - /approach. ...
approach. The chapter draws attention to the inconclusiveness of the 
existing literature and to the lack of a clear consensus on the 
effectiveness of instruments to regulate investment "behaviour.
Chapter 5? presents a first alternative analysis to the kind of 
study reviewed in Chapter i|. It reports on a less orthodox procedure 
for studying the influence of changes in the cost of capital on 
investment. By studying revisions to investment intentions, an 
attempt is made, at industry level to test econometrically the short- 
run sensitivity of investment to changes in the cost of capital and in 
liquidity.
Chapter 6 presents a second alternative approach to testing the 
sensitivity of investment to changes in both liquidity and cost of 
capital. The scrapping behaviour of sets of concentrated and sets of 
unconcentrated industries are examined to see if they (and by impli- 
cation replacement investment, which to a certain extent will mirror 
scrapping) respond to changes either in the cost of Wapital or in 
company liquidity.
Chapter 7 draws some conclusions from the above studies and 
explores their implications for policy making. Thus, each of the 
three elements of macroeconomic theory, outlined earlier, is discussed 
in terms of the evidence for it and the policy prescriptions that it 
warrants.
Finally, a brief Summary and Conclusions is contained in 
Chapter 8.
CHAPTER ONE
MACROECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
1.1 Eichner's Theory ; Review and Extension
This section discusses the basic economic theory of Eichner 
(1976). This is a synthesis of two elements. The first is a 
representation of macroeconomic cycles in regard to the timing of 
which the government has at least some control. The second element 
consists of the three propositions referred to in the introduction, 
viz. (i) the existence of a dual economy; (ii) planned cyclical 
surpluses and deficits; and (iii) the relative insensitivity of 
investment with respect to policy instruments. These three propo- 
sitions will be investigated both theoretically and empirically in 
later chapters; here it is only intended to explain how they 
interact theoretically with the occurrence of cycles in economic 
activity.
(i) The dual economy is characterised by different pricing behaviour
and different investment behaviour in the 'competitive 1 and 'oligopo-
2 listic 1 sectors. In the former sector, prices are determined by
the neoclassical principle of supply and demand, with excess supply 
or demand triggering price variations. In the latter, prices are 
set according to some mark-up over cost, with no role for short-term 
excess demand.
The size of the mark-up is consonant with the provision of 
desired funds for investment. Price is represented as a mark-up over 
cyclically averaged costs including capital costs and therefore the 
profit share tends to be hi^ier in expansionary phases of the cycle,
when costs per unit are lower due to higher capacity utilisation.
- 6 - /Thus .....
Thus, mark-up pricing, when combined with the existence of cyclically 
varying excess capacity, can explain why savings rise disproportionately 
with output in expansions. Furthermore, the existence of spare 
capacity, along with a price level that is fairly unresponsive to 
demand conditions discourages new entry into industries as demand is 
expanded. This helps to explain why oligopolistic investment "behaviour 
is considered to be more stable than that of the competitive sector. 
If this is indeed the case and if savings rise sharply in the expansion, 
a financial surplus will accrue over the upturn in the oligopolistic 
sector.
(ii) The existence of planned cyclical surpluses and deficits in the 
oligopolistic sector is the result of the pricing and investment 
policies described above. As the margin of spare capacity shrinks 
in expansion, unit costs fall and the profits of oligopolistic firms 
rise. Since, by assumption, the investment response to such an
expansion is slow, a cyclical surplus develops. Exactly the opposite
^ i 
mechanism occurs as the margin of spare capacity increases in recession,
forcing firms to run deficits in order to maintain investment. Oligo- 
polistic firms are assumed to match savings and investment over the cycle, 
but they will not expect savings to equal investment at all points of 
the cycle. It is in this sense that we can speak of planned surpluses 
and deficits occurring in expansions and recessions.
(iii) The third proposition simply expresses the view that investment 
behaviour, at least in the oligopolistic sector, cannot easily be 
altered by instruments such as interest rate movements, taxation, or 
investment incentives. This closes certain options for policy makers 
intent on raising the secular growth rate of the economy.
/The ..... 
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The synthesis of these propositions with the theory of 
government regulated cycles is achieved through a further set of 
arguments. These are:
(iv) Growth is not, in general restrained by shortages of capacity, 
however defined. In other words, no barriers exist in terms of 
inputs such as skill, labour, equipment, or natural resources. 
Eichner supports this argument by noting that even at cyclical peaks 
it is common that the labour force is considerably under-utilised and 
that the' oligopolistic sector at least generally continues to main- 
tain a margin of excess capacity. This view is discussed in the 
context of the UK economy in Section 1.2.
(v) Government stimulus will fail to raise the secular growth rate 
of the economy, even in the absence of capacity constraints unless 
the savings or investment behaviour of the oligopolistic sector can
be influenced. If this is not achieved the result will be a mounting
f i 
government deficit. The government will respond to this by deflationary
measures, curbing growth. A wage-price spiral may also be initiated, 
as described in proposition (vi), unless the oligopolistic savings curve 
can be shifted.
Eichner 1 s argument here is that the government can and does 
initiate cyclical movements in the growth rate. The simplest case to 
analyse is where the government increases its expenditure relative to 
its revenue. In Eichner 1 s theory where all variables are expressed 
as growth rates this implies a continually mounting deficit as shown 
graphically below in Figure 1.1. But the reader may, without altering
A
the point in any serious way, substitute the weaker condition that the
deficit will rise to a higher level than before the stimulus was applied.
- 8 - /FIGURE 1.1 .....
FIGURE 1.1
1,5
Government Sector Economy
(o)
Oligopoly Sector
S G2
Source : Eichner (1976)
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In Figure 1.1 above, adapted from Figure 22 of Eicnner (1976) 
It S and G are growth rate of investment and savings and output relative 
to trend growth rates. The shape of the oligopolistic savings and 
investment curves are as theorised earlier. The government sector 
savings curve is assumed to be similar to the oligopolistic case, given 
that tax revenue will tend to be disproportionately increased in an 
expansion. The government investment curve will have a shallow slope, 
given that 'some government outlays will be entirely independent of 
economic considerations 1 Eichner 1976 (P.218).
The economy as a whole is depicted in Figure 1.1 (b) as having 
a somewhat steeper investment curve and a somewhat shallower savings 
curve than the oligopolistic or the government sectors. This reflects 
the influence of the non-oligopolistic industrial sector, considered 
at the end of this section.
From an initial equilibrium, the government sector is assumed 
to raise its growth rate of investment by 'x 1 . This will produce a 
smaller shift f y' in the rate of growth of investment for the economy 
as a whole , given that government sector investment is but a part of 
the total. As may be seen from the diagram, the new growth rate G? 
is not sufficient to finance the government deficit, even though the 
government savings curve is bowed upwards. The oligopolistic sector 
will reflect the government deficit by incurring a surplus at Gp. 
This is shown in frame (c) of the diagram.
Clearly these conclusions implied from the diagram depend on 
the relative magnitudes of 'x f and f y' , themselves reflecting the
/relative .....
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relative weight of the various sectors in the economy. The 
conclusions depend also on the shape of the sectoral savings curves 
being as shown in Figure 1.1 If they were markedly different , 
the deficit might later be cancelled and the government expenditure 
would be self-financing. These formal points are further dealt with 
below.
The algebra that follows formalises a simplified version of 
Eichner's theory represented in Figure 1.1. The simplification 
consists of expressing investment and savings as levels of flow 
variables rather than as growth rates of flow variables relative to trend.
Investment (l) and Savings (s) functions are defined as below 
for three sectors: the non-oligopolistic industrial sector (c); 
the oligopolistic sector (0); and the government sector (G). All 
functions contain constants and linear terms in trend output or 
income (Y"). This trend variable is a function of time, as are the 
savings and investment variables, but a time subscript has been omitted 
for the sake of notational clarity. In addition, the investment 
function of the non-oligopolistic sector and the savings curve of the 
other two sectors contain a term for the first difference of income (A Y), 
reflecting the marked cyclical behaviour in these cases.
The government sector savings curve has the same parameters 
in Y and AY as the oligopolistic sector. This follows the assumption 
made by Eichner in this regard.
The Investment and Savings functions are specified below:-
- 11 -
Yc
sc = e + f Yc
YG
= z
For the economy as a whole (E) we may write:-
JE ' r + S A YE + * Yl 
SE = u f v £YE + y Y^
Given an initial stationary equilibrium for the economy :- 
r + t Y| = u + y Y^ ............ (1 )
Suppose now that the constant term in the government investment 
equation is raised by i. This raises investment in the whole economy 
by the same amount and A Y must be non-zero to equilibriate savings 
and investment.
r + t (Y^ + A Yg ) + i + s A YE = u + y (Y^ + ^Y^) + v A YE ........ (2
TLet A YT-, = od-AY^ . With oC = o, trend income is independent of iii i*j
cyclical variations. For o<ot< ^  > the trend responds partially to 
cyclical variation.
From (1); (2) reduces to:-
i + (* t + s) A YE = (<£ y + v) A YE
"E v-s+oC(y-t) 
Let W 1 Y£ = Yc ; W2 Y£ = YQ ; W Y£ =
where VL + W^ + W^ = 1
Then, A Y_ = W3 i
v - s +oi (y - t)
/Th 
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The deficit in the government sector, I_ - S^ may be examined,(j (j
again assuming an initial stationary equilibrium:-
At the new equilibrium in the economy,
(Y; + A - z - P - q.
(5)
Let
m
Yn =
\J
where d is defined as before.
Prom (U)» reduces to:-
(I - S) = i - (p - g)) (6)
From (3)> (6) may be written as:-
W3 (p + tf
V - S + O
i (q - g))
<. (y - t) J
(7)
For the government deficit in (7) to remain positive requires:-
W3 (p +ciL(cL - g)) < (v - s + ct (y - t)) ..
iff(y
(8)
Now,
and
v = Wp p + W.. p
s =
so, (8) may be written as:-
W1 b< W2 p -fOtf" (y - t) - W3 (q - g) 1
Now,
(9)
t = VL d -f Wp ID + W.. g
and q + W.. qy = . + 
so (y - t) - W (q - g) = W1 (f - d) + (q - m)
The condition for a government sector deficit then becomes: 
W1 (b -ot (f - d)) < W2p +otW2 (q - m) ...............
iff (v - s>n*(y-t)>0
/In a .....
(10)
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In a modern economy, VL is likely to be small. Furthermore, (f-d), 
(q. - m), the long-run difference between propensities to save and to 
invest for each sector, and,indeed o£ can be assumed to be fairly small in 
Eichner 1 s framework. These restrictions indicate that the inequality 
is likely to be satisfied f assuming that b and p are of comparable size.
Thus, even though government savings rises non-linearly with 
income as long as income is changing, nevertheless, an upward shift 
in its investment curve will not normally be self-financing, but will 
produce a higher deficit.
(vi) Consider now the final of the additional arguments that completes 
the basic Eichner theory. Following a government stimulus, a wage-price 
spiral may occur. The reason for this is not capacity shortages. It 
is rather a product of institutional arrangements - price setting 
policies of firms and the negotiating stance of organised labour. 
Trades unions are held to demand wages in line with reported profits. 
But oligopolistic firms resist the erosion of these cyclical profits 
by the shifting forward of wage costs into price increases. Eichner 
argues that new institutional arrangements to plan prices, wages and 
growth could prevent the wage-price spiral. This would involve an 
agreement by firms to reduce mark-ups, thus shifting down the savings
curve of the oligopolistic sector in exchange for agreements on wage
5
control as the economy expanded along a higher secular growth path.
The argument here is that the surplus in the oligopolistic sector 
could be transferred to other sectors and uses e.g. worker consumption, 
if it was not regarded as a hedge against the downturn in demand that 
is expected as the conclusion of cyclical growth. There is a measure 
of self fulfillment in such expectations, but any different expectation
_ __ /could, .....
could, in Eichner's opinion, only arise out of a commitment to 
indicative planning and in particular to planned income growth. 
Otherwise, real wages might rise to the point where they threatened 
liquidity. The normal wage pattern is set by bargaining in the 
light of reported profits. Thus real wages will tend to increase with 
capacity utilisation. If the expansion is regarded as temporary rather 
than implying a change within the secular growth rate, firms will wish 
to raise prices to protect their surplus as a provision for the downturn. 
This tends to lead to a wage-price spiral and government reaction in 
the form of deflationary measures.
The Competitive Sector
The argument so far has concerned the oligopolistic sector. 
Eichner's theory does not emphasise the role of non-oligopolistic 
industries (termed here the competitive sector) because they are seen 
as either small and likely to be absorbed into the oligopolistic sector, 
or old and declining industries. However, it is instructive to note 
that policy co-Delusions relevant to an economy dominated by the oligo- 
polistic sector are virtually the reverse of those that would apply to 
a fully competitive economy. This is important in view of the dominance 
of the competitive model in traditional and orthodox economic theory.
In the competitive sector profits rise with output, not because 
utilisation rises, but because prices vary procyclically in response 
to excess supply and demand. But although savings rise in the expansion, 
the competitive sector does not, in Eichner's view, incur cyclical 
surpluses in the manner of the oligopolistic sector. This is so for 
two reasons. Firstly, investment is also expected to rise sharply 
with output, given the entry of new firms, which, in contrast to the
/oligopolistic .....
oligopolistic sector are unconstrained by entry barriers in the form of 
excess capacity or limit pricing. Secondly, savings may be transferred 
to the household sector for personal consumption of entrepreneurs and 
rentiers. The theory here is advanced for small unincorporated busi- 
nesses, but in so far as dividend behaviour might mirror this pattern, 
Eichner's theory could be extended in this regard to all competitive 
sector firms.
"Were the competitive sector to behave as theorised, it would, 
if it were dominant, rapidly destabilise the economy in the manner of 
the ten year cycle that used to be experienced in the period preceeding 
national banking regulation and government stabilisation policies. 
The main dangers in such a system, a danger identified by Marx in his 
treatment of accumulation is that of competitively induced overinvest- 
ment. In so far as economies are still characterised by a strong com- 
petitive sector, the danger still exists for these industries. How- 
ever, this is lessened by the fact that many of the competitive 
industries are in long-term decline.
Policies to stimulate growth in an economy characterised by strong- 
competitive industries generally aim at reducing the instability inherent 
in the cycles generated by the faster growth of investment relative to 
savings. For instance, in Sweden, the attempt by the trade union 
organisation LO to design policies for stable full employment growth was
based on an imperative to control the instability of the cycle by res-
7 training investment in the upturn.
Clearly this contrasts with Eichner's view that in an economy 
dominated by oligopolistic industries, it is possible to make a transi- 
tion to faster secular growth rate by prolonging the upturn and shifting 
the investment curve upwards.
- 16 - /The .....
The Case of an Open Economy
Introducing the foreign sector into the analysis changes it 
only marginally if the following additional argument can be accepted. 
This is:-
(vii) The "balance of payments deficit does not tend to become 
imacceptably large as the economy is expanded by government stimulus.
Essentially the above argument is the analogue of (iv) for the 
closed economy case i.e. that the economy does not experience capacity 
shortages. Both of these arguments are discussed below, as well as 
arguments (v) and (vi) in the specific context of the UK.
1.2 Eichner's Theory in the Context of the UK
When growth is restrained by physical shortages and/or productivity 
levels, the constraint on savings or profits will be the key feature 
and the only remedies lie in growth financed by inflationary redistri- 
bution to profits or in long run structural reforms. The notion that 
the UK economy can be charact>rised in this way is shared by a wide 
variety of theorists, ranging from free-marketeers (Ball 1973» Bacon 
and Eltis 1976) through NEDO economists (Stout 1979) to marxists (Glyn 
and Harrison 1980).
Clearly, to the extent that the economy were constrained in this 
way, it would face a growth barrier and Eichner's theory would simply 
not be relevant. However, I will argue in what follows that in the 
case of the UK, the limits to growth posed by capacity shortages are 
more apparent than real and that consequently Eichner's theory is 
applicable. The argument hinges on whether capacity constraints (of 
a physical or economic type) arrest cyclical recovery or whether a longer
/upturn ..... 
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upturn would "be feasible if appropriate policies were pursued along the
Q
lines discussed earlier.
Certainly it does not seem that there was an absolute labour 
shortage in Britain in the post-war period. The politically inspired 
economic policies that helped to maintain a low level of unemployment 
until the mid to late sixties did not prevent the minimum cyclical 
unemployment level rising by one hundred thousand between 1955 and the 
peak cyclical years of the early and mid sixties. The question of 
specific skill shortages is perhaps more difficult to answer, but 
Cornwall (1977) has concluded that manufacturing did not suffer from 
labour shortages. He argues that there was a general lack of demand 
for labour in manufacturing throughout the post-war period pointing 
out that while the wages of manual workers in distribution and services 
remained between 75 and 80$) of wages of manual workers in manufacturing, 
many more workers entered these services than left manufacturing. 
Furthermore vacancy and unemployment patterns over the cycle were 
similar between manufacturing and services in the 60s suggesting that 
the former did not suffer any undue labour shortages (p.92).
It may be noted that such shortages as do exist place a limit 
only on the rate at which the secular growth rate can be increased in 
that reallocation of labour, training and acculturation takes time 
(Eichner 1976 p.229). However growth itself leads to a development 
of the skill matrix.
It is also difficult to sustain the view that an absolute barrier 
has existed with regard to resources. This is not to say that specific 
bottlenecks in capacity did not arise in recoveries, but the slow growth
of economy cannot seriously be put down to a shortage of certain inputs
/such ..... 
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such as ferrous castings. The margin of unused capacity in total
engineering was below 2-J% in only 11 quarters for the twenty years 
period 1958-77 (Panic 1978). For building materials it was true 
for only 3 quarters.
For highly concentrated industries, the margin of spare capacity 
at cyclical peaks has been even higher than the cases cited above. 
In the two decades since 1960, the weighted average of capacity utili- 
sation in the highly concentrated industries of Food, Drink and Tobacco; 
Chemicals and Allied; Metal Manufacture; Electrical Engineering; 
and Vehicles has never been higher than 9$% (See the data appendix to 
Chapter 6).
The balance of payments issue poses a more serious challenge to 
the relevance of Eichner's theory. Almost every cyclical upturn in 
the UK has been accompanied by balance of payments difficulties, 
culminating in deflationary action. It is important here to separate 
trend movements in import penetration which are a product of complex 
and long-run causes from cyclical movements which are the only real 
concern here.
Cyclical deficits in the balance of payment can be expected to 
arise from any expansion that is not sychronised with world trade 
growth. However, the tendency to run a trade deficit is not uniform 
across industries. It appears from the UK data that imports as a 
proportion of final demand have increased with the cycle almost ex- 
clusively in the non concentrated sectors of the economy, where the 
upturn is characterised by rapidly rising prices and possible specific 
capacity and labour shortages. Out of twenty-one MLH industries 
identified by Hughes and Thirlwall (1977) as contributing to increased
import penetrations, only 6 were industries where more than 50% of
- 19 - /final .....
final sales was controlled by £ °^ less firms. This compares with
approximately half of the industries comprising total manufacturing. 
The implication here is that advance measures directed at unconceri- 
trated industries to prevent capacity bottlenecks and inflation could 
alleviate the balance of payments problem.
What form might these measures take? The most obvious one con- 
cerns the level of stocks. Panic (19?8), while not denying the role 
of long-term factors which have helped to cause a high propensity to 
import, suggests that the cyclical deterioration in the visible trade 
balance 'gives a rather misleading picture of what might happen to the 
trade balance 1 if manufacturers were allowed to operate at a high pres- 
sure on capacity over a longer period of time. ! The reason for this 
is that UK industry seems to start each upswing with very low stocks of 
both materials and finished goods. Consequently, even the early parts 
of an upswing, when there is still plenty of excess capacity, are 
characterised by extremely fast increases in imports, not only of basic 
materials but also of semi-finished and finished manufactures' 
In view of this, it would seem appropriate to encourage certain sectors 
to carry higher levels of stocks, perhaps by designing financial incen- 
tives to secure this end.
The question at issue here is essentially the same one that arises 
for the case of a closed economy where spare capacity exists in the 
oligopolistic sector but not in the competitive sector at cyclical peaks, 
Advance measures need to be directed at the competitive sector to pre- 
pare it for a sustained upturn. But in any case the benefits obtained 
from stimulating the oligopolistic sectors to fuller utilisation levels 
will probably outweigh any inflationary or balance of payments problem
which expansion of the competitive sector would induce. In the long
/run......
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run, as the above quote from Panic makes clear, the cyclical problems 
could diminish if growth were to be sustained.
It seems therefore that the historical experience with balance 
of payments problems at cyclical peaks does not constitute a refutation 
of the applicability of Eichner's theory to the UK. The relevant con- 
straint is the balance of payments at fuller utilisation levels in the 
oligopolistic sector. This constraint however has never been binding.
Government Control of Cycles in the UK
As mentioned earlier, it is explicity assumed in Eichner's theory 
that government has at least some control over the timing of cycles. 
It initiates the upturn and, as a reaction to unfavourable developments 
such as rising budget deficits, payments deficits and inflation, curbs 
the cycle before the oligopolistic sector at least has reached full 
capacity. (Arguments v and vi).
The above characterisation differs from the traditional text-book 
model of the multiplier-accelerator cycle where private investment - 
because of its variability - is seen as initiating cyclical growth. 
The experience of economic cycles in the UK in the post-war period 
supports Eichner's characterisation over the text-book model.
In Britain, private sector investment other than housing accounts 
for about half of all domestic capital formation. But over the period 
1958-73» this form of investment had a lower proportionate variation 
than housing, public investment, or consumer durable expenditure. Nor 
did it lead the cycle, but lagged behind it by a few quarters (NEDO 1976).
/The ..... 
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The main initiators of cyclical tiirns in the UK have been those 
components of GNP amenable to government stimulus or contraction. 
The general pattern has been for public authorities current expenditure 
(some of which is a form of investment but which is more quickly respon- 
sive than capital expenditure) and consumer durables (influenced by 
Hire Purchase controls) to lead the upturn followed by fixed investment, 
stockbuilding and imports. Consumer durables and stockbuilding lead 
the downturn. (NEDO 19?6).
The proximate initiators of cyclical movement, then, are 
variables which need to be theorised as government reaction functions. 
Endogenous cycles undoubtedly exist, but these are distorted by inter- 
ventionist policies. The interesting problem is to investigate the 
limits of intervention, as presently practised and to test the extent 
to which these limits are absolute. What is the nature of the 
reaction functions that result in premature termination of upswings?
As has been argued earlier, the government may curb growth 'either 
for reasons associated with capacity and balance of payments constraints 
on the one hand or for reasons associated with a wage-price spiral or 
unacceptably high government deficits on the other. The former causes 
it has been suggested do not apply to the oligopolistic sector in the 
UK and for that reason they do not involve genuine constraints or con- 
stitute proper justification for curbing growth. If policies exist 
which can sustain the growth of oligopolistic sectors, then, the result- 
ing increase in capacity utilisation, accompanied by export subsidies 
or import substitution programmes could remove the balance of payments 
constraint. In any case, the capacity constraints in the competitive 
sector and, to a certain extent the rise in import penetration can be
ameliorated by a programme of incentives aimed at increasing stocks or
/capacity .....
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capacity in the competitive sector "before the upswing of the cycle.
The second set of reasons leading to a deflationary stance by 
the government centre around the fear of a developing wage-price spiral 
and unacceptably high "budget deficits. The wage-price spiral develops 
"because of competing views between capital and labour as to the appro- 
priate parameters of the savings function. The key to a solution to 
this problem rests with either voluntary agreements on prices and 
wages, or government control in the form of a facility to shift the 
savings function. The government deficit arises as a counterpart to 
the surplus in the oligopolistic sector. If the government could 
reduce this surplus through an upward shift in the investment curve, 
the government deficit would similarly be reduced. The feasibility 
of these forms of control is the central question at issue in this thesis.
1.3 Conclusions
This chapter has outlined Eichner's case for raising the secular 
growth ratejthrough policies aimed at prolonging and altering the cycle. 
It has been argued that upturns are aborted mainly because of price 
inflation engendered as price leaders in the oligopolistic sector pro- 
tect their rising financial surpluses as a hedge against a downturn 
and that expectations of such a downturn thus become self-fulfilling.
In the course of outlining the above issues, many questions have 
presented themselves for further examination. Three in particular 
remain unanswered satisfactorily in the current literature viz. the 
nature of the investment and savings curves - whether they in fact 
correspond to those theorised in Eichner's work; secondly, the extent 
to which oligopolistic investment is insensitive to policy instruments; 
and thirdly, the extent to which a downwards shift in the oligopolistic
/savings 
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savings curve could lead to faster growth.
The first question is investigated empirically in Chapter 3» 
The following three chapters 1| to 6 are concerned with the second 
question. Finally, the third question is addressed in Chapter 7 in 
the context of a discussion of policy instruments. However, before 
commencing on these policy-oriented chapters, the microeconomic 
foundations for Eichner's case is examined in Chapter 2, where the 
theory is set against existing studies of UK industrial behaviour.
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FOOTNOTES
1. This basic theory is further elaborated and subjected to 
econometric testing in various working papers of the Centre for 
Economic and Anthropogenic Research, Rutgers University, USA.
2. The oligopolistic sector consists of industries where a small 
number of firms control a substantial proportion of the industry's 
output. The remainder of the economy has been termed 'competitive 1 
for convenience. The cases of monopoly or nationalised industries 
are not considered. The firms dominating oligopolistic industries 
are termed 'megacorps' by Eichner. They are characterised by separa- 
tion of ownership and control; and by multi-plant operation implying 
constant or discretely changing marginal cost at the under full 
capacity output levels that typically apply. The small number of im- 
portant firms facilitates pricing interdependence. Firms in the 
competitive sector may either be monopolistically competitive, or 
price takers, but no price interdependence exists for these firms and 
thus long-run profits cannot be planned to equal investment. Marginal 
cost rises with output and price will equal the marginal cost of the 
least efficient producer. Ease of new entry eliminates inefficient 
firms and forces price down, eliminating excess profit.
3. Neither may there be a role for changes in costs unless these 
are thought to be permanent. See the discussion on mark-up pricing 
in Chapter 2. Note that dual pricing behaviour has also been 
theorised by Hicks (197^)« f There are markets where prices are 
set by producers; and for those markets, which include a large part 
of the markets for industrial products, the fixprice assumption makes 
good sense. But there are other markets, 'flexprice 1 or speculative 
markets, in which prices are still determined by supply and demand... 
What we need is a theory which will take account of both sorts of 
markets ...' (pp.23, 21;)  A similar duality appears in the pricing 
models of Kalecki (1939)> where raw materials are assumed to be 
traded in 'flexprice 1 markets. Neither of the above authors, however 
view oligopolistic pricing and investment behaviour as linked and it 
is the key feature that distinguishes Eichner's approach, as discussed 
in Chapter 2.
k» It will also be perceived by economic agents to have risen in 
relation to the secular trend in GDP, unless the latter has been 
perceived to have shifted upwards.
5. There is thus a measure of arbitrariness in the growth path that 
actually develops, though it is Eichner's view that the sluggish 
investment behaviour of the oligopolistic sector and its long-term 
matching of sources and uses of funds contributes to stability. In 
this respect, Eichner is not to be found among those who argue an 
underconsumptionist or long-term stagnationist view where the long-- 
run savings rate is too high relative to investment. The possibility 
of this is neatly illustrated in Harris (1975)> and the mechanisms 
leading to it are discussed theoretically in Steindl (1979) and 
Rowthorn (1981) and in the UK context in Cowling (1982). Eichner 1 s 
concern is the short term cyclical appearance of surpluses in the 
oligopolistic sector which emerge as capacity utilisation increases 
and investment rises along a stable, perhaps linear path.
6. See, however the empirical results on this point in Chapter 3»
/7. An ..... 
- 25--
?  An analysis of how the system worked in Sweden from 1956-72 may 
be found in Taylor (1982). He concludes that investment fluctuations 
were considerably reduced by a policy rule, compelling firms to lodge 
an interest-free but also tax-free portion of earnings with the Central 
Bank, these funds being released at times of GDP downturns. See also 
Apple (1980) for a study of the early history of the system and the 
implication it contained for wage bargaining. 33y absorbing cyclical 
profits, the policy rule contained wage drift in profitable industries 
and made wage increases more uniform. The LO saw this as a 'solidarity 1 
wage policy; it inevitably entailed shrinking the low wage sector in 
that firms had less incentive to avoid moving to new vintages of 
equipment if wages rose evenly throughout the economy. Of course, 
this policy was only acceptable in a climate of commitment to full 
employment on behalf of the authorities and to labour mobility on behalf 
of the unions, and to productivity increases on behalf of all partici- 
pants.
8. The question of growth barriers caused by long-run productivity 
decline is not addressed here since it is obviously part of a complex 
causal structure. It is not correct to see long-run decline as the 
arbiter of possible reforms; rather the failure to implement imagi- 
native reforms may be part of the long-term problem. The reader 
interested in these questions should refer to Blackaby (1979) or 
Beckerman (1979).
9. See Panic (1978 p.$0) for evidence of cyclical shortages of 
capacity.
10. The six industries were MLH 271, 312, 36^, 369, 38U, 351-t
11. It is suggested in NEDO (1976) that stockbuilding'usually peaks 
before GDP 1 (p.16), i.e. that it leads the cycle. The Central 
Statistics Office, however, treat 'stocks and work in progress' as 
a lagging indicator of the cycle (Treasury 1982). The confusion 
probr/bly arises due to the different behaviour of stockbuilding on 
the upswing and on the downswing, the latter being erratic. The 
discrepancy may also be due to different methods of valuing stocks.
12. The Sector Working Party System, set up under the auspices of 
NEDO seems particularly well suited to implementing such a programme 
(see Driver, 1983)-
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CHAPTER 2
MICROECONQMIC CONSIDERATIONS
2.1 Introduction
This Chapter is concerned with discussing and defending the three 
micro-level propositions outlined in the introduction to Chapter 1. 
These propositions provide the microeconomic basis for the macroeconomic 
synthesis explained in that chapter. To recapitulate, these proposi- 
tions concern (i) the existence of a dual economy in terms of pricing 
and investment; (ii) the planned equality of savings and investment 
on average over the cycle, necessitating cyclical surpluses and de- 
ficits; and (iii) the relative insensitivity of investment with 
respect to policy instruments.
Section 2.2 of this chapter addresses the question of a dual 
economy in respect of pricing behaviour. Duality in respect of 
investment behaviour is examined later, in Chapter 3»
Section 2.3 looks at the model of the firm and growth maximisation 
which underlies the argument that savings and investment are planned 
so as to match over a given planning period.
Finally, some rationale is advanced in Section 2.U of this chapter 
for why investment behaviour, at least in the oligopolistic sector, may 
be insensitive with respect to policy variables. The treatment here 
is brief in view of the more extensive discussion and empirical inves- 
tigations in Chapters ki 5 and 6.
2.2 Dual Pricing Behaviour
In view of the argument in Chapter 1, the cycle will be theorised
/as .     . 
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as entering a downswing as the authorities respond to rising price 
inflation. This underscores the importance of understanding the 
process of price formation over the cycle. However, the process 
must be viewed differently for sectors with different degrees of market 
power. Following Averitt (1968), Eichner (1973) and Panic (1978), we 
hypothesise the existence of a dual economy, characterised by a com- 
petitive sector and an oligopolistic sector. In the former, prices 
are determined by supply and demand. Inflationary tendencies in this 
sector given a certain output growth, can only be avoided by greater 
planning and coordination, to the extent that it is possible, at a 
micro level. For the oligopolistic sector, however, where there is 
a permanent margin of spare capacity, price is determined by a mark-up 
on costs. The theory and evidence of mark-up pricing is discussed 
below and, in the course of the discussion, some indication will be 
given as to which sectors of the UK economy fall into one or other 
category of price formation.
Mark-up Pricing
The concept of mark-up pricing is generally associated with 
Kalecki (1939) and Means (1935), though its lineage extends to at
least some members of the classical school (Lexis 1885, quoted in
 i 
Marx 1972, p.8). Theories of the mark-up reveal considerable
diversity and the empirical evidence is frequently inconclusive. 
The following remarks aim at a classification, rather than a defence 
of any particular view.
Mark-up pricing means pricing according to cost plus a fixed 
percentage, though there is some ambiguity about what costs are to be 
included here. When the theory is confined to variable costs, it
/provides ..... 
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provides a simple contrast with the neoclassical model where demand 
pressure is thought to influence price. These two theories are not 
necessarily inconsistent in that mark-up pricing could be viewed as a 
limiting case of the supply-demand model where adjustment costs are 
such that profit maximisation no longer dictates instantaneous adjust- 
ment to demand. But if adjustment costs (or other factors) are such 
that short term demand changes are not at all reflected in price 
changes, the neoclassical theory must fall. This is the conclusion 
of Domberger (1980) in a study which attempted to estimate the partial
adjustment coefficient of prices to cost and demand changes. No role
2 
could be found for the demand variable.
Domberger's result gives some support to the findings of Coutts, 
Godley, and Nordhaus (1978) where a whole set of demand variables was 
found to have little explanatory power when added to a predicted price 
variable based on 'normal 1 unit variable costs. The conclusion that 
short-run demand fluctuations play little role in price formation is 
the initial point of agreement of all meO-lc-up theories. It finds 
empirical support in a large body of studies, collated in several 
reviews of industrial price formation, e.g. Hay and Morris (1979)> 
Scherer (1980), Semmler (1981).
For several authors, price does not merely fail to respond to 
demand fluctuations, but is similarly invariant with respect to short- 
run changes in variable cost (Nordhaus and Godley 1972). Coutts et 
al (1978) construct their 'normal 1 unit costs by 'purging' the relevant 
series of reversible cyclical components. These 'normal' unit costs 
are then capable of explaining a substantial amount of each industry's 
variation in the price, with no improvement obtained with the addition
of cyclical or demand variables. 3 /Nordhaus .....
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Nordhaus and Godley (1972) state that they have 'reservations 
about the omission of capital costs' but that this should not intro- 
duce a f bogus cyclical element'. In fact, if firms engaged in cover- 
ing their immediate fixed costs, then, since these vary contra- 
cyclically, so too should prices. We will discuss this possibility 
below, but it may be noted here that a theory which predicts no response 
to short run changes in demand or variable cost is unlikely to coexist 
comfortably with one of cyclical adjustment to unit fixed costs. We 
may conclude that the implicit treatment of fixed costs in Nordhaus and 
Godley (1972) is that price is related to unit fixed costs at some stand- 
ard or norm of capacity utilisation. This interpretation is rein- 
forced by the authors' observation that 'there are clearly offsetting 
forces at work, since in expansions unit costs are falling, yet it is 
probably relatively easy to raise prices without losing sales. The 
presence of these offsetting forces ..... may be one of the reasons 
why normal pricing is followed1 (Godley and Nordhaus, 1972, pp. 63-U). 
We may note in passing that this does not necessarily contradict a 
growth maximisation strategy since raising prices in expansion may be 
an element in strategic growth planning.
A similar approach to fixed costs is explicitly adopted by some 
of those who favour a long-run 'target rate of return' thesis, whatever 
differences may exist over the determinants of the target rate. Eichner 
(1973> 1976) has suggested a formulation for price, p, whereby
  + CL P = VC +
where SOU, VC, FC, CL are standard capacity utilisation, per unit 
variable cost, fixed cost and gross profits (corporate levy). In 
Eichner, as in Wood (1975>)» "kne target rate is related to growth
/objectives ..... 
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objectives. The target rate is a long run average and firms are 
assumed to tolerate cyclical fluctuations about it. Firms are con- 
sidered as growth maximisers or long-run profit maxiroisers. The notion 
of short-run profit maximisation is either discounted or its meaning 
is queried (Shapiro, 1981). In these theories price is constrained 
only by potential loss of sales, new entry or government regulation.
There would seem no inconsistency between the mark-up theories 
of Coutts et al and Eichner, though the latter is explicitly set in a 
growth maximisation framework, and does not preclude the possibility 
of response to short-run variable cost changes.
However, these theories are not universally accepted, even among 
those who accept the notion of mark-up pricing. Domberger's results, 
mentioned earlier, suggest that there is significant adjustment to unit 
labour costs in 1£ of the 21 industries studied and significant adjust- 
ment to unit material costs in all cases. Furthermore, the partial 
adjustment coefficient is significant a^d positively related to con- 
centration, implying that concentrated industries respond more rapidly 
to changes in unit variable costs than less concentrated ones.
This demonstration of adjustment to variable costs does not 
necessarily represent a critique of the Coutts et al (1978) position 
in that the latter would accept that prices would rise in response to 
a rise in variable cost that was thought to be permanent. It fits 
comfortably with Eichner 1 s position in that it could reflect inflexible 
financing requirements of firms due to long-term capital commitments.
A critique of Eichner*s position has recently been voiced by
Cowling (1982), who opposes the inclusion of capacity costs in the
/pricing ..... 
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pricing decision. This alternative theory derives a profit maximising 
mark-up as a function of the Herfindahl concentration measure, the 
industry price elasticity and an index of expectations concerning 
retaliation by rivals. (Cowling and Waterson, 1976). This is a 
new departure in mark-up theory in that it does not rely on the notion 
of 'limit pricing1 i.e. pricing to avoid new entry as do the theories 
of Bain (1956), Sylos-Labini (1962) and Eichner (1973). Furthermore, 
by rejecting the inclusion of capital costs, the notion of exit barriers, 
such as described in Lamfalussy (1961) is discounted. This theory then 
is very much in the tradition of Kalecki, but this is not the variant of 
the mark-up implicit in Coutts et al, or Eichner. However, as 
Rowthorn (19$1) has noted, since the mark-up is theorised in terms of 
marginal cost, and marginal cost is taken as approximately constant, 
the result is that the price of output is largely unaffected by shifts 
in demand and capacity utilisation.
A final variant of the mark-up may be provided by considering 
once again the question of fixed costs. Eichner 1 s theory suggests 
that price formation is such as to cover these at a standard rate of 
capacity utilisation. But it seems possible that price can vary 
contra-cyclically to cover the unit fixed costs which fall in expansion 
and rise in recession. Posed less sharply, price rises may be more 
restrained in periods of expansion for industries pricing in this 
manner. Scherer (1980) gives support to this view: 'when demand is 
declining, concentrated industries prices tend to fall less, or rise 
more than those of more atomistically structured industries. In 
business upswings on the other hand, concentrated industries rise less 
rapidly' (p. 356). There seems a good deal of evidence to support 
this proposition, though it remains unclear whether the practice is a
/feature .....
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feature of concentrated industries, or capital intensive ones, these 
being correlated to some extent. In cross section studies of price 
changes in recession and expansion, the concentration ratio is not 
always significant, (Weston et al 1971+; Lustgarten 1975). On the 
other hand, Blair (197U)» using a product-based analysis has confirmed 
the thesis noted above by Scherer. Evidence that the mark-up on 
variable costs (as distinct from prices) moves contra-cyclically for 
concentrated industries is provided by Wachtel and Adelsheimer, (1977)«
Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1981)> using UK cross sectional data 
tested the proposition that price changes and concentration were nega- 
tively related during a boom and positively related during a recession. 
This was found to be the case for two out of five periods studied, pro- 
viding some limited evidence for Scherer's position.
Similar results have been observed by Panic (1978) using UK time 
series data for a number of manufacturing sectors. He notes that for 
most firms and industries it may take c?ome time to move into the peak 
range of capacity utilisation. Vhen this happens, both costs and 
prices will rise - depending on the extent to which increases in cost 
threaten to reduce firms short-run target rates of return on capital ... 
In recession, these industries are also likely to come under considerable 
pressure to increase prices in order to achieve, or even maintain a cer- 
tain desired level of profits. 1 (p.6l) Panic's results for six 
sectors of manufacturing suggest that Textiles and Metal Goods behave 
rather like the competitive model. Price increases move pro-cyclically 
with adjustment lags. Chemicals and Paper, Printing and Publishing 
with a medium level of concentration behave similarly, but price increases 
in recessions are more rapid. In the highly concentrated Vehicles and 
Electrical Engineering Industries price increases accelerate when demand,
_   /output .....
output and capacity utilisation fall and slow down as capacity utili- 
sation increases. These findings support the mark-up model of short- 
run target rate of return pricing, at least for the most concentrated 
industries. Panic supported this evidence with regression equations 
which showed significantly negative coefficients for change in capacity 
utilisation for four out of six sectors studied, the exceptions again 
being Textiles and Metal Goods n.e.s.
The evidence of these studies is difficult to ignore yet it does 
not quite fit with the theories we have outlined above for Coutts et al 
and Eichner and these may need to be modified. Eichner's position for 
instance assumes that firms know what their standard capacity utilisa- 
tion is and implicitly equates this with the cyclical average capacity 
utilisation. But even if firms do attempt to plan pricing in this 
way, the unpredictability and irregularity of the cycle may explain 
contra-cyclical pricing (in the weak sense advanced by Scherer). 
Cowling's theory too is capable of adaptation to the evidence cited above, 
Indeed ITB himself remarks that "the degree of collusion among capital- 
ists may be increased under adverse circumstances such as recession or 
slump". (p.25) In this he is following Kalecki (see Sawyer, 1982, 
p.9U), but conflicting with the view of Coutts et al (19?8) quoted 
earlier.
From Panic's investigation it is clear that dual pricing behaviour 
exists in British industry. Competitive pricing is evident only in 
textiles and metal goods, though it presumably also exists in uncon- 
centrated industries that were not tested - parts of building material 
industry and other manufacturing; and clothing, footwear and leather 
goods. The mark-up pricing behaviour established for concentrated 
industries includes provision for fixed costs. This is consistent
with the view that firms in these industries are engaged in long-term
- /planning .....
planning to match savings and investment for the planning period.
In the following section, attention will be given to the theory
7 
of the oligopolistic representative firm - the megacorp - in so far
as it engages in planning of the mark-up and of investment, decisions 
that will be shown to be interdependent.
2.3 The Interdependence of Pricing and Investment in the Oligopolistic
Sector
This section seeks to establish that pricing and investment are 
joint decisions for oligopolistic firms. In order to establish this, 
it is necessary to criticise the model of short-run profit maximisation. 
The following two points are sufficient to refute the traditional 
theory in this regard.
Point 1 There is a trade-off between current profits and the 
growth rate of output at the level of the firm.
Point 2 Firms 1 policies, including pricing are orientated to 
the long-term, as distinct from the current period 
only.
It might be argued that to cite both points is to engage in 
 overkill 1 , since point 2 taken on its own nullifies current profit 
maximisation. However, it is also important to establish that current 
profits maximisation is not identical with the long-term goal of growth 
maximisation and this is ruled out by point 1.
If in addition to the above, a third point is argued, viz: 
Point 3 Profitability depends positively on market share.
- 35 - /it .....
It may be deduced that there is no conflict between long-run growth 
maximisation and long-run profitability, since maximising growth will 
maximise market share and thus imply maximum long-run profitability.
These three points may be established theoretically or empirically, 
In the following section point 1 will be supported by a priori, reasoning 
while the burden of establishing points 2 and 3 will fall on empirical 
observation.
Point 1 ; Current Profits versus Growth Rate
Williamson (1966) attempted to demonstrate the equivalence of 
sales growth maximisation and current profits maximisation in a critique 
of Baumol (1962). This critique relied on the argument that price cuts, 
implying a reduction in current profits do not produce a sustained rise 
in growth in sales but rather a once-only effect, after which the growth 
rate of sales, starting from a higher base would be lower than if the 
low-price strategy had been avoided.
Williamson 1 s conclusions may be criticised, as Marris (196U) 
done, on two grounds, one involving pricing policy, the other cost 
considerations.
The first reason for a growth-current profits trad'e-off involves 
a critique of the standard demand curve where dynamic considerations 
are absent. Marris argues that if product sales can be characterised 
by logistic curves, (as they are often), a process of imitation and 
information diffusion must be at work with more customers being found, 
the more existing customers there are, until market saturation sets 
in. Thus it is quite possible that price cuts or a low price strategy
for new products will have the effect not merely of a once only increase
/in .....
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in sales, but of an increase in the growth rate. Similarly a high- 
profile marketing strategy which will reduce current profitability 
will increase the future growth rate of new products. Williamson's 
model fails to consider this dynamic process and his critique of 
Baumol, resting as it does on a standard static demand curve cannot be 
taken seriously.
The second reason for rejecting Williamson's conclusions rests 
on the argument that excessive growth lowers efficiency. Marris, 
following Penrose (1959) assumes that growth will come about partly 
by diversification into new products and that such diversification, 
if pushed far enough will lead to reduced profitability, mainly caused 
by limits to managerial capacity. Thus, while diversification may 
succeed in raising growth, it will reduce the efficiency of existing 
operations resulting in decreased profitability.
Point 2 ; The Firm's Time Horizon
The principle theoretical reason for why firms pay attention 
to the long run is that they intend to stay in business. Without 
the necessity of continuity and without exit or entry barriers, short- 
term profitability might well define firms behaviour, but most firms 
do not operate in such a frictionless ether. Indeed, the only argu- 
ment that can seriously be put forward for short-term profitability is 
one based on imperfect information as it concerns the capital market. 
Firms' current profitability may affect their capacity to raise finance, 
especially through new issues. Clearly the question of which in- 
fluence rules is one that is best settled empirically and fortunately 
an unambiguous answer is available on the basis of a questionnaire 
study of over seven hundred British manufacturing firms (Shipley 1981)-
/TABLE 2.1 
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TABLE 2.1
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PROFIT IN ALTERNATIVE TIME HORIZONS
a
Principal 
  pricing
objective
Profit or
return on
capital
employed
'Alternatives
All
principal
objectives
No. 
of
firms
U86
1 278
76U
%
20.6
59.7
19.8
12.2
61.2
26.6
17.5
60.2
22.3
Profit 
priority
given to
Short term
Long term
No priority
Short term
Long term
No priority
Short term
Long term
No priority
Groupings by number 
of employees (%}
E1i
18.14
U8. 0
33.7
8.1
50.0
U1.9
13.6
148.9
37.5
E2
18.6
60.7
20.7
9.2
65.1
25.7
114.7
62.5
22.8
E3
21.3
65.213.14
11;. 1
71.9
11;. 1
19.3
67.1
13.6
E,k
23-U
70.2
6.1;
kk.k
kk.h
11.1
26.8
66.1
7.1
-LJi  '5
29.6
1*1*. U
25-9
ko.o
60.0
0
32.1;
1*8.6
18.9
P C 1
23.5
U7.1
29.U
22.2
kk»k
33.3
23.1
U6.2
30.8
Groupings by number 
of competitors (%)
P C2
16.9
65.0
18.0
11.7
62.1
26.2
15.0
6U.O
21.0
p C3
22.1
5U.3
23.6
12.2
56.1
3L7
18.5
55.0
26.6
C,
a
22.0
59-3
18.7
23.1
59.0
17.9
22.3
59.2
18.5
^
K.I
60.0
114.5
1
i
2.7
73.3
2h.h
15.0
66. C !
19.0 i
There is some distortion in the figures since 3U firms set more than one principal objective. Also, there may be some small
numbers bias in especially groups E, , E-, C^ and
GROUPINGS OF FIRMS IN THE SAMPLE
Designation
Class
Frequency
Groupings by number 
of employees
E TTi T71 IT "I? a 1 0 "3 ) -CJ^cl
< 51 51-200 201-10001001-3000 >3ooo
178 2kh 217 55 3h
C 1
0
26
Groupings by number 
of competitors
C 2 C 3 CU
1-U 5-9 10-25
271 205 129
C5
>25
97
lTwenty-five of these firms employ more than 5000 workers.
Explanatory Note to the above Table:- 'Alternatives' include 'target 
market share of sales 1 ; 'stable prices'; 'stable volume of sales'; 
'price similarity with competitors'; 'prices fair to firm and 
customers ' .
(Source : Tables 1 and U of Shipley (1981))
It is clear, from the above figures that firms in all categories
are much more likely to give priority to long-term profit in deciding
9 on pricing. Of the total principal objectives, representing over
seven hundred firms, more than three fifths are associated with long- 
term profit preferences.
Point 3 Market Share and Profitability
High growth, while involving strategies that reduce current 
profitability lead eventually to a higher market share than low 
growth. If high market shares result in the firm being able to 
utilise market power to raise long-term profitability, there would 
be no conflict between growth maximisation and (long-run profit maximi- 
sation. The thesis that high market share leads to higher profit- 
ability is confirmed by several writers e.g. Gale (1972), Shepherd 
studies reported in Scherer (1980).
There is some dispute in the literature as to whether a market 
share variable or a concentration variable, or some interaction between 
them (increased market share being important only when concentration 
is already high) , best explains variation in profitability. - Scherer 
(1980) reports a study based on a cross section analysis of product 
lines produced by over a thousand US firms over a four year period in 
the 1970's. This analysis, carried out on the Harvard-based PIMS data
/bank ..... 
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"bank suggested that 'market shares exhibited a considerably more 
powerful and consistent influence' on profitability than concentra- 
tion. The reason for this influence of market share was partly 
attributed to cost advantages both in terms of purchased and produced 
inputs and to advantages due to superior ability to differentiate 
products and thus resist downward pressure on price. The PIMS study 
reinforces the result of Shepherd (1975) who, whdle using an unorthodox 
concentration measure, identified market share as an important deter- 
minant of profitability in a study of firms drawn from the Fortune 500,
11 
over the period 1961-69. It may be concluded therefore that
market share and profitability are positively related, suggesting that 
there is no conflict between long-term growth maximisation and long- 
run profit maximisation.
The Joint Nature of the Pricing-Investment Decision
Given that firms are pursuing long-term goals, it is not appa- 
rent what rule they should follow in terms of pricing. Certainly the 
theojy applicable to static short term profit maximisation can be ruled 
out in the light of the forgoing discussion.
In order to set the context for an alternative theory of pric- 
ing behaviour, it will be helpful to recall the negative relationship 
between growth and profitability involved in proposition 1. Shepherd 
(1975)» following Marris (196U) has reinterpreted this relationship 
as a negative relationship between change in market share (A M) and 
the rate of profit. He argues that the firm can add to market share 
by strategies that sacrifice profits. Such strategies include 'invest- 
ment' in price cuts, advertising campaigns, process innovations etc. 
Alternatively the firm can liquidate part of its market share by
/taking .....
taking high temporary profits and tolerating the erosion of market
share. 12 The above argument has been expressed diagrainatically by
Shepherd as follows, where p and M represent profit rate and market 
share respectively, and A M denotes change in market share.
FIGURE 2.1
T
B
B,
B
M,
Source : Shepherd (19?6)
The upward sloping curve M 1 represents the long term positive 
relationship between profitability and market share. The BB 1 curves 
represent the short-run changes in profitability, consequent on a 
change in market share from a given point CL . Thus, by liquidating
/market .....
market share along Bp Bp 1 , the company would receive a higher transi- 
tory profit rate, but the longer term profit rate at the lower market 
share would be less than the initial value. Thus the firm's short- 
term curve Bp B ' shifts down to B,, B ' on account of having liquidated 
market share for a temporary increase in profitability. Of course, 
to the extent that the firm uses the temporary flow of funds to in- 
crease market share in other areas, it will simultaneously experience 
an upward movement along the AA 1 curve of a different industry or 
product, assuming that a positive long-run relationship between market 
share and profitability exists for that industry or product.
Ignoring problems of empirical validation , the point is clear. 
There is a strategic decision which the firm must take, involving both 
pricing and investment policy, where 'investment' is taken to mean 
marketing, R & D, modernisation etc. The firm can set prices very 
low to increase market share, hoping that high market share will in- 
crease (long-run) profitability. Or it can sacrifice market share 
by f raising prices and using the resultant (temporary) profits to 
engage in modernisation, marketing or perhaps in diversification. 
The decision is complex and the decision process necessarily iterative 
but it is clear that the relationship hypothesised on the diagram above 
call for interlinked pricing and investment decision taking.
The Eichner - Wood Model
Detailed theories of the linked price-investment decision have 
been independently developed by Eichner (1973, 1976) and Wood (1975). 
Both may be traced back to the earlier theory of Marris (19610 and 
Appendix 1 attempts to locate the two theories in this way. The 
individual models are first described after which they are compared 
and contrasted. The term Eichner - Wood Model is taken to mean a
_ i p _ /model .....
model of joint pricing and investment planning.
Wood's Theory of the Firm
In this theory, the focus is on the corporate non-financial 
sector's long-term, (3-5 years) behaviour. Firms are said to maxi- 
mise this long-run rate of growth of sales, the argument being that 
managers are more interested in power than money.
Firms choose a mark-up to finance investment in an iterative 
way as described below. Pricing is with a view to the long-run - 
a mark-up on unit costs calculated at full or normal capacity.
Certain simplifications are introduced with respect to the 
flow of sources and uses of corporate funds. Dividends, for firms 
making profits, are assumed to be a constant proportion of retained 
earnings (most shareholders it is argued are long-term holders, due 
to uncertainty and transaction costs; fluctuating payment ratios 
adversely affect the valuation ratio). Depreciation is assumed to 
be given by the past structure of investment and more or less fixed 
decision rules. Financial acquisitions are theorised as a constant 
ratio f of gross investment, a flow relationship approximating a 
constant stock of financial to physical assets, given that the former 
are seen as maintaining a buffer stock of liquidity for the firm. 
Caution on the part of the firm results in a stable gearing ratio 
(debt as a ratio of total assets) resulting in a fixed (approximate) 
ratio x between the flow of external finance and gross investment. 
New issues are, according to the model, not a normal or preferred 
mode of finance. For firms making profits, taxation is assumed to 
be a constant proportion of taxable profits. The implication of the
/above ..... 
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above assumptions is that the ratio of internal finance (profits net 
of tax, interest, depreciation and dividends; gross of non-trading 
income) to the level of gross profits is a constant ratio, r.
Gross profits realised depend on both pricing policy and selling 
cost e.g. advertising, chosen by the firm. These are chosen to maxi- 
mise growth. The profit margin on sales, 7T is negatively related 
to growth g, by the function R» , where the function is parameterised 
by k, the incremental capital output ratio. Rises in k produce a 
higher profit margin. Thus, TC = M~ (g, k)     (1 ) 
This is called the 'opportunity function 1 relating the profit margin 
(itself a function of the mark-up) to g and k.
Another functional relationship termed the 'finance constraint 1 
gives the required level of gross profits P which must be generated 
for each level of gross investment I. This is given by
p ~ 0 + f - x) I or P = hi    (2)
r
where f , x and r are fixed ratios as described above. Dividing through 
by the level of sales or output, the function may be written as 7C =
h. g. k, a function relating 7Q to g, paramertised by k, where
&Ttis now positive and >^]fi also positive. It is implicitly assumed 
that the system is in steady state, since g represents both the growth 
of sales and of the capital stock.
Relationship (1) and (2) are constraints under which growth is 
maximised, yielding a determinant solution for profit share and growth, 
as in Figure 2.2, where the dashed line shows the locus of feasible 
solutions. Point A on the feasible locus maximises growth. This 
solution also determines the firm's incremental capital-output ratio k.
/FIGURE 2.2 ..... 
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FIGURE 2.2
\
opportunity frontier
finance frontier
Source : Wood (1975)
Eichner ! s Theory of the Firm
Wood's opportunity function has a negative slope due both to 
selling expenses and a nonrzero price elasticity of demand. Since 
Eichner defines profits (more accurately the corporate levy) as gross 
of selling expenses, the negative slope of the opportunity curve must 
"be due to price elasticity. Eichner argues that demand is inelastic 
in the short-run in the vicinity of the prevailing price. (This is 
a further reason for why the theory of short-run profit maximisation 
is inoperative). However, in the long-run price cannot be raised at 
will without incurring a loss of sales. Price rises are limited by:
* a substitution effect giving rise to a sales loss which
is a function of time and the magnitude of the price rise
* the threat of new entry
the possibility of government intervention
/Whereas .....
Whereas Shepherd (1975) theorised a rise in profits arising from 
a voluntarily ceded market share, Eichner theorises the process as a 
release of new funds which will, however, ultimately be outweighed by 
a loss of revenue. The important word here is 'ultimately 1 , for in 
the meantime the funds released can be used to improve prospects in 
either the same or in a different product line.
If the net effect of the price increase is positive for the 
first t periods, and negative thereafter, the total funds 'borrowed 1 
in this way ( A F) is the discounted sum of the net positive flows up
to the t u" period. The net negative flows after the t period, 
discounted to the starting point and averaged over the number of periods 
in the entire planning cycle represents payments on the 'loan'. Eichner 
suggests that an 'implicit interest rate 1 , R, may be calculated by 
expressing the negative flows, divided by the number of periods in- 
volved as a ratio of /\ F.
By means of the above theory, it is possible to build up a 
supply curve of investment as a function of the implicit interest rate. 
This is shown in Figure 2.3.
FIGURE 2.3
Demand curve for new investment
External Borrowing Rate
Supply curve of internal funds
F 
Source : Eichner (1976) /Above 
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Above a certain level of R equal to the external borrowing rate, 
the supply curve becomes a horizontal line.
The theory is completed by invoking a demand curve for addi- 
tional investment finance. Some investment will be insensitive to 
the interest rate, but by aggregating all marginal efficiency of in- 
vestment curves, a downward sloping curve will be obtained, as shown 
above. Depending on opportunities, technology etc., this curve 
may shift so as to intersect the supply curve in the upward sloping 
or the horizontal portion. In the former case, no recourse to extra 
external borrowing will be considered, whereas in the latter case 
borrowing will be relied on after the internal sources have been 
exhausted in the sense of pushing up the implicit interest rate to 
the external rate. The intersection of the demand and supply curves
gives a determinate solution for price rises and extra investment 
finance, given any initial operating point.
Similarities and Differences in the Models of Eichner and' Wood
The basic similarity between the Eichner and the Wood models 
lies in their common acceptance of linked pricing and investment be- 
haviour. The lineage of both these models may also be traced to the 
work of Marris (1961|), as argued in Appendix 1 to this Chapter.
Clearly, however, there are some differences between the 
Eichner and Wood theories of the firm. Firstly, Eichner ! s model is 
one where growth in long-run profits, or more correctly, the corporate 
levy (corporate discretionary income) is maximised, rather than the 
growth rate of sales or assets. However, he argues that maximising 
the 'rate of growth of the corporate levy 1 ... , assuming an optimal
investment programme, will lead to the highest rate of growth for the
 7 /mega corp .....
mega corp over time. 'As long as the concern is with the growth of 
some target variable over time, the capital stock can no longer be 
assumed to remain unchanged, and the pricing and investment decisions 
must be viewed as being inextricably linked. 1 (Eichner 1976, pp 5>2 -
5U).
Secondly, Wood's model is devised in terms of firms rather than 
industries. This seems of little consequence, except that it avoids 
on this account any reference to industry price behaviour and its de- 
terminants   limit price, entry barriers, price leadership - and focuses
mainly on the substitution effect to explain the downward slope of the
17 
opportunity frontier.
Thirdly, Wood's model is more restrictive than Eichner's in 
terms of the assumptions it makes, e.g. constant retention rate, 
fixed rates for external finance and levels of liquid assets etc. 
These restrictions may, however be thought acceptable in the context 
of Wood's theory, given that he is attempting to abstract from short- 
term fluctuations. Both models have been subjected to interesting 
criticisms and these are reviewed in Appendix 2 to this Chapter.
Evidence for Linked Pricing and Investment Policies
Once short-run profits maximisation is disregarded, it seems 
an inescapable conclusion that pricing and investment behaviour is 
linked. How does this work itself out at the level of the individual 
firms?
There seem two possible avenues of exploration in this regard, 
The first, adopted by Wood, (1975) involves a suggestion that the
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decision making implicit in his model of the firm, may be perceived 
by managers as pricing according to a target rate of return. The 
second approach is to seek evidence that the linked nature of the 
pricing and investment is a product of conscious managerial decision. 
Both of these lines of argument are pursued below.
(i) Target Rate of Return
Wood rewrites the finance constraint, defined earlier in terms
r
of the profit rate £ on the current value of physical assets. Writing O 
for the physical depreciation rate, and g-k for the rate of growth of 
capital stock, equation (2) above may be divided through by the capital
stock to give:- u = h (g -f o ) 
fc
The right-hand term represents a minimum (target) profit rate
that the firm must earn which will vary directly with the firm's growth
1R 
rate of capital stock. Wood remarks that such a decision-making
procedure 'non-rigorous as it may appear, resembles quite closely the 
ways in which firms actually use yield calculations' (p.99)» Evidence 
that this is indeed the case may be found in Shipley (1981).
(ii) Conscious JXlanagerial Calculation
There are again two issues to be examined here. Firstly, do 
firms have institutional arrangements which would facilitate decision 
behaviour, as in the Eichner - Wood model? And secondly, is such be- 
haviour ever observed directly?
The first question may be broached by considering whether pricing 
strategy is centralised, say at head office level, in the way in which 
investment decisions are generally centralised.
/The .....
The extent of high-level decision making on investment autho- 
rising is well known. The table below, taken from Rockley (1973) 
shows that there is very little discretion allowed for investment 
below board level.
TABLE 2.2
PERCENTAGE OF INSTANCES WITH POWER BELOW BOARD LEVEL 
Level of authorisation (£)
100,000 25,000 5,000 None, or less than 5»000 
Annual Sales (£m)
less than 10 - - 15 85 
10 - 15 12 12 15 61 
greater than 50 20 30 10 UO
Source : Rockley (1973)
Evidence of centralisation of the pricing decision is more 
difficult to find. Markham (1973) carried out a study on this to 
test the theory of cross-rubsidisation. He argued that when the 
pricing and related marketing decisions are made at division or profit- 
centre level, rather than at corporate management level, f it c'an rea- 
sonably be inferred that such decisions are made independently of those
19 
reached in other autonomous divisions. 1 (p.Lj.8).
Markham investigated a sample of 111; of the top 600 firms in 
the US, He found that pricing was carried out at corporate level in 
about 30% of cases and at mixed (corporate and division) level in 
another cases. Although the figures for investment and R & D 
were substantially higher, indicating greater central control, the 
fact that nearly one in two exerts some centralised influence on pricing
/provides .....
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provides some prima facie evidence that linked pricing and investment 
decision making occurs.
Further evidence is available, this time on international pricing, 
of industrial product multinationals (39 firms drawn from the Fortune 
£00). Baker and Ryans (1982) found that the international pricing 
decision is decentralised in the local or regional office in 53 per 
cent of cases and centralised in the home office in the other U7 per 
cent. Since international pricing probably involves a more extensive 
information flow than domestic pricing, this result may be regarded 
as an underestimate of centralised pricing for the domestic market. 
Thus, it may be concluded that large firms do have the opportunity of 
jointly planning pricing and investment strategy.
However, the theory of linked pricing and investment must be 
explained, not only in terms of firm behaviour, but in terms of 
industry behaviour as well. This implies that firms have some means 
of sharing information or some implicit method of coordinating price 
changes.
The institutional arrangement of price leadership is invoked 
in Eichner (1973> 1976) to explain how an industry's price is actually 
set. Certainly, price leadership seems to be quite common in UK 
industry, even though direct collusion has been unlawful since 19^6 
The report of the UK Monopolies Commission (1973) °n price uniformity 
suggested that price agreements were common in a large number of in- 
dustries where inelastic demand, barriers to entry and high concen- 
tration levels allow it.
In such cases, where the power of a price leader is very great,
/the .....
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the industry's pricing strategy may simply reflect the interests of 
the price leader.
Moss (1981) examining the conditions of applicability of the 
Eichner - Wood theory of the firm, argues that the power of a price 
leader is greatest when a single firm is the most efficient and also 
has access to large liquid reserves, as well as a substantial market 
share. The problem is to determine the applicability of the theory 
in less extreme situations. Moss suggests that in general, when 
power is shared between a number of firms, the industry price will be 
settled by compromise, where each firm has in mind a price determined 
along the lines of the Eichner model. The 'price leader will seek 
to determine its prices so that they provide some measure of the inter- 
nal finance required by other firms, even if these prices are in 
excess of the leaders own financial requirements. Furthermore, if 
it is the opinion of important price - following firms managers that 
a price rise is not warranted by current trading conditions, or if they 
fear it will induce entry by a potential competitor, the price lepider 
will usually take these views into account even if he does not share 
them 1 . (pp. 188, 189).
Moss also argues that the Eichner - Wood theory applies where 
market power lies on the demand side, i.e. where a purchaser of inputs 
such as a vehicle maker has a strong level of market power in relation 
to the supplier. In this case the price which suppliers charge will 
be largely determined by the buyer, but on terms which will allow the 
supplier to grow sufficiently rapidly to continue to meet the buyers 
requirements. In such a case, "the powerful commodity user will 
require to set the same price that the independent supplier would set 
in order to ensure his own survival and growth. /"These
/considerations ...
considerations^/ are no different from those that Eichner assumed in
his analysis of supply price determination by a price leader". (p.190).
It can "be seen therefore that the potential applicability of the theory
21 is quite wide. But has it ever been observed directly?
Direct evidence on linked pricing and investment is difficult 
to obtain, except for information of an anecdotal kind, often revealed 
through the report of regulatory agencies. Knight (1980) quotes a 
recent US anti-trust case where Du Pont's strategy for titanium dio- 
xide was held to be unfair because "it had set prices high enough to 
finance its own expansion, but low enough to discourage expansion by 
competition, and had expanded its production capacity to capture all 
the expected growth in demand" (p.2). Harcourt and Kenyon (197&) 
point out that one of the criterd a the former UK National Board for 
Prices and Incomes approving a higher price was the effect which a 
particu.lar level of profit has on the firms ability to finance future 
investment.
The results of this discourse may be summarised by saying that 
once short-run profit maximisation is rejected, it is inevitable that 
the pricing and investment decisions become interlinked. However, 
the evidence that managers actually view decision making in this way 
is very tentative. It may be that while the decision is best 
theorised as linked, the iterative nature of practical decision maker 
obfuscates the nature of the process for the individual managers. 
In that sense, the theory is not a behavioural, but an 'as if one.
Nevertheless, managerial decision models may well be moving in 
the direction of reflecting a joint pricing-investment strategy. 
Shone (1975)» i*1 "tne light of extensive experience of the iron and
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steel industry, has developed computer models which allow iterative 
planning on pricing and investment.
2. The Insensitivity of Oligopolistic Investment to Policy
Instruments
The proposition that the investment function of the oligopo- 
listic sector is difficult, if not impossible to shift will be the 
subject of empirical investigation in Chapters U, 5> an^- 6- Here it 
is only intended to review the theory underlying the alleged insensi- 
tivity of investment behaviour to policy instruments. The instruments 
considered are the monetary instruments of credit control and interest 
rate and the fiscal instruments of taxation and subsidies.
Consider first the role of interest rates. Eichner's posi- 
tion is that much investment in the oligopolistic sector is not a 
choice variable for firms in the sense that it is 'indispensable to 
maintaining a megacorp's existing market shares (and) is likely to be 
undertaken regardless of what the prevailing rate of interest happens
to be 1 (Eichner 1976," p.2Li5). This view seems to be supported by
22 
survey and anecdotal evidence. Certainly marginal projects may be
interest elastic but it can be argued that the appropriate cost of 
borrowing here is the 'permanent interest rate 1 , i.e. the minimal 
cost of borrowing additional funds over the cycle, involving factors 
such as the state of expectations of the stock market causing new 
issues to be more or less easy. A change in the short-term interest 
rate is thus unlikely to influence investment in any serious way, 
since it would first of all have to lead to a change in long-term 
rates and even then, this could be outweighed by a change in expecta- 
tions on the stock market. The latter point is particularly true if 
the interest change is expected to be reversed. The newly established
r., /long-term ..... 
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long-term rate would have to persist for a sufficiently long period 
time "before it could effect the permanent rate, as perceived by 
the megacorp. It seems, therefore, that interest rates can "be dis- 
regarded at least as a short-run policy tool.
Consider next the supply of credit. Even large firms finance 
some operations out of short-term credit, particularly stocks and work- 
ing capital. While banks may give preference to megacorps in allocat- 
ing advances, the latter will not entirely escape a credit squeeze
23 
and may have to cancel or postpone some marginal projects. But
this power to curtail investment does not translate itself into the 
power to stimulate extra investment, unless megacorps are already short 
of internal funds or constrained by high borrowing costs. In other 
words, easier credit will only affect investment if it is immediately 
preceded by a credit squeeze. But it seems more likely that an 
accommodating or neutral credit policy is pursued most of the time.
Furthermore, even the downward control of investment can only 
be crudely exercised; the effect of a credit squeeze will be felt 
disproportionately in sectors other than the oligopolistic one. This 
is not only because megacorps may be favoured over smaller firms in 
obtaining credit. The megacorps themselves have the power to extract 
credit from and delay payments to firms with lower degrees of market 
power. Control over credit is therefore a crude and indiscriminate 
instrument, whether it be exercised directly, or through control of 
the money supply.
Consider, finally the fiscal instruments available to the 
authorities to shift the investment curve upwards; corporate
/taxation .....
taxation rates and incentives. In so far as variation in these 
instruments influences the cost of capital, it is subject to the 
same reasoning as applies to interest rates. In so far as it in- 
fluences liquidity it is subject to similar reasoning as the control 
of credit. Furthermore, there is doubt about the power of government 
to ensure that the incidence of any particular tax is on the oligopo- 
listic sector. The megacorp can adjust its mark-up to ensure that 
after-tax revenue remains constant in the face of either a sales tax 
or a corporate income tax, provided that it has sufficient market 
power. This point will be considered again in the final chapter in 
the context of recent UK experience.
Conclusions
This chapter has explored the microeconomic basis of Eichner f s 
macroeconomic approach. It was established that dual pricing behaviour 
exists and also that pricing and investment decisions are linked when 
firms are not price-takers and pursue long-run goals.
Two appendices are attached. Appendix one shows how the 
Eichner and the Wood models of linked pricing and investment behaviour 
have their origin in the work of Marris (196U)« Appendix two considers 
some of the criticisms that have been made of the models and weighs 
their significance.
The following chapter, Chapter 3 shows how duality, established 
in Chapter 2 for pricing behaviour, extends also to savings and in- 
vestment behaviour.
/FOOTNOTES .....
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FOOTNOTES
1 . The introduction by Engels to Capital - volume 3 contains 
a discussion of Lexis 1 views which Engels argues amount 'in practice 
to the same thing as the Marxian theory of surplus value 1 (Marx 1972, 
p.10).
2. There are many reasons why firms with a degree of market power 
might be unwilling to let prices respond to short-run demand condi- 
tions. Price changes involve administration and costly information 
flows. Frequent price changes may also have an effect on customer 
loyalty, encouraging searches for alternative sources of supply. 
Unplanned price changes may also run counter to a planned promotions 
policy, where the expenditure may already have been committed. For 
a monopoly producer, constant marginal cost conditions would, even 
under profit maximisation lead to unchanged price in the face of a de- 
mand shift, assuming unchanged demand elasticity. From the stand- 
point of this thesis, however, the most important reason is that 
frequent price changes would disrupt long-term planning of cash flow 
and expenditure.
3. The method of 'purging' might give some cause for concern, in 
that the method of separating trend from cycle is strictly only valid 
if these are orthogonal variables. Note also that a long-run in- 
fluence of competitive pressure, perhaps from imports may be implied 
from the fact that the mark-up is trended.
U. Note that the positive relationship between the partial ad- 
justment coefficient and concentration flatly contradicts the view in 
Scherer (1980) that 'transmission lags may be longer in concentrated 
industries'. An engineering dummy is included to avoid the problem 
of different gestation lags.
5- See also Schultze and Tryon (196$) for an early attempt to 
grapple with this problem.
6. The argument here implies that prices are constantly increasing, 
Of course this will not be true for all firms, but with prices sticky 
downwards, different sets of firms raising prices in each period v/ill 
result in continuous price rises.
7. Chandler (1977) attributes the coinage of this term for a 
giant corporation to Eichner (19^9, p.U7).
It is interesting that Marris defines the profit rate after marketing 
expenses have been deducted. Since these expenses are, in his model, 
a form of investment, yielding a stream of future returns, there must 
be some question as to how profits should be defined, as the standard 
accounting definition measures profits before investment. Once this 
question is broached, however, the very concept of short-run profits 
(and its maximisation) becomes blurred at the edges.
9. The question asked was 'if and when it becomes necessary to 
give priority to either short-term or long-term profits, does your 
firm (a) regard short-term profits as more important; (b) regard 
long-term profits as more important; (c) the need to choose never 
arises 1 . Respondents were not asked to define their perceptions of 
the long and short terms. Note that categories E^ and C.. may be
/subject
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subject to small-sample bias. The fact that prices have been found 
to be inelastic in the short-run gives further weight to the view that 
long-term influences are at work in price determination. Hay and 
Morris (1979) report a study by Skinner (1970) in which survey evi- 
dence is recounted to the effect that short run profits could be in- 
creased by altering prices.
10. Scherer (19^0) is not quite willing to concede this but he says 
1 behavioural differences between long-run profit maximisation (e.g. 
through limit pricing) and various forms of sales revenue or sales 
growth maximisation are sufficiently subtle that econometric tests 
with available data are not powerful enough to discriminate among 
the contending hypotheses. 1 Note also that in the neoclassical 
model of a competitive price-taking firm, a cost reduction would 
lead to both increased profitability and increased market share. 
This will not persist in the long-run however, as the cost reduction 
is generalised to all firms.
11. This result contradicts the notion that firms market shares 
are gradually eroded over time as they bear the brunt of maintaining 
high prices and output restriction in time of recession. It may be 
noted that turnover of top-league firms has lessened since the 
beginning of this century (Scherer 1980, Hay and Morris 1979)«
12. Shepherd excluded diversifying firms from the analysis, thus 
lessening the likelihood of firms voluntarily liquidating market 
share.
13. The problem is that there is an econometric problem involved 
in estimating the relationships as posited by Shepherd. Ignoring 
any other variables in the regressor set, the two equations proposed 
are p = a + b M and N = c + dp with b> o, d < o. But it is 
not surprising that OLS estimates of d may be positive, contrary to 
the theory unless firms are voluntarily yielding up market share. 
Marris (19&U) met with a similar problem in attempting to justify a 
negative profitability-growth relationship when the data suggested a 
positive relationship.
1U. There would seem to be an error in Eichner's formulation for 
the payments on the loan, in that they are discounted only back to 
the ttn period rather than the present, and divided only by the number 
of periods beyond the t^ rather than the number of periods in the 
whole planning cycle.
15. By 'investment 1 here is understood not only tangible investment, 
but any project with future pay-off, e.g. advertising, R & D, dealer 
franchise or vertical integration to heighten barriers to entry, and 
the creation of a favourable public image. The return on these in- 
vestments may have unorthodox interpretations. R & D expenditure 
carried out for instance with the aim of differentiating the product 
more sharply, will exhibit its 'return 1 "by allowing the firm to charge 
higher prices without incurring an additional cost due to the sub- 
stitution effect.
16. Eichner ignores reswitching problems which would make it harder 
to obtain negatively sloped demand functions for investment funds.
/17  A defence .....
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17- A defence of a firm-based analysis, rather than an industry- 
based one may be found in Hazledine (1979). It may be noted that 
Marris (1977) objects to Eichner's analysis on the grounds that it only 
provides a firm-based decision rule for linked pricing and investment 
where the firm in question is not a conglomerate.
18. The procedure is complicated by the fact that the target rate 
depends on , but g in turn depends on the target rate, 'since the 
growth rate will depend on what investment projects the firm decides 
to undertake 1 (Wood, 1975, p. 100). Wood suggests that the firm may 
use an iterative approach to locate an acceptable target rate of re- 
turn. His discussion here is not entirely clear, but it must be 
supposed that the opportunity curve also enters the decision-making 
process, since otherwise one equation is being used to determine two 
variables.
In terras of decision procedures empirically observed, there is 
little doubt that target return pricing is extremely common. Over 
95% of firms, employing more than 3>000 employees use this method, 
while 80% see it as a principle pricing objective. (Shipley 1981, 
Table II, p
It may seem rather strange that evidence for a growth maximising 
model is adduced from a perception of profit calculation. In this 
regard, Shipley 1 s results are ambivalent as to whether a growth maxi- 
mising or revenue maximising framework is a superior description of 
the decision-making process. Nearly one-half of the respondents in- 
cluded a revenue target in this goal set and about one in fourteen 
view it as the principal objective, with the incidence of pricing for 
revenue targets rising rapidly with numbers employed. (p.U33)« In 
the largest firm category ( > 3000 employees), nearly seventy per cent 
thought profit was 'very important 1 , but little more than a quarter 
thought that it was 'of overriding importance 1 (Table VI p.61). Note, 
however that the fact that Shipley 's highest employment size category 
is defined as greater than 3000 ' is not very helpful in identifying 
the behaviour of really large companies.
19. Unfortunately, however, the issue is not so straight forward 
in that there is often ambiguity as to what is understood by a pricing 
decision. The pricing of individual products may well be decentra- 
lised, but central guidance may be given as to mark-up over costs or 
various target indicators of profitability. Because of this, the 
incidence of corporate level pricing decisions can only be taken as 
a lower bound of the incidence of centralised price formation.
20. Trade Associations, trade press, audited accounts and annual 
reports provide means whereby managers can communicate with each 
other.
21 . Some further indirect evidence for linked pricing and invest- 
ment may be adduced from the following table, from Rockley (1973)«
/Determination
Determination of the cost of capital by; of sample)
Annual Borrowing Average Dividend Opportunity
Sales (£m) Rate Cost Policy
less than 10 62 1+ 8
10 - 50 30 11|
greater than 50 29 29 6
The high percentage (29%) of very large firms determining a 
cost of capital "by average cost implies an insensitivity of invest- 
ment to the external "borrowing rate reflecting the greater reliance 
of large firms on internal funds.
The insensitivity to external "borrowing rates suggests that 
firms must have some notion of the costs and benefits of varying the 
current level of internal funds, though the procedures involved may 
not be explicit enough for managers to articulate the cost of capital 
in any way other than 'average cost 1 .
22. The United States Conference Board Survey on Capital Expendi- 
ture asks why firms intend to increase capital expenditure. The 
answer f need to protect share of market 1 occurs in approximately 
two-thirds of the replies. See also Rockley (1973) for a selection 
of comments from UK managers.
23. The CBI Industrial Trends Survey provides data on the per- 
centage of firms constrained because of an inability to raise ex- 
ternal finance. This appears to show some cyclical variation. 
The U.S. survey referred to in footnote 22 also asks the reasons 
for decline in capital expenditure. The percentage of replies 
citing 'tight credit market' shoys marked cyclical variation.
21;   See in this regard the article by M. 0'Connor in Economic 
Trends, February 1982.
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CHAPTER 3
EVIDENCE ON THE SAVINGS AKD INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR OF COMPANIES OVER
THE CYCLE
3«1 Int rod-action
It has long been recognised that the locus and nature of a 
growth path can depend on whether the marginal propensity to invest 
is greater or less than the marginal'propensity to save. The former 
can, depending on assumptions lead to an explosive growth cycle or 
to full employment equilibrium, while the latter can lead to stag- 
nation. (Hacche (1979) pace Kaldor (1961)).
Growth models such as the above usually deal with long-term 
tendencies. By contrast, Eichner (1976) has focussed on simple short- 
term tendencies to accelerated or decelerated growth depending on 
changes in savings and investment. In this theory, the economy is 
characterised by dual investment and savings relationships for the 
oligopolistic and competitive sectors. In the former, due to per- 
manent excess capacity, savings rise disproportionately with output 
as unit fixed costs fall. According to the theory, investment for 
this sector changes with output in a more stable way than savings
given that it is planned long in advance with the aim of protecting
2
market share. In the competitive sector, however, investment
responds more than proportionately to output growth, fuelled by 
expectations and the entry of new firms. Savings for this sector is 
not expected to rise disproportionately with output given the absence 
of planned excess capacity; output prices and costs rise with out- 
put and a linear savings-output relationship is assumed.
If the economy is dominated by the oligopolistic sector, cyclical
/surpluses ..... 
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surpluses will be generated and, unless other sectors are prepared to 
run a deficit, this will have a braking effect on growth. Other 
sectors may be prepared to run a deficit, but Steindl (1982) has in- 
dicated in a very clear passage how this cannot be relied upon.
f ... the sum of investments, public spending and exports is 
jointly financed by the sum of savings, taxes and imports. 
While this holds for the system as a whole, the individual 
sectors - business, the budget, the foreign balance - do not 
necessarily balance out. The overall balance is secured 
by a certain level of demand - i.e. of the GDP. But for 
the balance in each of the individual sectors a different 
level of GDP may be required. This involves some arduous 
tasks of harmonising economic policy because in each sector 
there is a certain target for its indebtedness. Ultimately 
this concerns the stock of debt and assets in relation to 
each other, but then management involves certain policies 
concerning the ratio of borrowing or lending in the flows 1 . 
(P-72)
The theory outlined above has not been tested satisfactorily. 
Sarantis (1978) has supported Eichner's position, referred to above, 
arguing that investment is more stable for concentrated industries 
when capital intensity and other factors are taken into account. 
On the other hand, preliminary estimates of the model built to test 
the Eichner hypothesis have not been able to confirm this result. 
The high coefficient on the capacity utilisation term in the in- 
vestment equation for the large-firm sector, indicates a very sen- 
sitive response. It is hard to be sure whether this result would 
stand up to industry disaggregation and whether it is sensitive to
the functional form used. The savings equation has yet to be
/estimated. .....
estimated. (Forman and Eichner,
As regards the savings behaviour for the two sectors, there 
has been surprisingly little work, perhaps because of lack of data. 
This chapter reports on the results of an empirical investigation 
for the UK, aimed at answering the following questions:-
(1) Is there a dual economy in respect of savings and investment 
behaviour? If so, how should it be characterised?
(2) Are the marginal propensities to invest and the marginal 
propensities to save with respect to output changes, as 
theorised above?
3.2 The Dual Economy
It is possible to examine the savings and investment behaviour 
over the cycle of a set of large firms in the economy on the basis of 
the survey of company accounts carried out by the UK Department of 
Industry. Data is available by industry, so it was possible to 
obtain a data series on gross income, payments out of income (in- 
terest, dividends and taxation) and expenditure on tangible fixed 
assets (investment), for concentrated and non-concentrated groups of 
manufacturing industries. Reasonably consistent data is available, 
for the above, on an annual basis between 1S&7 an^ 1977* Because
the sample of firms differs somewhat each year, the data has been 
expressed as two sets of ratios representing savings over invest- 
ment for each industry group. Savings here is proxied by gross 
income minus payments out of income.
/These ..... 
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These ratios are constructed in Table 3*1 an^ plotted in 
Figure 3A.1. (The graphs are contained in Appendix 1 to this chapter) 
It is clear from this there is very little difference "between the 
concentrated and the non-concentrated groups of industries. However, 
both sets of data are from the survey set which is limited to com- 
panies with net assets in excess of £2m in 1969. The size of the 
enterprise rather than the industry to which it is allocated may 
therefore be a more important discriminator.
The ratio of savings to investment shows a clear cyclical 
component for the years in question rising in recovery and falling 
in recession but leading the turning point in each case by between 
six and eighteen months. The data is based on the financial year, 
however, and should, therefore, be centred forward, reducing the lead. 
The turning points have been taken from Panic (1978) and refer to 
total manufacturing capacity utilisation. (See Appendix 2).
11
In order to determine whether the survey companies were re- 
presentative of all industry, the ratio of savings to investment for
all Industrial and Commercial Companies (lCC f s), obtainable from the
7 
national accounts was constructed. This data set is wider than
manufacturing and includes distribution and other activities. From 
the data in Table 3»2 plotted in Figure 3A.2, it would seem that this 
ratio has, not surprisingly, a smaller amplitude of variation than 
the large company ratios and, more interestingly that the ratio sets 
are not always in phase. This suggests that it would be instruc- 
tive to examine the ratio separately for the small companies that are 
not included in the Department of Industry Survey but that are in- 
cluded in the Industrial and Commercial Company category of the National
Accounts. /_./By .....
- -
By suitably weighting the ratios for large company components 
of the total, the savings to investment ratio for small companies 
shown in Table 3-3 was obtained. This is plotted in Figure 3A.3> 
along with the graphs for the larger companies for the data period
o
1961+-77   It should be noted that the 'large and 'small 1 data 
series are but approximations to the data series for an exact dicho- 
toroisation, but the latter are impossible to construct, as explained 
in footnote 8. The terms 'large' and 'small' are used throughout 
this chapter subject to this caveat.
It is apparent from Figure 3A.3 that the savings to investment 
ratio of the smaller companies is virtually the mirror image of that 
of the larger ones, moving in the same direction in only three out of 
thirteen periods.
This discrepancy can be examined further by checking the reasons 
for the cyclical movement in the ratio for large companies. Sta- 
tistics for year to year matched sample data have been published for 
manufacturing from 19&9- ^n the basis of this data, given in Table 
3«i| along with the longer series for large companies (except property 
companies), it is possible to compute growth rates for savings and 
investment separately for these sets of companies, also shown in 
Table It is evident from this data that the variation in the 
savings to investment ratio graphed earlier is dominated by variation 
in savings, especially for all survey companies combined. The 
savings growth rate is pro-cyclical with a peak occuring in the period 
of increasing capacity utilisation in 1968, 1972 and 1976. (See 
Figure 3A.U)
/The ..... 
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The savings growth for small companies shown in Table 3»5 
(Figure 3A.5), calculated in a similar manner to the figures in 
Table 3»3 show no systematic correlation with the cycle in general 
economic activity. It may be noted however, that there is some 
tendency for sina.ll company investment growth also constructed in 
Table 3«5 to mirror the pattern in small company savings. The 
notion that savings in the small company sector is affected dispro- 
portionately by transfer to the household sector does not appear to
be warranted by an inspection of the dividends ratio which is fairly
9 stable for small companies as well as large.
The data provides some evidence for the thesis that large 
company investment is more stable than for small companies. The 
coefficient of variation for the latter growth rate is nearly twice 
that of the former, though this conclusion must be qualified in view 
of the criticisms noted in footnote 8. There seems no tendency 
for large company investment to mirror its own savings behaviour.
/TABLE
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TABLE 3.1
LARGE COMPANY ACCOUNTS DATA LISTED (QUOTED) COMPANIES ONLY (£ Million)
Food, Drink & Tobacco, Chemicals & Allied, Elect. Eng. , 
Vehicles ^^ Other Manufacturing Industries
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
No. of 
Firms
323
285
262
253
242
223
215
211
199
195
190
(a) 1 
Income
1509.3
1792.5
1883.6
1863.7
2114.9
2V/8.6
3117.9
3291.5
3706.2
5166.9
51*86.5
(b) 2
Payments
755.0
875.5
929.2
1055.3
1016. 4
889. k
1139.8
1357.3
1347.4
11+69.2
1888.9
(c) 3
Investment
646.7
676.8
806.7
926.5
962.1
860.3
1231.9
1444.7
1701.3
2084.4
2817.9
a-b 
c
1.166
1.355
1.183
0.873
1.142
1.847
1.606
1.339
1.387
1.774
1.277
No. of 
Firms
819
773
648
621
592
563
547
535
497
U80
U59
(a) 1
Income
1010.3
1107.0
1358.5
1393.0
1501.7
1825.3
2302.1
239U.2
2339-5
3252.2
3301.4
M 2
Payments
537.3
567.2
721.0
766.9
750.8
659.9
8M.5
955.5
894.2
1005.6
1275.7
(c) , 
Investment'
390.5
442.7
622.8
642.5
619.2
581.0
849.9
1044.6
942.5
1073.6
1290.0
a-b 
c
1.211
1.219
1.024
0.970
1.213
2.006
1.719
1.377
1.534
2.092
1.570
1. Income from trading and other activities plus other capital receipts.
2. Payments out of income, i.e. taxation, dividends and interest on long-term loans.
3. Expenditure on tangible fixed assets.
: Business Monitor M3i MA3» various issues.
TABLE 3.2 
All Industrial and Commercial Companies (£ million)
1961*
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1971*
1975
1976
1977
Internal 
Funds (a)
2927
2913
2511
2U97
2986
3371
3U87
UU314
5733
8117
8950
9U89
12723
15122
Net Capital 
Transfers (b)
13
15
21
232
U27
57U
1477
553
381
3U9
335
UOU
357
251
Investment (c)
2288
2l4l46
21422
2361
2615
2987
3359
3U62
3888
U907
6023
6910
8107
9690
a + b
( c )
1.28
1.20
1.05
1.16
1.31
1.29
1.18
1.1*1*
1.57
1.73
1.514
1.1*3
1.61
1.59
Source: Bank of England for Financial Statistics for (b)
/TABLE 3.3
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TABLE 3-3
Co. Accounts Data for Listed and
Unlisted Companies in Manufactur- 
ing, Distribution etc.
Savings/Investment for
Companies not in company
2 Accounts Data
196U
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
197U
1975
1976
1977
1.18
0.98
1.0U
1.17
1.27
1.10
0.93
1.11
1.66
1.53
1.23
1.38
1.81
1.U9
1.U8
1.6U
1.07
1.1U
1.39
1.67
1.68
2.10
1.39
2.13
2.16
1.50
1.21
1.79
1. Definitions as in Table 3*1  Source : Business Monitor M3«
2. Constructed as outlined in footnote 8.
/TABLE 3.U
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TABLE 3.U
Company Accounts Matched Samples. Growth Rates of savings and 
investment for Manufacturing (Listed) and all Company Accounts Data 
in Manufacturing, Distri"butior etc.
Manufacturing, Listed Companies Manufacturing, Distribution 
etc. Listed and Unlisted 
Companies
1 965M
1 966/65
1 967/66
1 968/67
1969/68
1 970/69
1971/70
1972/71
1973/72
1 97V73
1 975/714
1 976/75
1977/76
Savings
 
 
-
-
 
-9.8
28.U
50.7
25.8
-2.0
10.8
57.8
5.3
Investment
-
 
-
 
-
9-7
0.0
-7.3
-U6.8
23.2
3.2
19-9
30.14
Savings
-3-5
-2.5
18.0
21.6
-3-U
-5-3
21 .U
55.1
19.1
-14.3
15.1
51-3
u.u
Investment
16.0
-6.7
6.0
12.0
11.8
11. 
2.2
3-7
30.U
21.6
2.3
1i4.6
26.1
Source: Business Monitor M3 various issues
/TABLE 3.5
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TABLE 3.5
Growth Rates of Savings and Investment for all Industrial and 
Commercial Companies and for companies not in company accounts data,
All Industrial and 
Commercial Companies
Companies not in Company 
Accounts Data
1 965 A
1 966/5
1 967/6
1 968/67
1 969/68
1 970/69
1971/70
1972/71
1973/72
1 97U/73
1 975/71;
1 976/75
1977/76
Savings
-0.0
-13.5
7.8
25.1
15.6
0.0
25.8
22.6
38.5
9.7
6.5
32.2
17.5
Investment
6.9
-1.0
-2.5
10.8
1U-2
12.5
3.1
12.3
26.2
22.7
1U.7
17.3
19-5
Savings
7.0
-35-5
-12.6
32.1
53.6
10.6
13.2
U2.U
29.6
( '37.7
-10.7
-6.0
U3.7
Investment
-27.3
10.U
-19.5
8.U
19.0
1U.7
29.5
17.8
2U.9
39.5
22.7
6.3
1. These growth rates are derived from the data in Table 3*2.
2. Calculated by the method outlined in footnote 8.
/Another .....
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Another source of data exists whereby the stability of 
investment for large and small companies can be coirpa:-ed. The 
Department of Industry has carried out a survey cf the sources and 
uses of funds for a group of large companies for sixteen quarters 
between 1977 and 1980. 10
Company income and gross fixed investment for the sample group, 
for all ICC's, and for the differences between these (representing 
small companies) are shown in Table 3»6. As can be seen from the 
data, company income reached a peak about end-1979 after which that 
of the survey companies fell slightly more than all ICC's. Survey 
companies investment rose more sharply in early 1978 and late 1979 
than all ICC's.
By regressing the data for large and small companies on trend, 
constant and seasonal dummies, a set of residuals was obtained, 
analysed in Table 3»7« The statistical analyses of the residuals 
shown in this table indicate that the variability in income was
comparable for the two groups while the variability of investment
11 
was much greater for the group of large survey companies. While
the time period is short there is no evidence here for the propo- 
sition that large firm investment is more stable. Once again however 
it must be stressed that investment volatility may be industry spe- 
cific and our results may be distorted by a capital intensive bias 
in the sample. The caveats in footnote 8 also apply here.
So far the evidence has confirmed that the savings of large 
companies is heavily procyclical, dominating the investment variation.
/The .....
The evidence is conflicting in so far as the hypothesised greater 
stability of large company investment, relative to small company 
investment, is concerned.
The savings behaviour of the large companies ensures that 
they accumulate surpluses which tend to be pro-cyclical. How are 
these surpluses used? Mueller (19&7) nas provided some evidence 
that R and D, (but not advertising) tends to absorb funds when in- 
vestment is below trend, but the effect seemed both minor and tenta- 
tive. We may conclude that the surpluses either accumulate as 
liquid assets, are used for acquisitions, or flow abroad.
Evidence will be presented below to show that larger firms 
accumulate extensive liquid assets over the cycle, matching their 
savings performance. This will be contrasted with the much more 
stable holdings of liquid assets on the part of all firms combined.
/TABLE 3.6
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TABLE 3.6
Income and Investment by type of Company.
£ Million 
ICC*s_____ Survey Companies Non-Survey Companies
Income Investment
1977
1978
1979
1980
01
02
03
Ok
01
02
03
QU
01
02
03
Ok
01
02
03
QU
61+1+2
6129
591+2
6505
6630
7068
6880
7881
791*3
9257
91*1*5
1069
1050
9069
7631
8569
11+37
11+52
11+82
1556
11+82
1585
15M
2015
171+8
2101+
1867
21+60
21+60
2030
1630
1671+
Income
1986
21+71
2UU7
2786
2786
2956
2980
311+9
3052
3222
3537
3901
3610
3828
3973
U21+0
Investment
51+1+0
5888
6080
8061+
7101+
7808
8000
9310+
8192
9280
8832
1177
1081
9728
1030
101+9
Income
5005
1+677
1+1+60
1+91+9
511*8
5U82
5339
5865
6195
7152
7577
8235
801+8
7039
6000
6891+
Investment
11+1+2
1882
1839
1980
2076
2175
2180
2215
2233
2291+
2651+
2723
2528
2855
291*3
3190
Constructed from Table 3 of the Survey Report in Economic Trends, 
February 1982.
/TABLE 3.7
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TABLE 3-7n
Analysis of the Residuals from an exponential trend regression with 
seasonal dummies of the data in the last four columns of Table 
Standard Deviations of Residuals
Survey Companies
Non- survey Companies
Income
0.126
0.100
Investment
0.075
O.OU7
Ratio of Standard Error to Mean Value of Dependent Variable
Survey Companies
Non-survey Companies
Income
0.0123
0.0090
Investment
0.0077
O.OOl^
/Once .....
Once again the data is drawn from Department of Industry surveys,
this time the Survey of Company Liquidity introduced in 1970 and pub-
12 lished quarterly. The sample is composed of large firms only.
Data for all Industrial and Commercial Companies has also been pro- 
vided by the Department of Industry.
3.
Table/8 shows the liquidity ratio - the ratio of total selected 
current assets to total selected current liabilities - for all survey 
companies and for manufacturing survey companies. Table 3»9 shows 
the annual figures for all survey companies and for all Industrial and 
Commercial Companies. These series are plotted in Figures 3A.6 and 3A.7.
These data series reflect the fact that large companies accumulate 
considerable liquid assets during the recovery phase of a cycle and 
borrow or draw on liquid assets extensively during a downturn. This 
is especially true for the manufacturing companies, as the non-manufac- 
turing liquidity ratio (not shown in the table) seems somewhat more 
stable. The liquidity ratio seems to lead the cycle in total manufac- 
turing utilisation by several quarters. The annual figures for all
ICC's are considerably more stable than for the survey companies and
13 
must reflect an opposing cyclical movement by non-survey companies.
This confirms the previous results for the savings:investment ratio 
where the ratios for large and small companies were found to be out 
of phase. The footnote 8 caveats do not apply to the liquidity analysis.
The data for large companies bears out the view expressed by 
ELchner (19?6):-
'Within an expansionary phase of the cycle ... the savings 
realised by the megacorp will exceed those originally planned
... the megacorps holdings of short-term liquid assets will
- 76 -. /tend .....
tend to increase ... within a contractionary phase of 
the cycle the opposite will be true and the megacorp 
holdings of short-term liquid assets will tend to de- 
crease 1 , (p.202).
/TABLE 3-8
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TABLE 3.8 
Quarterly Liquidity Ratio for Large Companies
Manufacturing Total Manufacturing Total
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
197U
1975
k
1
2
3
k
1
2
3
k
1
2
3
ii
1
2
3
k
1
2
3
1*
1
2
3
U
U
M
36
36
35
3U
U2
51
66
71*
96
102
108
122
119
111;
9k
Ik
U9
39
3U
38
51
63
75
68
6k
56
53
52
50
58
67
80
90
103
105
111
. 11?.
110
110
98
83
71
59
52
58
66
75
52
1976 1
2
3
k
1977 1
2
3
U
1978 1
2
3
U
1979 1
2
3
U
1980 1
2
3
U
87
92
10U
95
105
106
112
119
136
13U
118
121
102
110
97
71
71
63
65
69
91
89
96
89
101
98
1014
119
139
11*U
133
127
110
110
100
79
7k
73
72
82
Soiirce: continuous series for large survey companies provided by
Department of Industry.
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/TABLE 3-9
TABLE 3.9
Liquidity Ratios for Large ConrpaniesandlCC's
Annual Figures for Large Companies and all IGC's
1970
1971
1972
1973
197U
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1080
Large Companies
(Total)
56
6U
102
108
66
71
91
106
136
100
75
All ICC's
63
67
65
67
5U
57
63
63
69
63
5U
Source: Financial Statistics, Ta"ble 9«3 an(i Table 3»8 of this 
Chapter.
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Regression Results
The evidence presented above relies on a visual inspection of 
cyclical movements. Given the small number of data points, this is, 
perhaps, the most appropriate procedure. Hoy ever, for two of the 
longest series, viz., the saving to investment ratio for large and 
small companies, a regression equation was attempted using cyclical 
dummies.
The procedure followed here is adopted from Thorning (1975) 
and Shapiro (1976). Each cycle is divided first into peak to trough 
(contraction) and trough to peak (expansion) periods using the turn- 
ing points given in Panic (1978). Then each expansion is divided 
into two equal periods (phase 1 and phase 2) and each contraction is 
similarly divided (phase .3 and 1|). The importance of dividing the 
expansionary and contractionary periods into phases lies in the need 
to distinguish Eichner's theory from the argument that rising costs 
choke off an expansion "by squeezing profits in the second half of the 
upswing. Eichner, by contrast, would argue that large company sav- 
ings continue to accumulate as liquid assets in this phase.
Thornton (1977) in an investigation of factors influencing the 
cyclical movement of profits in the UK, suggested that in the 'matur- 
ing' period of the expansion (phase 2), profits deteriorate sharply 
because, although input prices slow down, so too do output prices. 
Productivity also falls he argues since output slows while employment 
picks up. Furthermore it is in this phase that an acceleration in 
unit labour costs takes place.
/Thornton .....
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Thornton has calculated the growth rate of eight indices in 
each of the four phases of the cycle from 1958 to 1973* These in- 
dices are: basic weekly wage rate for manual workers; wages and 
salaries per unit of output; output per person employed; employ- 
ment; wholesale price index of materials and fuels purchased by 
manufacturing industry; wholesale price index of output prices of 
manufacturing goods; manufacturing production; gross trading 
profits (excluding rent and non-trading income) of industrial and 
commercial companies.
In Phase 1, input prices rise faster than output prices, but 
output per worker rises quickly given that employment is still falling 
in a lagged response to the previous recession. Unit labour costs 
do not increase at this stage.
In Phase 2, the growth rate of profits for all ICC's deterio- 
rate. Although input prices sometimes slow down (though not in 
1972-3) so too do output prices. Employment picks up and, as the 
growth of output slows, so too does productivity growth. There is 
an acceleration in unit labour costs during this phase.
In Phase 3 "the growth of input prices slows or is negative 
while output price growth stabilises or rises.
Unit labour costs continue to accelerate and the growth rate 
of production, productivity and profits fall in general. Employment 
growth is variable, but may be positive.
/In .....
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In Phase [4., employment growth is ne.gr.~ive in general is 
production. Unit labour costs may fall and productivity may begin- 
to rise.
The following figures from Thornton's article show the growth 
rates of the indices over the first two phases, these being of most 
interest in the context of the arguments of this section.
/TABLE 3.10
TABLE 3.10
CYCLICAL BEHAVIOUR OF FACTORS INFLUENCING PROFITS
(COMPOUND QUARTERLY RATE:, OF GROWTH) 
TROUGH TO MID-EXPANSION AND MID-EXPANSION TO PEAK
PERIOD
Pnase 1 IV 58 - IV 59
Pncse 2 IV 59 - IV 60
Phase 1 IV 62 - IV 63
Phase 2 IV 63 - IV 61+
Phase 1 167 - 1168
Phase 2 1168 - 1169
Phase 1 IV 71 - IV 72
Phase 2 IV 72 - III73
WAGE RATES
0.5
0.90
0.70
0.85
1.70
1.25
3.95
3.10
UTCIT LABOUR 
COSTS
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.65
-0.1
1.35
1.20
2.20
OUTPUT PER 
PERSON
n/a
n/a
2.05
1.35
2.00
0.70
2.20
0.95
EMPLOYMENT
n/a
0.70
-0.05
o.l45
-0.^0
O.i|0
-0.30
0.30
INPUT 
PRICES
0.35
-o.l*5
1.35
0.70
1.75
0.95
2.00
9.30
OUTPUT 
PRICES
0.05
0.1|0
0.30
0.85
0.75
0.85
1.55
1.75
PRODUCTION
2.65
0.75
2.00
1.80
1.60
1.15
1.80
1.55
GROSS TRADING 
PROFITS
3.50
-2.20
5.55
-0.30
2.50
1.25
6.30
5.25
I
CO
I
Thornton's conclusion is ar, folJows:-
'... in the maturing phase of an expansion /phase 2_ 
manufacturers are unable to pass on higher costs in higher 
output prices; in the absence of policy to control wages, 
high employment and high profits might be incompatible. '
This conclusion is somewhat surprising in terms of the data 
that is under discussion. While it is true that unit labour costs 
appear to accelerate in the maturing phase, it is clear that this 
should not in general be attributed to accelerating wages but to 
falling production growth rates. The growth of wage rates can be 
seen to have fallen in phase 2 of the last expansion of the sixties 
and the first expansion of the seventies.
This also contradicts the view of Kuh (19&5) w^° expressed a 
similar opinion to that of Thornton::-
'... while the dramatic peak-trough - early recovery shifts 
in the profit share originate in cyclical labour productivity 
variations, the usual late cyclical recovery period decline 
in the corporate profit share depends to seme extent on ... 
the steady cumulative effect of wage increases ...' (p. 278).
The figures do indicate, however that profits begin to deterio- 
rate, for whatever cause, in phase 2, though the squeeze is hidden 
somewhat by stock appreciation in the later cycles. Employment rises 
in this phase, resulting in a fall in labour productivity, but the
/resulting .....
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resulting cyclical rise in unit cor:t is net jassc-'J on in j. ric-t- in- 
creases. This may be partly because oi' increased competitive pres- 
sure, perhaps from imports. However, the primary explanation is 
probably that firms do not 'fully 1 adjust prices for cyclical changes 
in costs - either unit capital costs which go down in expansion or 
unit labour costs which rise in phase 2.
Thornton's study however was carried out for all Industrial and 
Commercial Companies and as has been argued above this category com- 
bines two out-or-phase series. The following regressions provide 
the opportunity of examining the savings to investment ratio separately 
for large and small companies. This investigation while not exactly 
comparable to that of Thornton, provides a useful check on his aggre- 
gate results.
Results
Dummies are defined in the normal way as unity in the phase and 
zero otherwise. Entering all four dummies gave the results below. 
It was found necessary to include a time trend, probably because the 
savings figures are gross of stock appreciation.
Large Companies
S/I = 0.03 TREND + 1.19 PHASE 1 +1.11 PHASE 2 + 0.8)4 PHASE 3 +
(2.65) (8.U2) (7.U1) (7.59)
0.89 PHASE 
(7.03) 
R2 = 0.80, DW = 2.$!*, x2 (3) = 9.69
is
c
/I is the ratio of savings to investment for large companies, as 
defined in the text. The PHASE variables are as follows:-
PHASE 1 : unity in 196?, 1972, 1975, 1976; zero otherwise 
PHASE 2 : unity in 196U, 1968, 1973, 1977 
PHASE 3 : unity in 1965, 1969, 1970, 197U 
PHASE U : unity in 1966, 1971 
TREND is a time trend.
There is a small measure of arbitrariness involved in the 
definition of these dummies, as the turning points are defined for
o
quarterly data. However, "bearing in mind that the data for /I, 
based on the financial year, is centred on September rather than 
June, the above choice seems best.
2 The )( slTat(s-tie. which tests for dynamic mis-specification is
just unacceptable at the 2-J% level. Inspection of the unrestricted
n 
form indicates no obvious remedy, and the problem is probably due to
the inexact timing of the phases, necessitated by the annual data.
The coefficients on both expansion phases are similar and 
exceed the coefficients of the contraction phases which are also of 
similar magnitude to each other. This may be interpreted as indi- 
cating a larger ratio of savings to investment in an expansion. 
In order to test for significance a t test was performed on the dif- 
ferences between the coefficients of PHASE 1 and PHASE 3, using the 
variance-covariance matrix of the estimators. The t value is 1.73 
significant at the 10% level in a one-sided test. This significance
/would ..... 
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would be confirmed more strongly in a regression with only two cummies 
for contraction and expansion. There is no evidence of any signi- 
ficant difference between the coefficients of two expansion dummies 
or those of the two contraction dummies. This important finding 
indicates that for large companies, the ratio of savings to investment 
is as high in the second phase than in the first, suggesting that these 
companies do not experience a profit squeeze in this phase.
Small Companies
S/I = 0.06 TREND + 0.78 PHASE 1 +1.2)4 PHASE 2 + 1.1*3 PHASE 3 + 
(2.35) (2.97) (U.U2) (6.87)
1.28 PHASE U
(5-39)
R2 = 0.61, iw = 1.77 X2 (3) = 3- 99
A t test on the difference between the coefficients of PHASE 1 
and PHA^p 3 gave a value of 1.5, significant at the 10% level in a 
one sided test. There is no evidence of significant differences 
between the coefficients of the two expansion dummies or those of the 
contraction dummies. Thus, there is a striking difference between 
the results for small and large companies. Small companies, apparently 
have a lower savings to investment ratio in the initial period of the 
cycle, as defined by capacity utilisation for total manufacturing. 
The explanation for this may lie in a quicker investment response by 
the non-capital intensive firms that populate the small-firm sector.
Other uses of Cyclical Surpluses
The other possible uses of cyclical surpluses are acquisitions
and overseas investment. Since the former needs to be carefully
/planned ..... 
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planned and may be difficult to reverse, one would not expecx c 
close correspondence "between it and the savings/investment ratio. 
Kumar (1981) has found no relationship between acquisitions and gross 
investment current or lagged by up to three years for any industry 
group in the company accounts over the years 1962-76. This may be 
taken as ruling out any cyclical movement in acquisitions. Nor is 
any such movement evident from the company accounts data for the 
series on acquisitions or acquisitions by cash purchases.
However, certain categories of overseas investment may be varied 
without long-term planning or the problem of irreversibility. Sur- 
plus funds may be channelled to or from abroad in order to reduce 
interest changes.
Excluding acquisitions, the three categories of net outward 
direct investment defined in the official statistics are: unremitted 
profits, debt to parent companies on inter-company account and debt 
to UK parent companies of branches, as opposed to subsidiaries or 
associates. The definition of a branch is a technical accounting 
one, but it may be noted that branches exist mainly in Asia and 
developing countries.
It would appear from the data that the three categories are 
totally uncorrelated and that the two debt categories are highly 
volatile, perhaps reflecting speculation on exchange rate movements. 
The third category, unremitted profits, generally comprises more than 
half of all net investment and is much more stable. The ratio of 
unremitted profits as a proportion of UK companies share of overseas 
companies profits, for 1966-1980 is given in Table 3.11 and plotted
/in .....
in Figure 3A.8. It would appear from this data that there is a 
tendency for profits to be remitted in a UK downturn, the opposite 
happening during an upturn. While the data is only suggestive the 
implication is that the variation in remitted profits is due to large 
companies evening out their surpluses and deficits over the domestic 
cycle. Of course another interpretation is also possible; firms 
may remit profits during a recession abroad, i.e. when there are few 
investment opportunities there, so as to maintain dividends for the 
(mainly domestic) shareholders. As national cycles in economic 
activity have been synchronised since the late 1960's, this inter- 
pretation is plausible, but it implies that firms overseas operations 
do not incur cyclical deficits in the same way as domestic operations. 
Otherwise the transfer of profits would be difficult to understand.
Meeks (1981) gives some credence to the first of the above 
interpretations when he notes that multinationals operating in Britain 
'may have injections of cash available from their overseas operations 
should domestic cash flow be restricted at a time when domestic in- 
vestment prospects are favourable. The potential significance of 
this mechanism is illustrated by the fact that, according to our 
preliminary estimates, the top 100 members of the Department of 
Industry quoted company population derived some 25 per cent of their 
profit from overseas in 1976 (this percentage having risen from 
per cent in 1968)'. (p.138).
/TABLE 3.11
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TABLE
UK Companies Unremitted Profits (excluding oil)
Unremitted profits as proportion 
of UK companies' share of over- 
seas companies' net profits
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
197U
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
58.8
57.5
63-5
6U.U
57.0
56.1
60.8
67.0
66.1
65.1
72.3
66.6
61.8
66.9
6U.U
Source: Business Monitor, MAl;
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3«3 Conclusions
In respect of the questions posed at the end of the introduc- 
tion, it can now be stated that there is clear evidence of a dual 
economy in respect of savings and investment behaviour. However, it 
would appear that it is only correct to define this in terms of large 
and small firms rather than in terms of concentrated and unconcen- 
trated industries.
As far as the cyclical movement of savings and investment are 
concerned, the following conclusions can be drawn:-
(l) For large companies variation in savings growth rates exceeds 
that in investment growth rates. The ratio of savings to 
investment for large manufacturing companies (and all large 
companies) shows a clear cyclical pattern rising in recovery 
and falling in recession. The data seems to lead Panic's 
capacity utilisation index for reasons that are unclear, but 
the timing of turning poin'ts is a subject of some controversy 
(see Appendix 2 to this chapter for a discussion of alternative 
indices).
It should be noted however that savings depend not only on 
unit fixed costs in relation to price but on wages and com- 
modity prices as well. The movement of these latter com- 
ponents have not been theorised in this chapter but they will 
undoubtedly demonstrate some cyclical behaviour, as will tax 
payments and capital grants. Capacity utilisation then is 
but one cyclical determinant of savings, albeit an important 
one for large companies.
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(2) For small companies there seems to be some tendency for 
variation in investment growth rates to mirror variation 
in savings growth rates. Neither series seems strongly 
correlated with the cycle in economic activity. Never- 
theless the savings investment ratio for small companies 
seems to move inversely to that of large companies. The 
reason for this is obscure as both savings and investment 
seem to behave differently for the two sets of companies.
(3) There is conflicting evidence for the case that investment 
for the large companies is more stable over time than the 
small companies. However, irrespective of the truth of 
this proposition, it is clear that large companies experience 
cyclical surpluses and deficits.
Large companies accumulate big surpluses and run big deficits 
of short-term liquid assets over the cycle corresponding to 
expansionary and contractionary phases. The behaviour of all 
companies is such that small companies must also behave cycli- 
cally but totally out of phase with the large companies. 
Once again the reason for this is unclear.
(5>) Unremitted profits of UK companies and associates operating
abroad as a proportion of their share of profits seem to vary 
in such a way as to reduce the surpluses and deficits of large 
companies.
These conclusions, in particular (1) and (lj) provide strong 
evidence for the macroeconomic theories of A.S. Eichner. They
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demonstrate the importance of understanding how the accumulation of 
liquid assets by large companies during the upturn could weaken a 
recovery, set off a price-wage spiral and shorten the expansionary 
period of the cycle. They also highlight the importance of policy 
measures to reduce the cyclical surplus by stimulating investment or 
by planned incomes growth as proposed by Eichner (197&).
Finally, it should be mentioned that there is a problem in 
ascertaining causality in relation to the accumulation of liquid 
assets. The theory put forward here has represented the Eichner view 
that the tendency of large firms to invest only in line with sales - 
even when profits are disproportionately high - results in the accumu- 
lation of uncommitted funds which acts as a brake on growth in the 
manner of a self-fulfilling prophesy. While much of the evidence ad-
 
duced here supports this proposition, it is also true that the large 
firm liquid asset ratio leads the capacity utilisation series for 
total manufacturing, providing some evidence for those who wish to 
argue that large-firm liquidity affects its investment behaviour. 
Given that the liquidity ratio remains high, though falling, before 
the peak in capacity utilisation, there may be a case for arguing that 
both theories are operative.
There is some confirmation in the above results for a dual 
economy with savings and investment behaviour as stylised in Chapter 1 
However the fact that the duality is only apparent between large and 
small firms rather than between concentrated and unconcentrated groups 
of large firms indicates the need for caution in interpretation. It 
would seem that large firms, in non-oligopolistic markets or at least 
in markets where the level of concentration is not the highest, still
/behave ..... 
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behave in a similar manner to that theorised for the oligopolistic 
sector. Conversely, small firms operating in the oligopolistic sector 
may, because of factors such as single-plant operation, and the lack 
of a permanent margin of spare capacity display savings and investment 
behaviour not dissimilar from that of the competitive sector. Some 
small firms, of course may shelter under an oligopolistic price umbrella. 
This is the import of Eichner's statement - in personal correspondence 
with the author - 'while all large firms are oligopolistic, not all 
small firms are non-oligopolistic'.
In general, it is not possible to obtain data based on the 
dichotomy of large and small firms. For this reason, and because 
the dichotomy of competitive and oligopolistic sectors is a reasonable 
approximation to the former one, the original duality will continue 
to be employed in the remainder of this thesis.
The next three chapters turn the attention to the possibility 
of achieving an upward shift in the investment curve of the oligopolis- 
tic sector as a means of eliminating its cyclical surplus and prolong- 
ing an upswing in the economy's growth.
/FOOTNOTES .....
FOOTNOTES
1. There is however, a tendency for this to be negated by wage 
bargaining.
2. Note that Scherer (1973) used the same reasoning to argue that 
large - firm investment decisions being more centralised, would exhi- 
bit greater variability.
3« The argument here is reinforced by the claim that any non-linear 
relationship will be lessened by savings being transferred to or from 
the household sector as windfall profits are spent or losses are sub- 
sidised. Taxation could have a similar effect, though this may be 
distorted by allowances and payment lags. It may also be that wages 
for this sector if it is not highly unionised may lag prices and 
allow a non-linear savings relationship to emerge.
i|. The division of industries into concentrated and non-concentrated 
was achieved by selecting as the former the main industries where more 
than of sales revenue was received by five or less firms. These 
industries were Food, Drink, Tobacco, Chemicals and Allied, Electrical 
Engineering and Vehicles. From 1977, the form of the survey was 
changed in certain respects.
5>. The statistics are derived from the accounts of companies engaged 
mainly in the United Kingdom in manufacturing, distribution, con- 
struction, transport, property and certain other services. Companies 
whose main interests are in agriculture, mining, shipping, insurance, 
banking and finance and those operating wholly or mainly overseas 
are not included. The figures for 1967-69 rela~te "t° companies with 
net assets of £0.$ million or more, or gross income of £50,000 or 
more in 196U« The figures relating to non-quoted companies excluded 
exempt private companies.
During 1969 an<^ 1970 this population of companies was revised 
to cover companies with net assets of £2.0 million or more, or gross 
income of £200,000 or more in 1968.
Accounts used in the analysis are, wherever possible, the con- 
solidated accounts of groups of companies, including the balance 
sheets and profits and loss accounts of subsidiary companies within 
each group. The statistics are not therefore confined to activities 
in the United Kingdom. Where a company is excluded because it 
operates mainly overseas, the exclusion also applies to its subsidiaries 
irrespective of the location of the subsidiaries' activities.
Figures relate to companies' accounting years finishing between 
April 6 of the year shown and April 5> °f the following year. (Busi- 
ness Monitor MA3).
6. Note that the allocation of diversified companies to industries 
is somewhat arbitrary in the company accounts.
7. These statistics are published in Financial Statistics, Company 
income minus payments was calculated as the sum of 'Internal Funds 1 
and 'Net Capital Transfers'. Investment was taken as Gross Fixed 
Domestic Capital Formation.
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8. In order to obtain the ratio 3C 1 for smaller companies, the ratio 
for all large companies 3C 9 (manufacturing and distribution, etc.) was 
computed. Then, since the savings and investment figures for this 
group were approximately two- thirds of the total, the estimated ratio 
for the group of small companies was calculated as 3 (OC _ - 2/3 OCo 
where ;X"o was the ratio for all industrial and commercial companies 
Survey data for aggregate categories is available from
This construction is obviously open to criticism. The domestic 
activities of companies operating mainly overseas are excluded from 
the group of companies in the company accounts, as are companies such 
oil companies identified in footnote 5. However, this is not a major 
criticism of the large firm category in that there is no reason to 
believe that these firms would behave differently from those in the 
Company Accounts. A somewhat more serious criticism is that the 
Company Accounts data include the overseas activities of the sample 
companies, though the problem is lessened by the exclusion from the 
sample of companies operating mainly overseas. This problem cannot 
be avoided because there is no data source which gives a breakdown of 
investment by company into UK and overseas companies and some com- 
panies claim not to document this information. Extel cards, for 
instance only give UK and non-UK employment figures. Although this 
poses a problem, it is not believed to be serious enough to invalidate 
the procedures adopted here for constructing series for large and small 
company sets. Overseas taxation for the company accounts sample is 
only approximately fifteen per cent on average that of UK taxation and 
this may be taken as an indication that the proportionate weight of 
overseas activities in the large firm sample is relatively small. 
Correspondingly, the distortion induced in the small firm estimates 
is likely not to be excessively serious. One further criticism that 
can be made of the small firm estimates is that they include, in view 
of the procedure adopted, a component due to the domestic activity of 
companies operating mainly overseas. However, the main object of the 
analysis is the identification of phase differences between the large 
and small company series and the feature mentioned above should merely 
tend to cause this difference to be underestimated.
9. The dividend ratios for the two groups of companies calculated 
in relation to company income, .using net dividends up to 1972 and gross 
from 197U are given below. 1973 is excluded as the figures are re- 
corded differently:
Dividend Ratios
1970 71 72
Large Companies (Company .20 .20 .19 
Accounts Data)
Small Companies (iCC's not in .12 .12 .08 
Company Accounts)
Ii 76 77
.12 .12 .11 .12
.08 .08 .07 .07
10. The survey was an extension of the Department of Industry 
Liquidity Survey of large firms. Its findings are reported in Econo- 
mic Trends, February 1982.
/11. An
11. An exponential trend was fitted by first logging the data and 
it is the residuals froir this equation that are ana]ysed in Table 3»7»
12. The Department of Industry survey of company liquidity provides 
quarterly figures of certain short-term financial assets and liabili- 
ties for about 200 of the largest ICC's, beginning in the fourth 
quarter of 1969. For further details, see the articles in Economic 
Trends, November 197i| and Economic Trends, May 1977.
13« There is some difference in the definitions of liabilities between 
the two series as some long-term loans appear in the selected liabi- 
lities of ICC's.
1i|. Stockbuilding and trade credit are not considered in this 
According to NEDO (1976) 'the behaviour of stockbuilding is
^^f 
extremely erratic /and / there is no very close link between the 
inventory and overall cycles'. Trade credit behaviour seems to dif- 
fer between large and small firms according to the article cited 
above in Economic Trends, February 1982.
Note, however that Gilman (1981) argues that 'there is little 
evidence that multinational firms use their potential financial power 
to manoeuvre funds between currencies in pursuit of speculative gain 
{or to avoid losses) except in unusual, unstable situations' (pp.l63» 
1 614.) . Gilman also suggests that net home currency financing cf 
foreign assets depends on very rapid asset growth abroad, previous 
levels of investment and other factors influencing the availability 
of cash or credit to the overseas company.
16. It is worth noting however that a firm's cash flow can be high 
even when its stock of liquid assets is low. Weeks (19^1) failed 
to obtain significance for a variable representing the stock of liquid 
assets when entered with liquidity flow variables in a regression 
equation for gross investment. Forman and Eichner (1981) also fi,;nd 
evidence for a liquidity flow effect.
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CHAPTER 
INVESTMENT INVESTMENT INCENTIVES ; A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
U.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to show how the apparently simple 
task of establishing the determinants of investment behaviour is 
fraught with difficulty and lack of consensus. In the course of this, 
it will be evident that no consensus exists as to the effectiveness 
of short-tern) instruments to control investment.
Investment incentives of various types have been a significant 
feature of UK industrial policy for several decades. Yet, the 
published literature studying their effectiveness exhibits neither 
unanimity nor apparent convergence. It is true that some (though 
not all) of the most careful studies have found a significant and 
substantial effect of incentives on investment (e.g. Feldstein and 
Flemming, 1971)« But even if these results are confirmed, it is 
important to know which mechanism (liquidity or cost of capital) 
that the incentives are working through, since only then can they be 
judged against alternative instruments such as interest rate, taxation, 
or credit policies. If it is thought that different mechanisms 
operate for different types of firm, characterised perhaps by degree 
of market power or reliance on internal funding, then this also 
would be relevant for policy purposes.
It would seem, at first sight, a relatively easy matter to 
determine econometrically or otherwise whether policy instruments such 
as investment incentives have influenced the level of investment to 
any appreciable extent. This would seem to be especially true of 
recent UK experience where incentives have been altered frequently, 
thus providing ideal conditions for studying the responses to such
changes.
_o /The      
The apparent simplicity of the task may have lead indeed to 
an overconfident acceptance of some early results. Thomas (1972) 
referring to an earlier study which attributed a powerful role to in- 
centives (Boatwright and Eaton, 1972) termed it 'without doubt the 
most influential 1 piece of evidence to date. Yet it is clear from 
the survey by Lund (1976) that the most varied results have been 
obtained on this issue, many of them using methods and assumptions 
at least as reasonable as the one cited. Policy makers and especially 
politicians (e.g. Crossman, 1975; Healey, 1980) tend to believe that 
incentives are an important instrument. Yet the CBI have vigorously 
opposed variation in incentives, arguing that they do not have any 
appreciable effect on investment. (CBI, 1978). While this view may 
be politically inspired, it finds support in at least some of the 
studies surveyed in this chapter.
How does this wide divergence of views continue to exist for 
decades? The answer must lie, at least partly, in the difficulty of 
resolving the issue econometrically. Different researchers use 
different sets of variables, different functional forms and lag 
specifications, and even different representations of the same basic 
concepts such as cost of capital or liquidity. The number of 
pla.usible and competing hypotheses is also very large. Rowley and 
Trivedi reveal but a small part of the problem when they remark :- 
! A firm's reaction to increases in investment incentives may depend 
upon how long the incentive schemes are expected to last as well as 
on future expected demand, the response to the same incentives being 
quite possibly different under two alternative sets of demand 
expectations'. (Rowley and Trivedi, 1975, P.129).
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In this context, it is difficuli to agree on a set of nested 
hypotheses which could form the basis for an agreed programme of 
research; tests discriminating between non-nested hypotheses have 
not been adequately developed. It is rare for researchers to pay 
more than cursory attention to the inter-dependence between testing 
the efficacy of incentives and identifying the channel through which 
they are said to work (e.g. liquidity or cost of capital). More 
usually, the researcher adopts a particular viewpoint such as the 
Jorgenson approach and either omits other variables such as liquidity 
variables, or tests the latter in a non-exhaustive manner. Given 
the large number of competing hypotheses, this is probably inevitable; 
but it is clear that the results of any particular study must be treated 
with extreme caution unless it is supported with evidence from studies 
that explored the alternatives to it.
The next sections survey the investment models used in the 
empirical literature and discuss the role of incentives in these models. 
In view of the large number of studies the aim is to be representative 
rather than comprehensive.
U.2 Issues in Investment Equation Formulation
Most single equation approaches to investment modelling may be 
represented as a continuum from the neoclassical to the accelerator 
model, giving three broad classes of models as described below:-
(i) The neoclassical, Jorgenson 'type model assumes that capital
expenditure is ^reversible', i.e. capital is indistinguishable 
from other commodities that yield a return.
(ii) The vintage approach allows ex-ante substitution between capital 
and other factors of production, but rules out ex-post sub- 
stitution. /( i:ii ) The .....
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(iii) The accelerator model contains no relative price terir between 
factors of production. It is generally modified to incluae 
financial or liquidity variables.
Before discussing these approaches in the light of empirical 
results, it may be helpful to consider three issues that are of general 
interest in investment modelling, issues which are resolved in varying 
ways in empirical studies and provide a basis for contention even with- 
in the different approaches outlined above. Immediately below, we 
consider the issues of (a) replacement investment, (b) lag structure 
and (c) simultaneity.
(a) Replacement Investment
In many investment models, new and replacement investment are 
modelled separately. The usual assumption is of exponential decay 
of the capital stock, i.e. a constant rate of decay leading to a linear 
term in lagged capital stock for replacement investment. Nickell 
(1978) has surveyed the literature on decay and concluded that the 
exponential assumption is unacceptable on empirical grounds. His 
own theoretical models of adjustment costs suggest that replacement 
may be bunched on either side of cyclical peaks. Eichner (1972) found 
some evidence for pro-cyclical variation in 'replacement and moderni- 
sation' expenditure, though this component of investment was less 
variable than expansion investment. This is not inconsistent with 
Nickell.
Nickell (1978) also argued that the rate of scrapping determines 
replacement given a decision on gross investment and th£.t the former 
is a function of wage costs and the rate of interest. This would 
seem to imply that firms decide on capital appropriations before
1Q1 /deciding .....
deciding on specific investment decisions, which appears a reasonable 
assumption if major investment decisions are taker in a highly cen- 
tralised way. The conclusion then would follow that investment 
equations should seek to explain variation in gross investment. 
This is also the view taken by Kuroar (19^1). Replacement invest- 
ment under technical progress is difficult to categorise as simply 
replacement.
(b) Lag Structures
Irrespective of whether the theory is couched in terms of 
gross or net investment, it proposes an explanation for desired 
investment only. This variable is not usually observable and empi- 
rical studies impose lag structures to model the supply response, as 
well as decision lags.
The difficulty with using a lag structure with actual expen- 
diture is that the length of the lag can be expected to vary cycli- 
cally. If this is the case, the survey data on lag distributions 
obtained by Mayer (1960) and others must be treated with caution. 
This is underscored by the fact that different lag structure that 
are acceptable on a priori grounds produce widely different esti- 
mates of investment equation coefficients. Boatwright and Eaton 
(1972) report that when lag weights are determined by the Almon pro- 
cedure or the gamma distribution, the results are strikingly different
2 than when a rational distributed lag structure is used* Some of
the complications of a distributed lag structure can be avoided by 
dealing in terms of an investment appropriations framework (Nobay, 
1970), or by using data on investment orders (Lund and Miner, 1973).
/No oay'3 .....
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Nobay's approach was to take appropriations as responding with- 
out a lag to its determinants. He then represented 'normally to be 
desired' investment in terms of a single lag on appropriations and 
represented the difference between actual and 'normal' investment as 
a function of supply conditions in the capital goods industry. 
Clearly, while this avoids a lag structure, it is somewhat restrictive 
in that a variable decision lag is ruled out. The approach he:?e is 
somewhat similar to the 'realisation function' approach employed in 
the next chapter.
Only a few studies have used data on investment orders as these 
are only available for a limited data range. The longest such data 
series, that for machine tools domestically produced was utilised by 
Lund and Miner (1973) and adjusted to incli.de estimated foreign orders. 
The problem with using data on orders however, is that at times of 
high capacity, firms tend to place orders with more than one supplier, 
cancelling the multiple orders at a later date. This obviously 
lessens the reliability of the series (Fisk et al, 197U).
(c) Simultaneity
The problem of simultaneity may be illustrated by considering 
the inclusion of a relative price term as regressor in a single 
equation investment function.
Technological development makes investment goods cheaper in 
relation to wages and this impinges on managers in the form of wage 
pressure, leading to the substitution of capital for labour. Whether 
substitution occurs ex ante, ex post, or through a change in the com- 
position of output is not in question here. It is merely being
/asserted ..... 
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asserted that the relative prices of, say the interwar period are net 
compatible with the capital output ratio of the post war period. 
This simple fact is not sufficient however to merit the inclusion of 
a relative price term in a short-term investment equation. Quarterly 
or even annual variation in relative prices may have no marked effect 
on investment. Much capital equipment can be expected to last for 
several decades (apart from fairly short lived items such as vehicle 
production equipment and vehicles theuselves). Accordingly, it is 
expected relative prices that are relevant and these depend on ex- 
pected technological progress, which, if embodied depends en the 
expected aggregate level of investment. Clearly, this introduces 
an element of circularity into the model. If investment is largely 
determined by factors others than relative price, the latter is en-
dogeneous and its use in single equation estimation would be a mis-
3 
specification.
Other problems of simultaneity can occur- when variables such 
as stock-market valuations are used as regressors, as these may be 
correlated with economic activity. It has been suggested (Hall 1979) 
that the same argument applies to the interest rate variable. Hall 
argues that since interest rates are directly related to economic 
activity, its coefficient is biased downwards, thus accounting for 
those studies that have found no negative relationship between in- 
vestment and interest rates. However, this point is likely to have
more relevance for the US than for the UK where interest rates re-
fleet international rates.
/Anderson (1981) .....
Anderson (1981) raised the same problem as Hall, but in relation 
to the output variable where contemporaneous output was included as a 
regressor. The problem here is that investment is itself a component 
of output. Bean (1961) reports the use of instrumental variables to 
test for simultaneity and found no indication of 'serious' bias. The 
problem here is of course lessened when investment is disagregated and 
only a component part, e.g. plant and equipment estimated at a time.
It is interesting that if the output variable were made endo- 
geneous, it would be partly determined either by an interest rate 
variable or a varia.ble collinear with this such as oank advances for 
consumer expenditure. The fact that output demand, especially for 
consumer durables and housing is determined in this way adds yet 
another doubt as to the ability of the cost of capital term to confine 
itself to capturing the cost of capital.
A Survey of Particular Models
This section discusses the three basic models referred to 
earlier - Jorgenson, vintage and modified accelerator - drawing mainly 
on UK studies. It concludes with a review of estimation studies 
specifically testing for the effect of investment incentives, including 
questionnaire studies.
(i) Neoclassical Model (Jorgenson)
The simplest neoclassical investment nndel (Jorgenson 196?) 
assumes perfect competition in factor and product markets, perfect fore- 
sight or unchanged future prices, constant depreciation and a Cobb 
Douglas production function. The model is internally inconsistent 
since the determination of the desired capital stock is obtained by 
equating the marginal product of capital derived from the production 
function with the marginal product of capital derived from the first
order condition for maximising the time integral of net discounted
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revenue. In this procedure, output is taken as exogeneous, though 
clearly it should be jointly determined with capital and labour 
inputs if perfect competition rules.
The criticism gains added force in thk? presence of adjustment 
costs since the optimal values of inputs and output are no longer 
the static optimal values of the Jorgenson formulation and it is in- 
adequate merely to impose lags at the estimation stage to take 
accour.t of this.
The cost of capital tern, generally employed in Jorgenson-type 
investment studies is some variant of:- 
q(l-A) (d-q + r (1-T))
where q/p is the relative price of investment goods to output at
the margin 
d is the (assumed constant) rate of depreciation plus an
(assumed constant) risk premium
q is the expected rate of appreciation of capital goods 
T is a tax rate, usually corporation tax, at the margin 
A is the present value of investment allowances per unit
of capital expenditure
The second bracketted term in the numerator is sometimes re- 
presented as a post tax rate of return (Feldstein and Plemming, 1971) 
and sometimes as a post tax rate of interest (e.g. Bean, 1981). A 
weighted average of bond yields and return on equity is sometimes 
used (e.g. E^schoff, 1971). It should be noted that the use of a 
return to equity figure causes the coefficient on the cost of capital
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variable to be biased upwards and its significance to be inflated, as 
it usurps the role of the output variable. This occurs beca.use 
equity values fluctuate in response to output and investment over the 
cycle. This point has caused some researches to argue for the ex- 
clusion of equity return from the cost of capital (e.g. Coen, 1971)  
The case for this is strengthened when it is remembered that equity 
is usually raised some considerable period, often more than a year 
before it is needed for investment.
King (197U) has pointed out that tax laws influence optimal 
financing between bonds, debt, and equity. There is also a further 
problem in deciding the appropriate tax rate to use, whether it should 
be the rate on retained earnings only (implying a managerial model) 
or a weighted average of this and the rate on distributed income 
(implying a shareholder oriented model). This same question is also 
relevant to the construction of the present value series of the 
allowance variable with the consequence that the data for this can 
vary markedly even where the discount rate used is the same (e.g. 
Meliss and Richardson, 1976, Sarantis 1979). Further variants of 
the cost of capital term are possible if different expectation 
generating mechanisms, different risk premiums, or different estimates 
of depreciation are used.
Martin and O 1 Connor (1981) note that the common practice cf 
subtracting the current inflation rate frcm nominal long-run interest 
rates 'is most unlikely to give an accurate picture of the real cost 
of long-term debt finance if long-term expectations of nominal yields 
and inflation differ significantly from rates previously observed. 1
/One ..... 
- 107 -
One procedure here is to use an expectations general ing mechanism 
for prices as in Bean (19&1). An alternative solution is to derive 
an estimate of the cost of capital from an estimate of the financial 
valuation of companies in the belief that this reflects expectations 
on inflation and risk (Flemming, 1976). But different approaches by 
different researchers seem to yield quite different series here
rj
(Martin and O'Connor, 1981, pp.52-5>U)» There has recently been a 
debate, mainly among neoclassical economists as to whether share prices 
really do reflect fundamental prospects, in the form of earnings, 
dividends and othei observable characteristics of firms. Modigliani 
and Cohn (1979) argue that there is no rational explanation, only 
'money illusion* behind the movement of share prices. Pollen (1982) 
reports on a number of other contributions which attempt to come to 
grips with the reasons for the change in stock-market values over 
the 1970 f s.
The Jorgenson model has been subjected to unfavourable empiri- 
cal scrutiny by Eisner and Nadiri (1968). They estimated the elasti- 
city of desired capital stock with respect to price to be close to 
zero, when the cost of capital and the output variables were allowed 
to enter the regression separately. This result was confirmed by 
Bischoff (1969) with a vintage model using Eisner and Nadiri's data, 
but the lesults were very sensitive to the exact specification of the
Q
r component of the cost of capital. The result was confirmed when 
the long-term yield on government bonds was used for r. Buu with r 
proxied by the ratio of corporate profits plus net monetary interest 
to the value of outstanding securities, no sensible results were 
obtained. A further estimation, using Bischoff f s own data for the 
dependent variable and a cost of capital term derived from a 'trend
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adjusted weighted average of earnings price ratios and bond yields 1 
resulting in long-run -onit price elasticities. But, as Eisner and 
Nadiri noted in reply (1970), the weights and trend were themselves 
estimates from f previous investment regressions with very similar 
data.' Bischoff's formulation was incorporated in the Federal 
Reserve - MIT model and a test of its predictive ability for the 
years 1973-8 (discussed below) indicated performance inferior to that 
of the flexible accelerator (dark 1979).
Martin and O 1 Connor (1981) note that earlier researchers in 
the UK had more success in establishing a significant role for re- 
lative factor prices than more recent TJK studies. Savage (1977) for 
instance notes that 'the performance of the pure neoclassical model 
is extremely disappointing and definitely inferior to that of the pure 
accelerator'. Sumner (1979) also concludes that with regard to the 
pure neoclassical investment model, 'there are string grounds for 
its rejection'. (Both quoted in Martin and O'Connor, 1981, PP«55» 
56). Savage (1978) remarks that 'hardly any British research has 
been able to show that interest rates are an important influence on 
aggregate business investment' (p.86), though the reverse has been 
true of the US.
The cost of capital is a composite term but it is possible 
to make a priori judgements as to the signs of its constituent 
coefficients when each element is entered separately in an investment 
equation. The results are far from favourable to the cost of capi- 
tal term when this form of disaggregation is attempted (Peldstein 
and Fler-iming 1971; Bean 1981).
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Feldstein and Flemming modified the jDrgenson model in 
several ways. Firstly, like Eisrier and Nadiri they did not impose 
a unit price elasticity of desired capital stock with respect to 
the C3st of capital. Secondly, to take account of expectations 
they used short lagged values of the dependent variables in con- 
junction with the usual adjustment lag structure. In the case of 
output expectations, the secular and recent quarterly growth rates 
are utilised. Thirdly, the components of the cost of capital term, 
as described earlier are all entered separately. The r term used 
was a weighted combination of equity and debenture yields, but the 
discount rate used in calculating the present value of allowances 
was ten per cent.
The study concluded that there was f no reasonable and signi~ 
ficant response to observed changes in any term, except the allow- 
ance term. It was argued that constraining the user cost by 
entering it in aggregate form understates 'the effect of investment 
allowances ... and overstates the effect of other components of user 
cost.'
Bean (1981) also entered the elements of the cost of capital 
separately, obtaining the incorrect sign for the own product - 
capital goods relative price term, but the correct sign for the other 
terms. However, the rate of interest used in this study was a short 
rate; a long rate produced 'inferior results'. It is not clear 
therefore, whether it is sensible to view the interest rate as captu- 
ring profitability rather than liquidity or uncertainty. Also, the 
appropriate procedure of omitting the incorrectly signed variable and 
then reporting the results was not followed in this case.
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Sumner (1976) has suggested that the unsatisfactory estimates 
obtained when the elements of the cost of capital are entered sepa- 
rately may be explained by measurement error and argues that the com- 
posite variable should be used. There can be no quarrel with this 
as long as it is recognised that several a priori judgements are being- 
imposed with immunity from falsification.
(ii) Vintage Models
Vintage models represent an attempt to explain investment given 
exogeneously determined output. King (1972) justifies this by sug^- 
ge sting that firms wish to maintain or reach a fixed market share. 
Within this constraint the choice is between old and new equipment: 
the factor intensity of the latter is also a choice variable. The 
cost of utilising old equipment is usually approximated by labour costs.
Vintage models are putty-clay models in which only ex ante 
substitution between inputs is possible. One way of representing 
this is to estimate a Jorgenson-type model with separate lagged 
functions of output and relative prices (Bischoff, 1971). This 
allows for a longer average lag on the relative price term in keeping 
with the putty clay assumption. There is evidence that this formu- 
lation outperforms the neoclassical model in terms of goodness of fit 
to sample data, but its forecasting performance for US economy over 
the mid seventies was extremely poor (Clark, 1979).
King (1972) minimises the total cost of production of a project 
for an average year (the current year) , subject to a Cobb Douglas pro- 
duction function for each vintage. As he made clear (King, 197Ub) 
the model is strictly myopic and no attempt is made to relate this
/year ' s .....
- 111- -
year's plan to the plan which firms will have to make next year. 
The ratio of marginal products equals the ratio of factor prices 
under the minimisation. Also, the marginal product of labour on new 
equipment equals output per head on the oldest plant. This is the 
scrapping rule. Substituting the first condition in the production 
function yields a logarithmic relation between investment and va- 
riables representing relative wage-capital cost on the one hand and 
output to be met by new vintage on the other. The log of the latter 
can be approximated, as in King (1972) by a function of current out- 
put, or as in Peterson (1976) by a function of change in output.
Suirner (197U) extended King's model (where the cost of capital 
is calculated by a target rate of return incorporated into the constant 
term), so as to make the target rate of return a variable. Although 
the bond rate was initially used, this was abandoned in favour of 
various fixed rates. The significance of the relative price term 
was found to depend on which rate of return was used.
Peterson (1976) used a slightly different approach in that he 
assumed that all old equipment would be used, if variable cost was 
less than revenue. Using a CES production function he obtained a 
final form that had to be estimated by non-linear methods. His 
empirical results, disaggregated by type of investment and by industry 
group were poor. Within manufacturing, chemicals plant, but not 
buildings was the only case where the relative price coefficient 
(including discounted investment incentives) was significant. The 
term was however signed as expected in all cases and in the case of 
services (which includes equipment leasing) it was highly significant 
for plant and buildings.
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It should be noted that an increase in corporation tax neces- 
sarily increases investment in Peterson's formulation. This is be- 
cause a constant pre-tax rate of return is assumed as a target. In 
King's terms this is called 'zero shifting 1 . King's own results 
suggested that the opposite, or full shifting was the case, i.e. that 
firms 'were able to adjust the required pre-tax rate of return to 
fully compensate for changes in the tax rate' (King, 197Uh). Indeed 
Sumner (197^) imposed this in his estimation. Sarantis (1979) dis- 
putes King's conclusion. He extends King's model in several ways. 
Cash flow is introduced as an influence on the timing of investment 
by making the adjustment of investment to desired investment depend 
on cash flow as in Coen (1971)* This was intended to overcome the 
problem that King's formulation assumed perfect factor markets.
**
Thus, log I , = I . + (1 - ) log I, ^ where the asterisk represents 
the desired value, and the 't 1 subscript represents time. By de- 
fining A as a linear function of ^ F . ^ where P is
log 1 - log It-1
cash flow, the cash flow term appears as an extra linear term along 
with log I. ^ in King's basic investment equation. Other features
"C  I
of the Sarantis model are (1) the target rate of return is, as in 
King incorporated into the constant term. (2) The return on equity 
was used to calculate the present value of incentives. (3) An 
'effective' tax rate rather than the corporation tax rate was used, 
implying a shareholder oriented model as discussed in section U»3»(i 
([4) Following the logic of (3) the wage rate term is the money wage 
rate net of corporation tax. (£) The constant rate of return, as 
in King is allowed to enter as the pre-tax rate of return minus a 
constant times the corporation tax rate to test for shifting.
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The results of this model indicate that the relative price co- 
efficient is statistically significant in six (ort of eleven) Industrie 
and close to significant in three others. However, this must be 
treated with caution, if not skepticism. Astonishingly, the lags for 
the relative price term are identical with those of the taxation var- 
iable in all eleven cases (two unlagged, seven lagged once and three 
lagged twice). It seems likely that the post-corporation-tax defi- 
nition of the wage rate may be producing collinearity between the re- 
lative price term and the taxation variable. Nor is it easy to inter- 
pret the results. As indicated earlier, the wage rate may represent 
a demand influence. For these reasons the conclusion of zero shift- 
ing must also be viewed as questionable.
(iii) The Accelerator Model with Liquidity and Financial Variables
The assumption here is that desired capital stock is a constant 
multiple of output, implying that net investment is only carried out 
to increase output. Because of adjustment costs and delays, new 
investment is formulated as a lagged series of the change in desired 
capital stock, or equivalently of output. This 'flexible* acce- 
lerator formulation may be derived by positing a trade off between the 
 out of equilibrium 1 costs to the firm and adjustment costs under the 
assumption that firms pursue a cost minimisation strategy. (Eisner 
and Strotz 19&3). This is the single factor analogy to Schramm's 
joint input factor model discussed earlier in footnote 6.
A cash flow term is occasionally added to the model, either to 
capture the growth prospects, or the availability of funds. This 
variable may also capture some of the variation in the effective cost 
of funds as internal funds are generally regarded as a preferable
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source of finance. The cash flow variable is usually deflated and 
entered with a separate distributed lag. The variable is sometimes 
represented by net profits plus depreciation less dividend payments 
(e.g. Meyer and Glauber, 19&U). Clark (1979) used net profits, de- 
preciation allowances and stock appreciation, deflated by the price 
index for the appropriate investment category. In this form the
variable did not improve on the performance of the simple flexible
9 accelerator for the mid seventies.
The study by Meyer and Glauber mentioned above, as well as three 
other studies (Anderson, Resek and Evans) reported in Jorgenson (1971) 
used both a liquidity variable and an index of capacity utilisation. 
However, as Panic and Vernon (1975) point out in a study which in- 
cludes capacity utilisation and past profits as a ratio of net re- 
placement value, the correlation between these variables is very high, 
both varying cyclically. This accounts for the fact that sometimes 
one, sometimes the other is significant in Jorgenson 1 s survey.
The liquidity variable is not always entered as a straight cash 
flow variable. Peldstein and Flemming (1971) entered it as a separate 
component of the cost of capital, implying a direct effect on de- 
sired capital stock: this was clearly rejected by the data. Coen
(1971) obtained significant results by making the speed of adjustment
11 in a neoclassical model dependent of cash flow. Lintner (19&7)
used a leverage variable to help express the variation in the marginal 
cost of capital, though the equity value of the denominator calls his 
results into question. Bower (1965) in a case study of the brick 
industry in the US found evidence for a liquid asset to equity ratio 
in a regression which included profits but no output term. The 
interpretation offered is that firms aim at a target liquidity ratio,
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a position also adopted by Wood (1975) in his theoretical work. 
Bower argues that the liquidity ratio represents neither the influence 
of cash flow nor a. mechanical step in the build up of funds for in- 
vestment. The latter construction is dismissed for the industry 
studied because outside equity is unimportant, dividend payments are 
inflexible and the flow of revenue is unstable. This short-term 
planning view of the investment process could apply to a range of 
small quoted or unquoted companies, so that Bower's formulation may
be important in spite of his questionable econometric work and the
11 fact that his liquidity ratio is a function of equity values.
Certainly it is not admissable to include only the profits term with- 
out the output variable as Kuh (1971) has demonstrated.
A series of studies by Eisner has defended the accelerator 
model and investigated the role of liquidity as represented by past 
profits. Eisner (1960) carried out a cross section study of two 
hundred large US corporations over 1953-5* Gross real capital ex- 
penditure as a ratio of fixed assets was regressed on current and 
lagged sales growth rates, depreciation as a ratio of fixed assets 
(to proxy replacement differences) and a profit variable. When 
investment was related in this way to firms own sales, the accele- 
rator effect was found to be concentrated among firms whose sales had 
been rising and who had relatively rapid long-term rates of growth. 
This led Eisner to formulate a 'permanent investment' theory dis- 
cussed below.
Eisner (1967) carried out a series of industry and firm cross 
section and time series studies. He found that the sum of the 
accelerator coefficients was greater in industry cross sections and
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in cross sections of firm means across industries than in firm data 
cross sections. This was explained by the argument that the rele- 
vant sales figure for the accelerator model is not the firms 1 
'transitory 1 one but a permanent one approximated by the industry 
experience. This was confirmed in time series studies.
The contrast between the coefficient on the past profits varia- 
ble in the time series and in the cross section results was interpre- 
ted as evidence that profits affect the timing but not the long-run 
average of capital expenditure. In other words, firms invest 
transitory profits in the year in which they are received but over 
the long run firms earning higher profits do not carry out significant- 
ly higher investment than firms with lower profits. This is an in- 
teresting result but difficult to understand if retained earnings are 
a preferable and cheaper source of finance. Perhaps the answer is 
that firms are using their surplus funds for diversification. In 
any case Eisner's results question the existence of any liquidity 
route by which incentives might affect investment. This too is 
the implication of Kuh (1971) except that here the flow of funds can 
exert a depressive influence on investment during the planning period.
If this is accepted, incentives would be a relevant variable mainly
12 
at a particular point in the aggregate investment cycle.
It may seem somewhat surprising that few studies have shown a 
clear link between liquidity and investment, especially as external 
funds, for large companies in the UK, been less than twenty per cent 
of total sources of funds, as a historical average. In a recent 
article, Meeks (1981) has argued that in the late 1960's and 1970's, 
cash balances were squeezed sufficiently for liquidity to appear as
an important determinant of investment.
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Meeks (1981) carried out a cross-section study across firms for 
five years and eighteen industries. He regressed gross investment 
on output terms; a proxy for the age of the capital stock; and 
three liquidity terms. These latter variables were: depreciation 
provisions; retentions net of stock appreciation; and the stock 
of liquidity (short-term liquid assets). The last variable had 
little explanatory povrer but the retention variable and, especially 
the depreciation variable were generally significant. Meeks notes 
that the 'positive association between investment and internal finance 
is notic^bly more marked in years and industries when such finance is 
in relatively short supply 1 (p.137)» In other words, liquidity may 
not generally be an important determinant of investment, but it may 
become so when there is a, profit squeeze. As Meeks recognises, 
however, there is a danger in drawing time series conclusions from 
cross section studies, given that the data may merely represent dif- 
ferent behaviour patterns. It may also be the case that retentions 
and investment are jointly planned variables and that depreciation 
provisions merely represent the influence of lagged values of the 
dependent variable.
Financial Variables
Eisner (19^7) also experimented with a variable representing 
the market value of the firm, but this caused the output coefficient 
to become insignificant. In many other studies, however a variant 
of this has been attempted. One popular representation is to enter 
the 'valuation ratio' i.e. the financial valuation of the firm over 
the replacement cost of capital, an index known also as the Q, index. 
The lower the valuation ratio, the less keen firms are expected to 
be to acquire new fixed capital assets and the more keen they are
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expected to be to engage in takeovers. (Tobin, 19&9). There are 
serious measurement problems here however, not only with the replace- 
ment cost variable, which should be a marginal concept, but also with 
the market value term, given that it represents more than fixed assets. 
Perhaps more seriously, the causal nature of the relationship has been 
inadequately defended. The index may be responding to the same or 
similar sets of variables as investment. If so, it is little more 
than a leading indicator of investment in much the same way as in- 
vestment intentions data are. This criticism applies to all models 
that use stock market indicators such as Panic and Vernon (1975) and 
Lund and Miner (1973). Clark (1979) found that a simple linear model 
in current and lagged Q, values gave inferior prediction results than 
the flexible accelerator for the mid seventies, though he did not 
attempt to estimate a combination of the two models. Although this 
is understandable, given the collinearity between the variables, the 
notion that all investment decisions can be captured in the rule that 
investment takes place if the marginal addition to market value exceeds 
the cost price of fixed capital seems a very restrictive one, implying 
a strict shareholder oriented approach, and ignoring market share 
considerations.
Recent UK studies reveal conflicting evidence on the usefulness 
of Tobin 1 s Q, variable (Martin and 0'Connor, 1981). The Bank of 
England Bulletin (1977, June, p.1^7) states that results with this 
variable have 'not been particularly encouraging 1 . On the other 
hand, Oulton (1978) using a data series on Q, quite dissimilar to the 
Bank's suggests that it outperforms other variables. Clearly, little 
reliance can be placed in a variable which is so difficult to measure.
UK
U.U UK Models Specifically Testing the Effects of Incentives
The studies discussed in this section are frequently quoted in 
support of the effect of investment incentives in raising UK invest- 
ment above what it would otherwise have been. But it will be appre- 
ciated in view of the earlier survey of investment models generally 
and of the difficulties in interpreting the results that a critical 
and cautious approach is in order.
Very often, the studies only purport to be a direct investi- 
gation of the effect of incentives. But as the incentive variable 
is entered in a composite cost of capital variable e.g. in Agarwala 
and Goodson (19&9) or Boatwright and Eaton (1972), it is not clear 
that the effect of investments are being subjected to any direct or 
clear test.
Many of the studies have unacceptable features. For instance, 
Argawala. and Goodson used only two variables, a liquidity and a profit- 
ability variable in their regressions. Variation in the 'profitabi- 
lity' varia.ble is almost totally due to the influence of the cycle 
while the liquidity variable is heavily trended.
Boatwright and Eaton (1972) estimated a Jorgenson-type model 
based on a CES production function. Unacceptable features of this 
study were the use of a composite cost of capital term (including 
incentives), the use of dividend yield for r, and the lack of a 
liquidity variable.
Lund and Miner (1973) carried out an elaborate study of in- 
vestment in equipment by considering as a dependent variable the order
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level for machine tools produced domestically plus estimated imports. 
They rejected the approach of formulating a macro investment equation 
from micro-level "behavioural considerations in view of aggregation 
problems. Instead they utilised Keynesian theory to select variables 
that might either influence the marginal efficiency of investment 
schedule or the marginal cost of funds schedule. These variables 
were then entered linearly.
The formulation adopted includes a partial adjustment mechanism 
to desired capital stock. This is proxied in two ways: either by 
output, or by existing capital stock times the actual capital utili- 
sation divided by the desired capital utilisation. The latter is 
assumed constant and subsumed into the coefficient. Capital utili- 
sation is proxied by CBI intentions data. Replacement is modelled 
by a constant times actual capital stock. A stock market variable 
is derived by taking the residual from a regression of share prices 
on current profits. Other variables are the company tax rate, allow- 
ances a.nd grants, past profits, the bank rate and the rate on Consols. 
The estimation was on quarterly data 19561 to 19&9II  ^le variables 
were, where appropriate, defined in terms of the machine tools sup- 
plied industries, mainly engineering.
A surprising result was the lack of significance of the re- 
tained profits variable. Equally surprising is the positive (though 
not significant) coefficients on the long-term interest rate. The 
expectations variable, tax rate, the desired capital variable and the 
replacement variable are all highly significant with the correct sign. 
As for the variable representing allowances and grants it was positive 
and significant whenever the output variable was used to proxy desired
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capital stock, but negative (with a t value of up to -1.25) when- 
ever the CBI estimated capital utilisation variable was used. This 
result does not inspire confidence in the study.
Sumner (19^1) has presented an interesting study in which he
 
fits a series of investment equations - the best fitting being of 
the putty-clay type - and then examines the prediction errors in and 
around the period of investment grants in the mid to late sixties. 
Many conclusions emerge from this study. The grants were effective, 
Sumner argues, though the effect was felt with a lag of two years 
and was partially offset by a switch from non-manufacturing to manu- 
facturing investment.
U»5> Interview and Questionnaire Studies
The conflicting evidence from econometric research compels 
one to refer to the less satisfactory approach of interview/question- 
naire studies. Two such studies, one of them unpublished, are sum- 
marised in Lund (1976). Unfortunately, the evidence is again some- 
what conflicting. The study of large retailing firms reported in 
George (1968) suggests that while incentives are often important, 
liquidity is the main influence. On the other hand, the Ministry of 
Technology survey (1970) suggests that the channel of influence is 
profitability in two thirds of the cases where incentives are im- 
portant. Almost all firms thought investment was sensitive to in- 
centives, though only two fifths were 'very sensitive 1 .
Lund also reports that DCF methods are used in appraising only 
approximately U0$> of investment. The Ministry of Technology survey 
also seemed to suggest that only a few, even of the largest firms,
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make allowance for tax payable on distributed profits. Other 
studies are reported in Thomas (1972). Among the information 
collated here is the suggestion that firms most responsive to invest- 
ment incentives were those that did not employ any method of invest- 
ment appraisal. This of course may simply mean that smaller firms 
are more sensitive to incentives than larger ones. However, this 
would appear to conflict with the view expressed in the Wilson 
Committee Report that large firms are more sensitive to incentives 
(Lloyd, 1975)« Two recent and intensive studies are those of 
Rockley (1973) and NEDO (1975).
In Rockley f s study, there was considerable variation (and 
significant differences between differently sized companies) in the 
definition of the cost of capital. The following table already 
shown in footnote 21 of Chapter 2 and reproduced here for convenience, 
gives the percentages determining the cost of capital in various ways.
TABLE 1+.1
Borrowing Average Dividend Opportunity
. n 0 , Rate Cost Policy Cost Annual Sales 
less than £10M 62 8 8
£10 - 50M £0 11; - £
greater than ££OM 29 29 6
Many firms did not explicitly assess a cost of capital.
In the NEDO study the main survey covered a subset of Industrial 
and Commercial companies accounting for approximately of gross fixed 
capital formation in manufacturing. All companies in the survey had 
capital employed of more than £1M. The survey throvs some light on
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the role of liquidity and cost of capital in constraining invest- 
ment. It is argued that both of these factors were not considered 
as constraining investment up to 1973* During the 1960's retained 
profits financed 95% of investment and firms carried out external 
funding every four or five years. In the period since 1973> appro- 
ximately two thirds of the firms surveyed were regarded as con- 
strained in their investment planning. The main factor mentioned 
in terms of financial constraint was the problem of stock appreciation. 
Price control was the next most important factor. The high level 
of gearing also featured prominantly. The answers seemed to indicate 
that firms thought in terms of the availability rather than the cost 
of capital, though this may have been the result of the questions 
asked. Low market values were presented as a constraint on avai- 
lability, though clearly funding through a rights issue is not 
impossible, only impracticable. However, if companies focus on 
availability rather than cost of capital, it may be that variation 
in liquidity is a. more important indicator of investment intentions 
than the cost variable.
Since October 197U> the CBI Industrial Trends Survey has asked 
a six-monthly question on company liquidity. Firms are asked to 
report on what action has or will be taken in response to any de- 
terioration in liquidity. The figures given are reproduced below 
along with the end-period change in liquidity noted for the whole 
sample. It is clear that liquidity has had the effect of at least 
postponing planned investment during this period.
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TABLE i|.2 
Action taken to reduce: and/or;
Liquidy
3.Position
-66
-36
+16
+21
+12
- 1
+ 5
+ 2
+ 6
-21
-29
- 7
+20
+10
0
Survey
Oct ?U
Apr 75
Oct 75
Apr 76
Oct 76
Apr 77
Oct 77
Apr 78
Oct 78
Apr 79
Oct 79
Apr 80
Oct 80
Apr 81
Oct 81
Apr 82
Oct 82
Invest-
ment
35
15
7
1
1
2
2
3
2
7
11
13
13
6
5
11
Stocks
33
29
16
9
9
10
11
10
10
5
11
19
23
16
7
12
12
Employ-
ment
7
7
6
2
3
1
2
2
U
1
3
U
15
11
6
5
5
Output
5
3
1
+
+
3
1
2
+
1
3
5
3
1
+
2
Tighter
credit
28
16
8
3
3
5
5
5
2
7
10
10
6
U
5
6
Raise
prices
5
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
3
+
2
1
+
+
1
+
1
Borrow
18
11
5
6
10
9
7
8
8
6
7
6
7
3
3
3
3
Other
23
16
10
6
U
3
3
6
6
7
12
15
1U
12
7
5
7
* All figures are weighted percentages of the total sample 
+ indicates a positive response of less than -g- per cent 
a. Difference between the showing an improvement and 
showing a deterioration in liquidity in the previous 
twelve months.
Source : CBI Industrial Trends 
Survey, October 1982
However, for large firms at least, the liquidity problems seem 
to arise mainly from a shortage of internal finance. The percentage 
of respondents in the largest firm category (greater than five thou- 
sand employees) reporting that their investment was constrained by a
/shortage .....
shortage of internal finance averaged thirty-seven per cent between 
1975 and 1979- The corresponding figures for those mentioning an 
inability to raise external finance was only four per cent. Al- 
though no comparative figures are given as to how the tendency to 
reduce investment in response to worsening liquidity varies by firm 
size, the Survey notes that 'reductions in capital expenditures were 
most marked for the largest participants' (p.1l|).
U.6 Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from the mass of evidence pre- 
sented above? Very few, it would seem. The accelerator model seems 
to have the best single performance, but the rationale for this is 
obscure. It is not clear whether past output is a proxy for ex- 
pectations of profitability, an indication of pressure on large firms 
to maintain market share, or whether the accelerator has a more tech- 
nical 'fixed coefficients' rationale.
Three statements seem worthwhile making on the basis of the 
above survey. Firstly, if the cost of capital is to be included, 
its component parts should be entered separately. The few studies 
that have done this have given rise to serious doubts that all the 
components are correctly represented when a composite term is used.
Secondly, future studies would do well to represent the de- 
pendent variable in as disaggregated form as possible. While re- 
cognising that such studies might have to be supplemented by aggregate 
investigations, it would surely add to existing knowledge if, sa.y 
defensive investment (which might be negatively related to the profit 
rate) could be distinguished from expansionary investment (which
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might be positively related). It might also be rewarding to separate 
large firm investment from small and medium firm investment. It does 
not seem sensible to posit similar behaviour for all categories of 
investment.
Thirdly, it remains unclear whether incentives influence in- 
vestment, and, if they do, whether they operate through liquidity or 
through cost of capital. Progress here may again depend on dis- 
aggregating categories of investment. The next two chapters take 
some steps in this direction.
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FOOTNOTES
1. This holds also for more sophisticated neo-classical models 
such as that described in footnote 6,
2. A rational distributed lag was also used by Burman (1970), who 
noted that the Jorgenson cost of capital term was not significant in 
this formulation.
3. See in particular Zarrowitz (1972) chart 5> P«1£5 where the 
price movements of producer finished goods and consumer finished goods 
are closely correlated.
A different problem is met when, as in some formulations, re- 
lative factor prices, e.g. the wage - capital goods price ratio w/q 
is included. This may be correlated with the real wage which varies 
pro-cyclically, while reflecting productivity change in the long- 
run. An additional problem arises here due to the demand effects 
of changes of distribution from or towards labour as the real wage 
rate changes.
I).. When a long-term interest rate is entered in level form at 
current value or with a short lag, it is frequently found to "he of 
the incorrect sign e.g. Lund and Miner (1973). Hines and Catephores 
(1970) suggest that government aation in tightening monetary policy 
implies contemporaneously high rates of interest and investment peaks. 
Savage (1978) has reviewed the performance of the interest rate term 
in UK investment equations, confirming its general insignificance.
£. According to the FBI Survey (i960), companies treat the Bank. 
Rate as an index of expected consumer behaviour.
6. The Jorgenson model can be made consistent by considering the 
joint derivation of factor demand equations arid incorporating ad- 
justment costs directly into the investment decision rule. This 
approach has been followed in several studies including Schramm 
(1970).
Schramm uses a general production function approximation 
F(X.) = aX, + X ' A X , with capital and non-capital inputs, represented
"C "U "C ~G
by the vector X, . An adjustment cost vector, representing the sum"C
of all adjustment costs is assumed to be a quadratic function of A X, .
c(A xt ) = AX{. DAxt
It may be shown that maximising the discounted sum of present 
value (defined to include adjustment costs) subject to the production 
function yields an input demand vector dependent on the difference 
between desired and actual level of all inputs. This may be repre- 
sented as follows :-
X, = B(X* - X, ) where X* is desired level and B is an adjustment 
cost matrix.
The desired target X* is then replaced by the long-run expecta- 
tion of the target, this being generated by forming expectations as 
to the movement of the relative price variables that the stationary 
target depends on.
/Fcr 
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For the three input case (labour, fixed capital and liquid
capital) used by Schramm, the following equation is obtained for a
change in the capital stock:-
A.K.J. = f(u./p, i\/P» u /p, K,L,M) where M is liquid capital, K fixed
capital, L labour, u factor price and p output price, and where the 
lower case subscripts correspond to the upper case ones.
The result may be seen as similar to a hybrid of an accelerator 
model with output proxied by levels of K and L (with the inclusion of 
a liquidity variable) and a neo-classical model with separable cost 
of capital effects.
Sarantis (19^0) altered the above model to one where the discoun- 
ted integral of dividend streams was maximised and introduced borrow- 
ing as an extra factor input. Annual data for eight industries and 
all manufacturing over twenty two years was used. Sarantis reports 
that the 'relative price of fixed capital has the expected negative 
effeci? on investment in 8 out of 9 cases and 'is statistically sig- 
nificant in most of them 1 . However, the huge variation between 
industries in the short-term response seems implausible. It should 
be noted that the 'relative price' term to which Sarantis refers is 
a composite cost of capital variable in which equity values are used 
to calculate r and the value of incentives. It may also be noted 
that a zero order restriction is imposed on the coefficient of the 
long-run interest rate in seven out of nine estimations and that the 
presence of this variable in one of the two remaining equations 
results in a positive sign for the cost of capital coefficient.
7. There are enormous difficulties involved in any method chosen 
to assess the cost of capital. For instance it may not be very 
interesting just to know the average expected inflation rate. Brittan 
(1983) reports on a survey of US financial officers which showed that 
their average inflation expectation for 1982-87 was but this was 
hedged by the view that a take-off into hyper inflation had a one- 
third probability. As for the method adopted by Flemming et al 
(1976), the Wilson Report (HMSO 1982), referring to the estimated 
fall in the cost of capital during the 1960's remarks that 'there 
is no evidence to show that industrialists reduced their cut-off 
points in response to the fall during the 1960's, nor indeed that 
they have raised them again subsequently' (p.1l(5)«
8. Bischoff criticised the autocorrelated errors of Eisner and 
Nadiri's study, but elimination of this problem did not confirm 
Jorgenson's model (Eisner and Nadiri, 1970).
9* However, other studies, e.g. Barman (1970) found retentions 
plus depreciation a significant extra regressor in an accelerator 
model.
10. This was confirmed for the absolute level of profits and a 
different index of capacity utilisation by Nobay (1970).
.11. Coen's results may be interpreted differently as indicating 
a supply response of the capital goods industry (Lund, 1976).
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12. His conclusion is that 'the initial funds position, a result 
of many forces "beyond the firms control, is a basic consideration in 
short-term investment planning 1 . This view is challenged for large 
firms in Meeks
13. Eisner (19^7) also estimated an alternative model which included 
capacity utilisation and rate of return on equity. The former 
variable improved the regression but the rate of return coefficient 
was non-significant in cross-section and negative in time series, re- 
flecting, according to Eisner, the positive relationship between 
investment and market value. Not surprisingly, Jorgenson (1971) 
claims that a cost of capital effect is being captured by this result.
11+. The papers by King (1972), Sumner (197U), Sarantis (1979) and 
Peldstein and Fl enroling (1971) have already been discussed. Other 
UK studies: Burman (1970), Nobay (1970), and Rowley (1972) give 
conflicting results as to the significance or route of influence of 
incentives (Lund 1976). Burman for instance found only a possible 
influence through the liquidity variable in an accelerator model. 
Wall, Preston, Bray and Peston (1975)> using the methodology of their 
control theory model of the economy found no significant role for 
incentives at all.
Lloyd (1979) reports on medium sized firms surveyed for the 
Wilson Committee to assess the effect of government assistance for 
investment. 'Seemingly in contrast to some large companies, the 
overwhelming response was that the availability of such assistance 
:iad, at most, a marginal effect on the investment decision, although 
naturally companies would take what was going. Although the Grants 
may be substantial in relation to the initial capital cost of a 
proposed investment, they were only of marginal significance in the 
context of total long-term operating costs.' (p»39)»
16. Lloyd (1979) reports that of the fifty medium sized firms in
the Wilson Report survey, only two companies were found to have for-
mally assess-d a cost of capital. (p»39).
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CHAPTER 5
THE EFFECT OF INVESTMENT - DIRECTED POLICY INSTRUMENTS; COMPARING
ACTUAL WITH INTENDED INVESTMENT
5.1 Introduction
It is possible and perhaps likely that more can "be learned about 
investment behaviour by studying investment intentions ar-d corres- 
ponding actual investment than by estimating actual investment func- 
tions. The presence of decision lags and delivery lags and the 
pursuance of a cost minimisation policy by firms implies that the 
investment function is a distributed lag of the determinants of the 
capital stock. This raises nralticollinearity problems, problems 
that are exacerbated if it is desired to make the delivery lag or 
the adjustment coefficient endogenous (or cyclical). These problems 
are lessened, though not avoided in the study of the discrepancy 
between actual and intended investment. It is still difficult to 
isolate supply delay factors, but, as is discussed below, the only 
other determinants of the discrepancy can be assumed to be unanticipa- 
ted changes in the determinants of the desired capital stock.
The following section. 5.2 outlines the theoretical origins of 
the approach adopted in this chapter. Then, in section 5«3 certain 
variations are suggested on the model derived by Lund et al (1976). 
The results of estimating the revised model are reported in later 
sections for the aggregate case and for a number of individual indus- 
tries.
5.2 Origin of the Theory of Realisation Functions
As noted by Modigliani and Cohen (1980), the use of forecast 
data on investment and its determinants 'might simplify considerably
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the task of deriving specific behaviour functions of the type re- 
quired in the simultaneous equations approach to forecasting. It 
would enable us to bypass the problem of estimating general behaviour 
functions, replacing it with the presumably much easier task of esti- 
mating realisation functions, that is, determining the extent to which 
errors to anticipation cause the actual course of action to deviate 
from decisions and plans.' (p»93)
Referring to this approach, Fiowley and Trivedi (1975) note that 
actual and intended investment may not be equal because '... the 
decision-maker's environment has changed, new information has become 
available to him concerning the path of uncontrolled variables, or 
objectives have been revised ... This reduced form approach acknow- 
ledges our imprecise knowledge of basis structural relations ir in- 
vestment behaviour and wholly concentrates on simple forecasts. 1 (p«l8)
Eisner (1962), again following a similar approach, has indicated 
which variables need to be included in a realisation function. 
'Investment and investment plans are determined by essentially the same 
variables. Aside from random disturbances, they differ because of 
changes in the values of these determining variables between the points 
of time at which plans are formulated or revealed and the points of 
time at which they are executed.' (p«190)
Modigliani and Weingartner (1958) have further qualified this 
by noting that in principle, 'the realisation function should include 
all variables that may exert a significant influence on the actual 
behaviour of the firm and which are capable of significant unantici- 
pated variation over the interval covered by the plan, ... it need 
not include initial conditions ... because the initial conditions
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are fully reflected in the plan itself ...' (pp 38, 39).
As an example of the above procedure, consider a simplified 
example from Modigliani and Weingartner (1958),
The capital stock (K) planned for period t, at t-1 is proportional 
to the level of sales (s) expected for period t, at t-1. 
K(t-1 , t) = a. S (t-1 , t)
Ignoring depreciation, the planned investment may "be repre- 
sented as (t-1, t) = K (t-1, t) - K (t-1 ) if planned adjustment 
is instantaneous, where K (t-1-) is the actual capital stock at time 
t-1. If planned adjustment is not instantaneous, the right hand 
side should "be multiplied by an adjustment coefficient. Actual- 
sales at time t are represented by S(t). The actual level of invest- 
ment at time t, l(t) may be represented as a weighted average of the 
initially planned investment and what might be called the ex-post 
desirable investment l(t,t). If desired adjustment is instanta- 
neous, the latter is just the difference between desired capital stock 
at time t, K(t,t) and the actual capital stock at t-1; otherwise 
it may be represented as a constant fraction of this, the fraction 
representing an adjustment coefficient. Thus, investment at time t,
I(t) = b.I (t,t) + (1-b) I(t-1,t)
Interpreting 'a' as the capital-output ratio and substituting for
I (t,t) = K(t,t) - K(t-l) 
and I(t-1,t) = K(t-1,t)-K(t-l) 
gives :
+ c. ( S(t,t) - S(t-1,t) )
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where S(t,t) is the revised expectations of sales at time t, made 
at time t. Modifying the substitutions for the case of non-unit 
adjustment coefficient does not alter the above result. Correcting 
for different price bases, the authors estimated this equation using 
various functional forms, including an equation where the percentage 
error of investment plans was regressed on the percentage change in 
expected sales.
With a constant term included, this allows for a constant per- 
centage bias in the forecasts of investment. Since the authors did 
not model supply delays, this formulation is equivalent to assuming 
that these contribute to a constant percentage error in the forecasts 
of investment.
Eisner (19^2) has also estimated models of this form. Using
the same basic notation as before, his nodel may be represented as
  nn 1 follows:
+ m(B) S(t)-S(t-1,t) +
S(t-1,t) 
n(B)P(t)-P(t-l) + q(b)
P(t-l)
Where the upper case B represents a polynomial in the lag operation 
and P represents Profits,,
This formulation merits some discussion as regards the lag 
structure, since the approach under discussion was intended to sim- 
plify this problem. When the independent variable is expressed as 
a function of the difference between actual and expected values, as 
is the case above with the sales variable, a lagged value can only
/be .....
be justified by assuming that the discrepancy between sales at 
time t-1 and expectations of these sales formed at t-2, is not known 
when investment plans are formulated or revealed at t-1 , i.e. unless 
an information lag is present. Noting that the lagged sales term 
was insignificant in his cross section results, Eisner (1962) re- 
marked that 'sales' realisations, pretty much known at the time 
capital expenditure anticipations were reported, should have little 
effect on the difference between actual and anticipated investment 1 
(pp 195, 196).
When the independent variable is expressed as a function of the 
difference between observed variables at time t and time t-1 (as for 
variables such as profits for which no reliable anticipatory series 
is generally available) it may be that planned investment responds to 
such variables with a combined information and anticipation-forming 
lag. In other words, where it is not possible to know what data are 
being used to form anticipations, the realisation function may best 
be represented as a lagged polynomial of past differences in the hope 
that this will capture the decision making process of forming anti- 
cipations. It would seem, however that the lags involved here are 
very short (Eisner 19&2, p.198)» The inclusion of a lagged differ- 
ence term may be justified by hypothesising an expectations forming 
process where P(t-1,t) = P(t-1) + a. ( P(t-l) - P(t-2) ).
A more general expectations scheme, such as the adaptive ex- 
pectations scheme would imply a lagged polynomial in actual profits, 
in addition to the current difference term.
Although the use of the current difference term on its own might
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involve model mis-specification in that the actual change in profits 
might not adequately capture the discrepancy from expected profits, 
it could "be justified if expectations were assumed to be myopic.
The use of the lagged dependent variable was not properly justi- 
fied in Eisner's model. The lagged l(t) term was also justified 
only in an ad hoc manner, as serving to correct for 'error in anti- 
cipation'. Subsequent work referred to later in this chapter 
suggests that this ten? may act as a cyclical indicator for swings 
in optimism, or for supply delays.
It may be concluded that although a lag structure may be justi- 
fied in realisation functions the lags will be short as they re- 
present only information and anticipation forming lags. The problem 
of modelling gestation lags is completely avoided, except in so far 
as it may be appropriate to include an indicator of supply delays.
5.3 Recent British Work on_Realisation Functions
A thorough review of previous work with the Bepartmert of 
Industry intentions survey data is giver, in Lund, et at (1976). An 
updated version of the main theoretical model adopted there is given 
in Lund et al (1980), where the version of the model employed and 
tested includes a consideration of the effects of inflation.
The final model in the above work is derived as follows.
Investment at current prices is represented by a forecast 
volume, plus a volume revision, modified by a price change ra.tio term, 
whose exponent is the price elasticity, and then expressed in current 
prices. The price change referred to is the ratio of current to
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expected price levels.
In current prices,
(where I, I, i are actual forecast, and revision to investment 
volume: P, P actual and expected price level)
. (pt/pt)e   it   pti/ u LI
= (1
e)
- G
A A
where G. = I, . P, = intended investment in terms of expected future 
prices, the price basis which most respondents use.
Surveying the combined results of the two studies on this 
point in 1970 and 1972, Lund et al (1976) remark that 'it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the vast proportion of manufacturing 
industry 1 s stated intentions are expressed in terms of expected 
future prices 1 (p.37) 
In constant price terms,
For small 'e 1 and price forecasting errors, Lund et al (1980) 
employs a linear approximation to (2) with six terms, though their 
reported regressions omit three of these terms.
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Unlike the previous studies by Lund et al, the model derived 
"below uses a log form so as to economise on degrees of freedom and in 
order to avoid the multiccllinearity problems of the linear approxi- 
mation.
Lund et al (1976) have noted that 'The choice of linear for- 
mulations is essentially arbitrary and arguments could be made for 
adopting a logarithmic formulation 1 . (p.1+1).
Furthermore a better formulation for testing the performance 
of the model is obtained if the equation is divided through by G,,
since otherwise the close correspondence between I and G guarantees
2 
a good fit. Thus we have, dividing (1) by G, and taking logs,
U
log (It Pt) = log (1 + + (1 + e) log (Pt/Pt)     (3)
The price change variable is intended to capture not only the 
liquidity constraints of budget oriented firms (where the variable 
represents the price change of capital goods) but the general effect 
of uncertainty, particularly in so far as this is reflected in high 
nominal interest rates (Bean 1981). Since the price change variable 
is concerned to capture absolute as opposed to relative prices (and 
as the relative prices term has rarely been shown to be individually 
significant in investment studies), it seems permissable to use the 
expected future price of manufacturing output re.ther than that for 
capital goods procured. A price expectation series for manufacturing 
output has been constructed by Bean (1981) on the basis of CBI data 
and since this seems more straightforward than the expected price
/series ..... 
- 138 -
series for capital goods constructed by Lund et al (1980) on the 
basis of data collected only since November 1972, we have used the 
former series.
Adopting a multiplicative form for the volume revision gives:
V? = a 
t
where Yt/. is the ratio of output in the 1st quarter of the current
t-1
year to that in the la.st quarter of the previous year (when the survey
ii G ~ 
was undertaken). ( d/G) is the ratio of deflated intentions to its
trend, a variable introduced by Lund et al (197&) "to reflect the over- 
reaction of firms to cyclical indicators and which, in Lund et al 
(1980) is taken as reflecting a combination of this and supply delay
factors. ( t/n ) represents a subset of other variables from aUt-1
vector -, entered in a similax form to the output variable. These 
latter variables are discussed later.
The stochastic specification of the model may be effected by
adding a multiplicative error term, u, to ([4.) , where u is assumed
to be distributed independently of the regressors and to have expec-
tation unity.
The stochastic equation, to be estima.ted may nov/ be written as:
log t = log (a) + b^ log Yt + log . log
Yt-1 ot-1
+ log (u )
/Since .....
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Since the expected value of log (u) is not zero, the constant 
term will not be an unbiased estimate of log (a), but rather of (log 
(a) + E(log (u)), where E is the expectations operator. The second 
term in the parentheses is less than zero. However, the main in- 
terest is in the estimated elasticities rather than in the constant 
term, so the bias is of no great concern.
It may also be shown that under the multiplicative disturbance 
specification, the conditional variance of the dependent variable 
varies with the dependent variables and is proportional to the square 
of the expected value of the dependent variable. In other words, 
the error pattern assumed is heteroskedastic. (Goldberger, 1968, p.121). 
This seems appropriate for the situation under consideration, where 
the forecast discrepancy could be expected to have a higher variance 
for greater shifts in the conditioning variables, i.e. for higher 
values of the regressors.
5>.U The Forecast Discrepancies
At regular intervals the UK Department of Industry surveys a 
sample of representative firms in various industries and obtains 
unadjusted forecasts for each industry and for various aggregates. 
These are then adjusted on the basis of past patterns of discrepancy 
between forecast and actual investment. In the manufacturing sector, 
unadjusted intentions data generally overstate actual investment. 
The reasons for this are somewhat obscure. As Lund et al (1976) 
notes, there is considerable variation in the manner in which companies 
compile their forecasts. Some companies have to report calendar 
year forecasts by interpolation from data on accounting years. Some 
companies, probably the larger ones, are thought to report board
/authorisations ..... 
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authorisations for investment expenditure, which are more in the 
nature of provisional ceilings. The major part of the discrepancy 
may be caused by larger companies, because of their weight in the 
sample, but they appear to have a better record for accurate fore- 
casting than the smaller ones. Of a sample of firms in the 
Chemicals industry, 1^9% of the large, but only of the medium size 
firms had a discrepancy of less than twenty per cent (Lund et al 
1976, p.30).
Interview studies carried out to discover the origin of the 
discrepancies revealed surprise on behalf of management at their 
extent. The discrepancies were attributed mainly to supply delays 
and difficulty in phasing in new equipment. There was little em- 
phasis on changes in government policy (Lund et al, p.29).
The following tables, extracted from CBI (1978) give an indi- 
cation of the reasons behind the project delays, aid an indication 
also of the extent of these delays.
TABLE 5.1
Details of the delays outside the firms control (M% of projects 
surveyed)
Reason Frequency Average Delay (months)
Technical, late deliveries, 31% U-6 
shortages in raw material
Depressed general level of eco- 27% 6-8 
nomic activity (inc.3 day week)
Industrial Relations 20% 2-3
Direct Government Delays 12% 9-18 
Safety and Planning etc.
Hazards, e.g. weather 10% 1-U
- 
/TABLE 5.2
TABLE
Details of delays by decision of firm (16% of projects surveyed)
Reason 
Financial 
Technical
Economic (e.g. Market Failure) 
Accidents
Frequency 
38°/o 
31°/o
Average Delay 
2-6 months 
2 - months 
up to 2 years 
up to 5 years
In terms of Table 5>»1 there is little surprise, but it is 
important to note two points. The depressed general level of 
economic activity delays projects considerably, reinforcing the 
effect of this variable (or its proxy in causing deliverate postpone- 
ment). Secondly, industrial relations cs.use relatively minor de- 
lays of 2-3 months, implying that if the level of stoppages is 
used as regressor it should refer to the last quarter only.
Table reveals a surprisingly large role for financial 
factors in delaying the delivery of capital goods. However, it is 
not clear from the question whether it should be interpreted as 
referring to the cost or the availability of finance.
5.5 The Data
Four main investment forecasts are collected in the Department 
of Industry enquiry. These will be referred to as the preliminary; 
first main; second main; and third main. The dates of the 
enquiry and the periods to which they refer are given below.
/Preliminary .....
Date of Enquiry Years for which forecast obtained
Preliminary Nov/Dec t-2 t
1st main Aug/Sept t-1 t
2nd main Nov/Dec t-1 t
3rd main Aug/Sept t t
The preliminary forecasts are only available since 1965> 
The others are available from 1961
The study reported on here utilises the combined plant, machinery 
and vehicles data of the second main enquiry only and compares the 
forecasts with the actual outcomes for the following year - termed 
the 'current 1 year in what follows. The preliminary enquiry is 
not considered due to a lack of data. The third main enquiry occurs 
too late for the discrepancy to be interpreted primarily as a response 
to corrective action. The first main enquiry is not considered 
because corrective action may be taken before the current year.
The decision to utilise only the second main enquiry, i.e. to 
utilise only the forecast for year t made in November and December 
of the previous year, raises a further problem for estimating a 
realisation function, viz. the extent to which actual investment can 
respond to a new desired value in such a short time interval. The 
study by the CBI (19?8) is useful in this regard.
By giving frequency distributions of lead times of investment 
projects, it allows a judgement to be made on the extent to which 
revisions over a year are likely to occur. The table below is 
extracted from the survey.
/TABLE £.3 .....
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TABLE 5.3
Distribution of lead times in manufacturing industry (months)
Stage I
Start of 
Development 
Work to Board 
Authorisation
Stage II
Authorisation 
to Date of 
Principal 
Contract
Stage III
Principal 
Contract to 
beginning of 
Installation
Stage IV
Beginning of 
Installation 
to Regular 
Production
All
10% shortest 
10% longest 
20% largest
29
It should be noted that the above times refer to all projects 
including large scale construction works. It is likely that projects 
involving plant and machinery as a main item are clustered towards the 
shorter end of the spectrum. It seems quite possible therefore that 
investment in plant and machinery can easily be varied up and down 
within the time of one year.
5.6 Estimation for the Total Sample
Estimating equation (3) for 1961-1979* without yet entering 
any of the 0_ vector of variables gave results which indicated no 
significant role for the output variable. The t- statistic was 
never greater than 1.0.
This is not altogether surprising, as output expectations have 
not been modelled. However, it is likely that output increases are 
more likely to trigger investment if capacity utilisation is high and
output decreases more likely to cause cancellations if capacity
C Y 
utilisation is low. For this reason, the variable t-1. t was
- Yt-1
/entered
entered as log form where C, 1 is the capacity utilisation in the
b   I
fourth quarter of the previous year and Y, the output of the first 
quarter of the current year. With this correction, the estimation
7
of equation 3 gave the results in Table below.
It may be noted that expressing the output change term in this 
way provides a better approximation to unanticipated output change 
in that output increases at fuller capacity levels and output decreases 
at lower capacity levels are exaggerated by the functional form used. 
Both of the above cases probably correspond to cases where the un- 
anticipated component of output change is highest.
TABLE 5.U
T p
Dependent variable log ( t t)
log
log (d/~ ) d
log (Ct-1. Yt/ )
x t-1
constant
R2 = 0.70, S/ME = 0.3U6, X 2 (3) = 8.23, W = 1
The capacity based output ratio term is similar to that used 
in the investment equation of the National Institute model. The 
use of this term may be justified statistically by testing whether
the data supports the restriction of a common coefficient for the
C Y t-1 and the t/Y, ^ terms. The difference between the separate
/estimates .....
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estimates may be tested "by considering the t statistic of the ratio 
of the difference to its estimated standard derivation, obtained from 
the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates. When tested in 
this way, the data indicated no support for the hypothesis of dif- 
ferent coefficients, the t statistic being approximately -1.0.
This was obtained as:
A A
t = b - b 0.188 - O.i+86
Var (1^ - b2 ) / 0. 237+0. 331+2(-0. 238)
= -0.982
The results are encouraging in a number of respects. Firstly 
a considerable proportion of the variance of the discrepancy is 
explained. Secondly, the output change variable is highly signifi- 
cant. The Durbin Watson statistic is in the inconclusive region, 
but a first order auto-regressive transformation was rejected by the
data. However, there are two problems - the low t statistic for
2 the price variable and the unsatisfactory X statistic, the latter
indicating that there is model mis-specification, resulting either 
from an incorrect specification of lags, or from the omission from 
the regressor set of important variables.
Before discussing further results, a comment should be made on 
the magnitude of the coefficients. The ( '?) coefficients represent 
1 + e implying a value of about -0.£. This seems high and it should 
be stressed that as with all regressions, the value is unstable and 
changes in response to the addition of a constant and other terms.
/Lund et al .....
Lund et al (1980), with their linear approximation to the log form 
were able to adopt three separate values for £ for different sources 
of volume revisions (i.e. the determinants of t/* ). They conclude
-L~t
that 'most of the estimates of £ . fall in the range 0 to -1 though 
it would be heroic to single out particular estimates of this co- 
efficient and the implied estimates of P ? and £ -, are very 
volatile'. (p. 237)
**
The ( d/G, ) term proved highly significant, confirming the re- 
sults of Lund et al (19?6) and Lund et al (1980). Attempts were 
made to model delays more directly be estimating average wait times 
for engineering equipment according to the procedure of Nobay (1970).
Neither this, nor several variants of a strike index proved success-
es * * 
ful and it seems likely that ( d/G, ) stands both for swings of optimism
and pessimism and as a comprehensive indicator of supply delays. 
It is interesting however that using either an index of output change 
beyond the first quarter of the current year or an indicator of a 
change in capacity utilisation between the forecast date and the 
current year gives coefficients signed contrary to expectation, the 
assumed underlying model being one of positive response of investment 
to an upturn in activity. This would appear to constitute evidence 
in favour of the notion of variable or cyclical adjustment costs. 
At high rates of change of capacity utilisation, some non-urgent 
investment plans may be shelved to avoid the loss of current sales. 
Alternately, of course these results may simply demonstrate the pre-
sence of supply constraints not captured by the ( cL/GO variable or
simultaneity problems. The negative constant reflects the fact that 
for the total sample, the intentions survey persistently overstates 
investment. However, published forecasts by the Department of
/Industry ..... 
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Industry correct this bias which is probably due to the sample being 
biased towards larger firms. The bias is less for some industries, 
e.g. Food and Tobacco.
Further Results
The variables so far included as regressors correspond to those 
entered in different form in the two studies by Lund et al. In an 
attempt to increase the explanatory power of the model and to deal 
also with the mis-specification problem extra regressors were entered. 
The log form made this possible without an unacceptable reduction in 
the degrees of freedom.
The first set of extra regressors consisted of changes in the 
present value of investment incentives, available nationally and in 
assisted regions. The procedure for calculating these series was that 
of Meliss and Richardson (19?6). The construction of the series Is 
described in the glossary. Z, ZR, ZDIF represent respectively 
changes in national incentives, regional incentives and the regional/ 
national differential, all expressed as a log of the change between 
the forecast and the current year.
The ZR variable on its own is close to significance and negative, 
contrary to initial expectation, while no significance was found for 
the Z variable. This suggested that investment relative to intentions 
may respond negatively to the gap between regional and national in- 
centive changes, the theory being that higher incentives for the regions 
reduce investment in relation to planned investment, at least tempo-
o
rarily, perhaps while plans are revised. In other words, the long- 
run effect of regional incentives may either be an increase of total
/investment, ..... 
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investment, or mere displacement from the non-assisted areas. The 
short-run effect is to delay investment in the non-assisted areas.
Entering ZDIP gives the results shown in column 1 of Table 5«5>
T P 
where the dependent variable is, as before, log ( t t) : t-values
are given in parentheses.
TABLE 5.5
/The .....
The ZLIF variable is highly significant and improves the over- 
all result. The price variable coefficient is now close to unity and 
significant, implying a project oriented rather than a budget oriented
approach by firms. The mis-specification problem remains however,
2
as may be seen from the X statistic which is still marginally un- 
acceptable.
2 It is possible to obtain a satisfactory X figure by lagging
G 
the log ( ^/G--,) term, which then appears as significant and of
opposite sign to the unlagged term, implying a learning process in 
firms forecasting. Alternatively, or in addition, the mis-specifi- 
cation problem may be eliminated by adding a nominal interest rate 
regressor.
The use of the lagged term may be justified as follows. If 
deflated intentions relative to trend are high, it may indicate a 
swing of optimism, causing over-reaction on behalf of firms. The 
lagged value of this variable may be important because if it also is 
high, it could indicate that the over-reaction could already have been 
expected to have occurred. The positive coefficient found for the 
lagged term would correctly reduce the over-reaction effect.
There is considerable difference of thinking; over which, if any 
interest rate is the appropriate one to include in an investment 
equation for manufacturing, the choices being long-rate or short-rate, 
nominal or real. Nominal rates are applicable if long-term borrow- 
ing commits the borrower to paying these rates in the future even when 
inflation falls.
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As Bean (1981) notes, high nominal rates pose 'the possibility 
of substantial future falls in rates, thus increasing uncertainty 1 
(p«115). Bean also notes that nominal rates are appropriate if a 
cash flow effect is being proxied. This cash flow effect will vary 
between firms and probably between industries. City analysts fre- 
quently point out that outstanding loans as a percentage of capital 
value can vary between firms from a low of under ten per cent to a 
high of over a hundred per cent. Industries which are most likely 
to be affected by changes in interest rates are those with high 
working capital, implicitly those with slow sales such as metal 
manufacturing, shipbuilding and vehicles (Rybczynski 1982).
Short-term interest rates may be defended on the grounds that 
projects are frequently initiated with bank loans, these being repaid 
when internal funds are sufficiently regular. Furthermore, stocks 
and working capital are likely to be financed out of short-term 
loans and a change in the short-term rate will thus affect liquidity 
(Johnson 1 976) . Changes in the short-term rate may also affect the 
Debt : Equity or gearing ratio. Corporate treasurers who tend to be 
conservative in respect of gearing ratios may control borrowing so as 
to maintain the gearing ratio in the event of a rise in interest rates,
This study found no role for real rates and the best fit was 
obtained by using the change in the short-term (Local Authority) 
nominal rate between the last quarter of the forecast year, RLA, . 
and that of the second quarter of the current year, RLA, .
The results of these two methods of dealing with the mis- 
specification problem are shown in the second and third columns of
/Table 5.5-
Table 5.5. The inclusion of the lagged variable makes the coefficient
of the price variable greater than unity, implying a positive elas-
9 ticity. It is constrained to unity in the results. The interest
rate variable is retained in both sets of results, though it falls 
short of significance in the presence of the lagged variable.
The use of the ZLIF variable will strike some as implausible 
and it is difficult to satisfactorily defend it against competing 
hypotheses, given the size of the data set. It has been suggested 
to me that since the increases in ZDIF were most marked for the years 
1963 and 1972 - years when growth expectations are known to have been 
revised downwards - the ZDIF variable is representing the unusual cy- 
clical revisions of these years. This proposition is tested by 
including a dummy variable DUM, taking the value of 1 in 19&3 an(^- 
1972 and zero otherwise. The results, shown in column Lj. of Table 5*5 
demonstrate a measure of support for this argument.
Other variables were introduced without success at the aggregate 
level. Changes in the company tax rate did not improve the over- 
all result and tended to give very unstable coefficients. There is 
reason to believe that companies can sometimes forecast tax changes 
with certainty and this presents problems for the specification em- 
ployed here. Sumner (1981) for instance argues that the introduction 
of the corporation tax in 19&5 and "the introduction of the imputation
system in 1973 were known in advance. This makes the tax change
10 
variable of questionable use in representing unanticipated changes.
The Gross/Net Yield Ratio, defined as one minus the net present 
value of investment incentives per unit of investment, divided by one
/minus .....
minus the company tax rate was also entered as a regressor in the 
usual log ratio form. No significance was found for this variable.
Changes in the pre-tax rate of return on trading assets, as 
calculated by the Bank of England (1980) was also entered, but was 
insignificant. The data here was annual, but no alternative is readi- 
ly available.
Previous work by Lund et al (197&) attempted to use an absolute 
measure of annual profits, net of stock appreciation and deflated by 
the price index for capital goods; this was not, however found 
helpful.
5>.7 Disaggregated Results
The results presented so far for total manufacturing have been 
concerned with vehicles and plant and machinery investment only, 
since this form of investment is probably more immediately responsive 
to planned change than building investment. At a disaggregate 
level, however, intentions data are only available for all assets, 
disaggregation being on the basis of five EEC industry groups. For 
three of these groups, shown below, the CSO was able to provide quar- 
terly index of production figures from 19&0, and it was possible, by 
suitably weighting capacity figures (see Glossary) to obtain cor- 
responding estimates of these.
The results for each of the three EEC groups for which data is 
available are given below in Table 5«6. In each case it was necessary 
to constrain the price coefficient to unity to obtain plausible
results.
/The .....
The explanatory power of these equations are not as great as 
for the total sample. Food, Drink and Tobacco is the most satis-
factory result with over of the variation explained though, the 
2
X statistic is marginally unacceptable at the level. The Durbin 
Watson figure is in the inconclusive region, but the data rejected a 
first order autoregressive transformation.
The results for Engineering and Allied demonstrate a poorer fit
2 
as reflected in the lower adjusted R and a low t-statistic on the out-
put change variable. The X statistic is acceptable at the level 
and the Durbin Watson statistic indicates no autocorrelation.
TABLE 5.6
Disaggregated Studies Dependent variable log( t t) - log (P/P)
Gt 
t values in parentheses
log (Gd/Gd)
log (VSaV,
log (°t-1. Yt/Yt_1 )
log ( t/RLA , 1 )
Constant
R2
IW
X2 (v)
Food, Drink 
& Tobacco
-0.08
(5.85)
0.03 
(1.87)
0.85
-
-
0.61+
1.U2
6.37(2)
Metal 
Manufacture
-0.08 
(1.65)
  .
0.09 
(0.18)
-0.22 
(1.72)
-0.16
0.25
1.50
5.96(3)
Engineering 
& Allied1 2
-0.05
(3.26)
 
0.14; 
(1-U2)
-
-0.08 
0.95)
o.U3
1.69
0.99(2)
/The .....
The results of metal manufacture were unsatisfactory, in that 
only of the variance was explained but the X value was accep- 
table at the 5% level, with the Durbin Watson statistic in the incon- 
clusive region. Perhaps because of high state involvement in this 
pector, its performance is not captured adequately by the model.
The Z ard ZDIF variables were reconstructed to refer to all 
assets as appropriate for the disaggregated estimations. While the 
ZDIF variable was frequently significant as in the aggregate results, 
the instability of the coefficients under different formulations, 
coupled with the difficulty of distinguishing this effect from that 
of the dummy variable suggests that these results should be treated 
with caution and they are not reported on here. The Z variable was 
always insignificant and it was wrongly signed except for the Engi- 
neering and Allied case, where it came close to significance in some 
formula.tions, but with an unstable coefficient.
No role for the interest rate variable could be found for either 
the Engineering group or for Food, Drink and Tobacco, perhaps because
both groups are quite highly coricentro.ted, implying little rcle for
1"} 
a cost of capital variable (Rockley 1973> Sichner 1976). In
Metal Manufacture, where the explanatory power of the model is very 
low, the interest rate term is significant. This may reflect high 
stock levels, implying a cash flow effect mediated by interest rate 
changes.
For total manufacturing, no clear evidence could be found in 
the residuals to confirm the effect of the various selective aid 
measures which the government adopted, mainly in 1975 and 1976.
/However, .....
However, the Engineering and Allied residuals are dominated by two 
underpredictions: 1977 and 1979. As the selective measures were 
"biased towards engineering, the 1977 residual could be evidence of 
the success of the selective measures.
5«8 Conclusions
This Chapter has advanced on the pioneering work of Lund et al 
in several ways. Firstly, a log form was used, allowing for more 
variables in the regressor set. Secondly, the definition of the 
dependent variable as the discrepancy between actual and intended 
investment provided a severe test of the results. Thirdly, a capa- 
city modified output term was successfully used. Fourthly, a set 
of extra regressors, including incentive and financial variables was 
tested.
The performance of the incentive variable was interesting in 
that it indicated that differential incentives may, be altering 
plans, temporarily slow down investment. This may also be inter- 
preted as an effect of uncertainty in that any change in the environ-
 
ment may cause delays while plans are revised. However, this inter- 
pretation must be regarded as somewhat tentative in view of the small num- 
ber of data points. Sharp increases in incentive differentials coin- 
cided with years in which growth expectations were revised downwards 
and it is difficult to distinguish the cause of the downward revision 
of investment. Perhaps a more important result to emerge from the 
study is the lack of any short-term response to changes in the level 
of incentives. This is in direct conflict with many other studies, 
surveyed in Chapter 1; which have claimed to confirm the efficacy of 
incentives. The present results indicate that incentives are not 
effective, at least in the short-term. This is consistent with the 
results of Sumner (1981) discussed in Chapter where investment
- /grants .....
grants were seen to be effective only after a substantial time lag: 
1 ... there is no reason to question the truism that investment cannot 
be altered rapidly, despite numerous attempts by former governments 
to do so'. (p.315).
At a disaggregated level, the only case where the incentive 
level variable was even correctly signed was in the Engineering and 
Allied industry group. This could be interpreted as an expectations 
effect of greater demand for capital goods in the other sectors, this 
increased demand being expected to occur fairly slowly, as firms in 
the other sectors reacted sluggishly to the incentives. This would 
imply that firms relied on increments in the capital stock to bring 
about new optimal factor proportions* In such a case, changes in 
incentive levels could only be expected to have a slow and weak effect.
The implications of these results for Eichner's theory are as 
follows:-
(i) There appears to be some further weak evidence for dual
investment behaviour in that the three disaggregated studies 
refer to industry sets that are highly concentrated, apart 
perhaps from parts of Engineering. While it has been argued 
in Chapter 3 that it is more appropriate to use firm size as 
a discriminator, the industry disaggregation proxies size dis- 
aggregation to a certain extent, given that the highly con- 
centrated industries will be dominated by large firms. These 
industries see.m to be characterised by greater stability , 
as lower over-reaction or supply delay coefficient,
/Furthermore, ......
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Furthermore, there is no evidence of an interest rate effect 
in two of the three industries» confirming Eichner's view in 
this regard, outlined in Chapter 2.
(ii) It is significant also that the interest rate coefficient is 
low in the total sample. Neither interest rates nor invest- 
ment incentives appear to exert a strong short-term influence 
on investment behaviour. This suggests that Eichner is 
correct in discounting the possibility of exerting short-term 
control on oligopolistic investment, at least by means of 
traditional policy instruments.
The results of this study however are not quite as conclusive 
as one might wish. The disaggregation, dictated by available data 
is not very satisfactory; neither has the study been able to dis- 
tinguish profitability from liquidity influences in assessing the 
effect of investment incentives. The next chapter continues the 
investigation by a different route and surveys the effect of policy 
instruments on the scrapping of capital equipment.
GLOSSARY .
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GLOSSARY Mm DATA SOURCES
(1) IJ.PO. Actual investment at current prices for
u w
vehicles, plant and machinery (total manufac- 
turing) and for all assets (disaggregated 
studies); National Income and Expenditure 1981.
^
(2) G. Investment intentions, second main inquiry at
forecast prices, corresponding-to (1), Source: 
Department of Industry.
(3) P+ Price index for plant and machinery (total ma- 
nufacturing) and all assets (disaggregated studies); 
National Income and Expenditure, various issues.
A
(1|) P, Index of expected prices, constructed with the
aid of data and method, utilised and described 
in Bean (1981).
G, Transformed variable (2) -J- (3).
y ~o- its exponential trend.
(?) ^t'^t 1 Seasonally adjusted index of production figures
for the first quarter of the current year and 
the last quarter of the forecast year for total 
manufacturing and for disaggregated st\.;dies. 
Sources : Economic Trends, Annual Supplement 
1982 and CSO.
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^t-1 Capacity utilisation for total manufacturing
and for disaggregated studies in the last 
quarter Df the forecast year. Source : Panic 
(1978). The series was extended to 1979 using 
CBI data and regressions of Panic's series on 
CBI Data. For disaggregated studies, the ca- 
pacity utilisation series for each industry, 
extended as above were combined into the re- 
levant groups using as weights the estimated 
capital stock for the first quarter of 1970.
(9) RLA, ,RLA, ,. Local Authority (short-term) nominal interest
rates, averaged over the second quarter of the 
current year and the fourth quarter of the 
forecast year respectively. Source : Bank of 
England.
Z,ZA Ratio of present value of investment incentives,
averaged over the current year to the value at 
the end of the third quarter of the forecast 
year, using the technique of Meliss and 
Richardson (197&) for plant and machinery. 
ZA refers to the disaggregated studies only 
which concern total assets. Following Meliss 
and Richardson, ZA is calculated for a mixed 
project of plant and machinery and industrial 
buildings in the ratio of 1^:1 . 
.....
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(.11) ZR,ZRA As (10), but referring to incentives in
assisted areas.
(12) ZDIF,ZDIFA Transformed variables: ZR  Z and ZRA-r ZA
respectively.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Rowley and Trivedi (1975) present a variant of this (p.28) 
where they onr'.t the last term.
22. The H figures in the studies mentioned are typically of the 
order of 0.9.
3« The expected annual rate of appreciation of capital goods was 
estimated as P = 0.61; + 20.U PE, where PE was the difference "between the 
proportion of respondants expecting a rise and those expecting a 
fall in the trend of price increases - question 1 2 of the CBI 
Industrial Trends Survey.
It may be noted that this formulation implies that firms "base 
their investment volume plans on past sales data and have no other 
forecasts (e.g. order books). Clearly this is not always true but 
to some extent an allowance for this is made by taking Y, . to refer
I
to the final quarter of the forecast year, the forecast being made 
before such sales figures are available. Attempts to model volume 
revisions by assuming that firms could predict sales further into the 
f-o.ture did not produce acceptable results. The formulation also 
implies that firms are able to adjust their investment up or down 
within three or four quarters. Some evidence that this is the case, 
at least for plant and machinery, may be found in the study carried 
out by the CBI (1978). In this study, the average time from con- 
ception to completion for the shortest 10% projects was six months. 
Cancellation of course would take place in a much shorter period.
5. This is the analogue of the lagged investment term in Eisner 
(1962) discussed earlier.
6. It was not possible to obtain forecasts for plant and machinery 
only. There is a certain problem of measurement arising from the 
increasing proportion of equipment leased rather than bought by the 
manufacturing sector in the last half of the 1970 f s. It rose by a 
factor of six in nominal terms to ten per cent of the total in the 
years 1975-1980. However, there seems no reason to suppose that this 
should affect revisions to expenditure rather than the forecasts 
themselves.
7« The computer programme used for estimation is called 'GIVE 1 and 
was written by Professor Hendry of Oxford University. This programme 
provides for a test of first order autocorrelation - for full details, 
see Hendry (1973)» The value of the autocorrelation coefficient (alpha) 
is found by an iterative procedure, following the standard autoregres- 
sive transformation,, and by employing a t-test on alpha one can verify 
whether or not autocorrelation exists. When the t-statistic on alpha 
indicates that the latter exists - and that autocorrelation has been 
taken care of - its value is reported with its t statistic. In this 
case no Durbin Watson (DW) statistic is reported. The X^(v) statis- 
tic reported tests for the correct dynamic specification of the equa- 
tion with v degrees of freedom. It is unacceptable if it is greater 
than the corresponding tabulated value. For the details of this t^st, 
see the appendix in Arestis et al (1978). The value of S/ME is also 
reported, where ME is the mean value of the dependent variable, and 
S is the standard error of estimate. This statistic may be considered
/as ....  
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as a comparative measure of fit and moves inversely with the R sta- 
tistic that is also reported when no autoregressive transformation is 
carried out.
8. It may be noted that Moore and Rhodes (1976) obtained a positive 
effect for regional incentives on factory movements to assisted areas, 
but only with a one year lag. It may be deduced that changes in in- 
centives would, therefore, positively affect investment in relation 
to previous plans with a similar lag. The ZDIF variable was also 
redefined to omit negative values and this gave very similar results 
to those in the text. Restricting the price coefficient to unity and 
entering the supply delay term in both current and lagged form gave 
the following coefficients and t-statistics corresponding to the 
order in which they appear in Table 5.5. 1.O(-),-0.50(5.62),0.15(1.72), 
0.U9(2,19),-0.31(2.7U),-0.03(1.11),-0.05(3.UU), the last term being 
the constant. R2 was 0.79, the Durbin Watson statistic was in the 
inconclusive region (1.1I|), but a first order auto-regressive trans- 
formation was rejected by the data. The X2 statistic was 6.90 for 
four degrees of freedom, acceptable at the five per cent level.
9. A coefficient greater than unity may imply that the price varia- 
ble is an endogenous regressor, unanticipated inflation being a res- 
ponse to an unanticipated surge in investment.
10. To a certain extent, this will also impinge on the incentive 
variable, since the tax rate is a component of these. Also, the 
investment grants that ended in 1968 had been announced as temporary.
11. The gross/net yield is an index which takes account both of the 
present value of incentives and the effect of tax changes on post- 
tax income. It is particularly relevant for the case of companies 
with a target post-tax rate of return. As Melliss and Richardson 
(1976) note, a fall in the index 'will indicate that the pre-tax pro- 
fits required for a given post-tax rate of return has fallen, there 
having been a reduction in net taxation (after allowances) levied on 
the company. Where the ratio takes a value of unity, the effects 
of tax are precisely offset by the allowance given, this will occur 
under a system of free depreciation 1 (p.28). The lag in tax pay- 
ment was ignored in the estimation reported in the text, but it is 
doubtful if this important, as the index has taken a value of unity 
in recent, high inflation years, due to free depreciation.
12. This consists of SIC orders (1968 classification) 7, 8, 9, 1C, 
11, 12.
13. In a survey by Rockley (1973)> less than a third of firms with 
annual sales greater than £50m assessed a cost of capital figure as 
a borrowing rate. Many of them assessed it as an average cost of 
.funds over a long period. Internal funds are of course the main 
source gross investment finance for these industries.
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CHAPTER 6
THE EFFECTS OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS USING A MODEL OF SGRA1-PING BEHAVIOUR
6.1 Introduction
Other things "being equal, a one-per cent fall in the user cost 
of capital will bring about a sigma per cent rise in the equilibrium 
level of the capital stock, where sigma is the elasticity of capital 
with respect to its relative cost. This standard view is put for- 
ward by Blake (1976) in pursuing 'the fairly United aims of sum- 
marising what can be said in the abstract about investment incentives'. 
Blake also notes that ' ... to the extent that the subsidy is paid to 
manufacturing investment alone, net only is capital now relatively 
cheaper than before for manufacture, compared with labour, but capi- 
tal and labour in combination are relatively cheaper compared to 
output. Thus we have an 'income' as well as a 'substitution 1 effect: 
subsidised firms, besides moving around the isoquant for their present 
output are able to move simultaneously to a higher isoquant for the 
same outlay'. (p«9l)«
Thirlwall (1976) in a comment on the above, disputes the notion 
that firms move around the isoquant at all. The new production 
methods 'may, or may not, embody a more capital intensive technology 
as a result of the relative price change depending on th- nature of 
the project and ^ny bias in technical change' (p.100). He criticises 
what he sees as Blake's position that 'the main effect of investment 
subsidi-s is tc raise the level of investment by the substitution of 
capital for labour as a result of a fall in the relative price of 
capital ... the essence of a subsidy to investment is not primarily 
to induce substitution along- a given production frontier, but to make 
profitable projects that were previously just below the margin of pro- 
Thirlwall's position in stressing the income effect is reason- 
able. However, since this income effect per unit of output is 
highest for capital intensive industries, it would seem that the sub- 
stitution and income effects should, at the macro level, work: in the 
same direction to produce a greater capital-labour ratio for an in- 
crease in capital subsidy. To see this, assume that there is no 
substitution effect operating at the micro-level. Following an X% 
increase in capital subsidy, the highly capital intensive sectors will 
be able to increase capacity and output by nearly X%, given that 
ca.pital costs are such a high proportion of total costs. However, 
a labour intensive sector will, at the same level of gearing as before, 
only be able to finance a small increase in capacity from the subsidy, 
given that labour costs s.re a significant part of total costs. Thus, 
an increase in the general level of incentives, even if there is no 
substitution effect at the micro-level, should raise the level of in- 
vestment and growth most in the capital intensive sectors, since 
these will be the main beneficiaries of the increase in incentives. 
This would result in a substitution in favour of capital at the 
macro-level.
The effect of incentives on scrapping behaviour is more complex. 
If the substitution effect were operative, v/hile the income effect 
was small, one would expect a positive response of scrapping to incen- 
tives. A. rise in the capital labour ratio will involve the purchase 
of new capital goods and the displacement of capital goods which are 
labour intensive. The latter category will include equipment that 
nee:ln a high labour input to operate it and also equipment th?,t, per- 
haps because of its age, requires a high labour in;mt to service and 
repair it. On the other hand, if the income effect is dominant,
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scrapping will not be markedly affected by incentives that change 
the relative price of capital goods.
Indeed, a negative relationship between scrapping and incentives 
could be defended on the grounds of expectations of new dem-md con- 
ditions, consequent on the introductions of incentives, or more 
plausibly, on the grounds of a liquidity effect, whereby the level 
of incentives affects the incidence of closures of marginal plants 
and firms.
The effects of incentives or. scrapping is explored in this 
chapter because it offers a novel way of ascertaining the power of 
such stimuli to promote investment and technical change. However, 
as should be clear from the abo :/e, there are many complex issues 
involved in interpreting the processes involved, as scrapping may 
represent either a process of renewal and restructuring, or may, 
instead, represent a response to a. demand contraction. In the fol- 
lowing section, the theory of the scrapping decision is reviewed.
6,2 The Scrapping Decision
The subject of scrapping of productive equip.Tent is important 
primarily because of the consequences of scrapping and replacement 
decisions, as shown in the matrix below.
Scrap
Retain old 
Equipment
Undertake 
Replacement Investment
a
c
Undertake No 
Replacement Investment
b
d
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Options 'a' and 'd 1 determine the difference between levels of 
technology. Option 'b s allows for a reduction in the capital stock, 
preventing excess capacity, but incurring the possibility of future 
bottlenecks in productive capacity, given a sharp upturn demand. 
Option ! c ! give*-; firms the possibility of hedging on future upturns 
in dsna,nd by delaying scrapping rather than engaging in anticipatory 
^xpansion investment.
These options are of both theoretical and policy interest, 
raising the questions; what deternines scrapping? and how can 
or should the rate of scrapping be influenced?
These questions would be trivial -  at lenst at the micro-level - 
under assumptions of (a) perfect second-hand capital markets implying 
zero capital ey.it barriers (b) sero supply delays for productive 
equipment ax.d (c) zero adjustment co^ts of investment. The firm 
would then be able to adjust its desired capital stock instantaneously 
and costlessly. The rate of scrapping would then b3 determined only 
by technology and the relative costs of using old and new equipment. 
Policy instrument:? such as investment incentives would influence both 
replacement investment and scrapping.
Options 'b 1 and 'c 1 are not relevant options in such a perfect 
world (option 'b 1 implies disequilibrium, and option 'c 1 - hedging - 
would not occur); they rather refer to choices which become relevant 
where investment is 'irreversible 1 (putty-clay) and takes time. In 
such a non-perfect world, the firm uses excess capacity as a buffer 
and adjusts the level of the buffer according to demand and expected 
demand conditions. The implications of this are that the scrapping
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- 167 -
decision depends, in addition to those variables mentioned above, on 
demand and expected demand. Indeed the latter variables may out- 
weigh the others and call into question the effectiveness of instru- 
ments aimed at changing the relative costs of old and new equipment. 
This possibility will be taken up later, tut, first, some of the 
existing theoretical literature on scrapping is reviewed.
Some theory of scrapping is implicit in all models of invest- 
ment. However, most investment models have paid little attention to 
this issue. The most common assumption is exponential (i.e. a 
constant rate of change of) decay, leading to an assumption that 
replacement investment is a fixed proportion of the capital stock. 
But as Nickell (1978) makes clear, with theoretical and empirical 
arguments, this assumption cannot be sustained.
Nickel! argues that the scrapping rate is a decision variable 
and develops models of how it responds to demand changes in the 
presence of adjustment costs and supply delays.
Gross investment, including a planned replacement component 
(which may be proportional to a capital stock) is postulated as a 
decision variable. A subsequent sub-decision is made on actual 
scrapping:-
'Scrapping and replacement ... vary in response to economic 
forces ... variations in the scrapping rate are then simply 
explained by the firm adjusting its current capital stock in 
response to unforeseen changes in the economic environment. 1
(Nickell, 1978, p.307). 2
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Nickell shows that the optimal lifetime of capital goods depends 
on the rate of technical progress, the price of maintenance and the 
cost of capital. He then considers the role of demand over the cycle, 
with a model of a representative firm. This firm faces downward 
sloping demand curves, with adjustment costs proportional to gross 
investment and where output supplied is always sold due to flexible 
prices. Variation in capacity utilisation is only considered paren- 
thetically, and the burden of adjusting demand to output falls on price. 
However, it is quite possible to re-interpret the theory so that capa- 
city variations replace price variations and, given a target capacity 
utilisation rate, pressure on capacity gives the same signals to firms 
as prices.
There are three basic cases Nickell considers in relation to 
demand and scrapping.
(a) -Given a shallow slump in demand, the firm may adjust its capital 
stock downwards by ceasing expansion investment and lowering or 
ceasing replacement investment while keeping the scrapping rate 
constant.
(b) However, if the slump is both severe and foreseen, replacement 
investment will fall beforehand and scrapping fall until the 
onset of the slump, when scrapping will rise. It will fall 
again only when demand picks up.
(c) The scrapping response to a boom will depend on adjustment 
costs. If these are 'strictly convex 1 , i.e. costs rise 
disproportionately with the time rate of change of the capital
/stock, ..... 
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stock, rapid change is penalised, so firms may try to smooth 
the investment boom "by timing replacement investment (and 
possibly scrapping) before the rise in demand. These then 
fall as the boom gets underway while expansion investment 
comes on stream, peaking with peak demand. Of course, the 
extent to which adjustment costs are convex is not known, it 
probably varies between industries.
Nickell's observations bring out the complexity of the scrapping 
decision. With (a), scrapping is unaffected by the cycle whereas 
with (b) and (c) combined, there may be as many as six turning points 
over the cycle. With annual data or with myopic decision making, one 
could perhaps simplify the latter case and argue for a negative re- 
lationship between scrapping and the rate of change of demand, com- 
bined with scrapping high also when demand has peaked. It should 
also be noted however, that Nickell's models do not consider the case 
where excess planned capacity is held as a matter of routine and where 
scrapping may consequently be unaffected by the cycle.
The above considerations point to a variety of possible formu- 
lations for scrapping, depending on the character of the industry, or 
possibly the severity of the cycle for the industry concerned. How- 
ever, there may be some merit in investigating the determinants of 
scrapping for total manufacturing industry using a more elementary 
model. This is considered in the following section after which, an 
attempt is made to theorise and estimate aggregate and disaggregated 
equations for scrapping, using UK data.
/6.3
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6«3 Previous Empirical Studies
It is known from the theory of vintage models of investment 
that the economic lifespan of equipment is directly dependent on the 
level of real labour costs - using the price of output as deflator - 
relative to labour saving technical progress (den Hartog and Tjan, 
1976). In so far as capital costs are recoverable through scrapping 
it is also appropriate to include variation in capital costs in the 
scrapping decision. Even where scrap values are minimal in relation 
to initial cost, this inclusion of capital costs would be appropriate 
if output were considered exogenous, since a decision must then be 
taken between producing the output on new or old vintages. The 
relative advantage here will depend on capital costs.
In so far as capital goods are initially purchased out of ex- 
ternal funds, a significant variation in their relative price occurs 
with variation in the short-run interest rate. Shone (1971) reports 
that in the case of the steel industry, interest charges during the 
construction period are capitalised and added to total investment 
cost. Even if this is not always the formal procedure, variation in 
interest rates should affect scrapping inversely, by directly influ- 
encing capital costs. Thus, both labour costs and capital costs are 
generally included in models of the determinants of scrapping of 
plant and machinery.
Two such studies have been undertaken on the electricity supply 
industry; the US (Bitros and Kelejian, 197U) and the UK (Lioukas, 
1980). Bitros and Kelejian (197U) worked with a unique set of 
physical data in the form of nameplate ratings of the (relatively 
homogeneous) electricity generating machinery of the electrical
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utilities industry, where the ratings are adjusted annually to take
_*
account of use.
In the Bitros and Kelejian study, scrapping, as a ratio of 
output capacity (s) was regressed on the ratio of real maintenance 
expenditure to output capacity (m), capacity utilisation (c), an 
interest rate variable (r) and gross investment as a ratio of output 
capacity (i).
The investment variable was intended to capture technical change 
effects, and thus to "be positively signed. The interest rate variable 
was expected to be negatively significant, as was the maintenance 
expenditure variable. No a priori belief was attached to the capa- 
city variable, as it was intended to capture (a) the effect of usage 
on capital delay and scrapping and (b) the demand, or anticipatory 
demand effect which was" thought to exert a negative influence on 
scrapping.
Two stage least squares results were only marginally different 
from Ordinary Least Squares, though the c variable was significantly 
positive only with the former method. All the other variables were 
significant and signed as expected. No lag structure was apparent 
and about half of the total variation was explained.
One difficulty with the model is that all the explanatory va- 
riables with the exception of the interest rate depend in turn on the 
scrapping ratio. In particular, maintenance and scrapping are likely 
to be joint decisions, and including the volume of maintenance expen- 
diture rather than its unit price seems to introduce unnecessary simul-
taneity< /Lioukas .....
Lioukas found that planned capital retirement was positively 
related to current pressures on capital spending, positively related 
to short-term capacity margin anticipations and negatively associated 
with the level of currently committed investment. The latter variable 
implies a smoothing process similar to option 'c 1 where peaks in 
planned investment are associated with a longer retention of obsolete 
equipment.
Other studies have been undertaken in which scrapping is only 
implicitly theorised, in particular models of gross investment. In 
vintage models (King 1972, Sumner 197U» Peterson 1976 and Sarantis 1979), 
where output is taken as exogeneous, there is a scrapping rule implicit 
in the equality of the marginal product of labour on new equipment and 
the output per head of the oldest plant.
6.U Scrapping Estimation for Total Manufacturing in the UK
The estimation of scrapping equations is made difficult by the 
failure of the UK authorities to collect any figures directly measur- 
ing this variable. However, there is a series on disposals, availa- 
ble for plant and machinery at industry order level, which can proxy 
for scrapping. The second hand goods market for capital equipment 
is highly imperfect and many disposals will be for scrap. Further- 
more, disposals and scrappings are likely to be influenced similarly 
by the same variations in economic variables.
The dependent variable used in this estimation is the real value 
of disposals for plant and machinery, where the nominal data is deflated 
by the implicit price index for gross investment in plant and machinery. 
The estimate period is 1959-1979 and annual data only is available.
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The following variables were used as regressorslcapacity 
utilisation (c); real cost to employer of maintenance labour, (w), 
various long and short-run interest rates (RL, RS), real gross in- 
vestment in plant and machinery (l), present value of incentives for 
plant and machinery at national (z) and regional level (ZR), and CSO 
estimates of real capital retirements (CR) based on capital stock 
estimates.
From the previous discussion, the following functional speci- 
fication was initially adopted for the scrapping variable (s). The 
expected sign is given below each coefficient.
(+) (-0 (-) w w (+) (+)
where U, is an error term.
The CR variable proved consistently insignificant or of the 
incorrect sign and tended to produce model mis-specification as revealed 
by the error pattern. It is believed by the CSO that the estimates
may be unreliable due to an overestimation of asset lines and for this
7 
reason it was decided to omit it from the regressor set. The V
variable, as well as representing maintenance costs may represent 
operative costs.
o
The best equations obtained were as follows (t values in 
parenthesis).
TABLE 6.1
Dependent Variable : Real value of Disposals of Plant and Machinery
(Total manufacturing)
s/
7.1U(3) 8.20(U) 5.3000 9.U8(5) U.78(U) U.7U(5)
The positive role for C confirms the belief that when demand 
(and capacity) peaks, scrapping will be high. The positive relation 
may also be explained, as Bitros and Kelegian stress, by the increase
d 
usage and decay of equipment.
The short-term interest rate (RS) performed consistently better 
than the long-term rate (RL). The lags on I and W presumably reflect
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delays in decision making and execution.
The other variables, with the exception of the incentive varia- 
bles are signed as expected and significant. No role could be found 
for an output (index of production) variable or for the change in 
seasonally adjusted output between the first and fourth quarters.
The incentive variables, entered separately are highly signi- 
ficant and negative. This might suggest that firms may react to 
high incentive levels by lower scrapping, hedging on the possibility 
of a boom in investment, but reasons will be given later for pre- 
ferring an alternative explanation. The high correlation between 
the national and regional incentive variables causes both to lose 
significance when entered together.
2 The X values are all acceptable at the level, indicating
2 
no problems in terms of dynamic specification. The R and the ratio
of standard error to the mean of the dependent variable indicate a 
reasonable fit which could probably be improved if accurate estimates 
of the capital stock (and hence retirements) were available.
6.£ Scrapping Estimation - Disaggregated Studies
While information on disposals is available at industry level, 
individual industry studies are not reported here. Scrapping may be 
heavily influenced at this level by non-observable factors such as new 
technology, supply delays, specific labour market factors or echo
effects from previous investment booms. Furthermore, the capacity
Q 
utilisation figures at industry level are not very reliable. All
of these problems are likely to be lessened if the disaggregation
occurs at the higher level.
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In view of the results in Chapter 3> it would be appropriate 
to divide total manufacturing into groups of large firms and small 
firms. Clearly this is not possible on the basis of the available 
data and so the second-best procedure was followed whereby, total 
manufacturing was divided into two groups: 'concentrated 1 and 
'non-concentrated 1 industries. The discriminating variable chosen 
to create these groups was the percentage of an industry's gross out- 
put accounted for by the five largest enterprises as reported in the 
census of production. Where this was over and where there were 
separate disposals figures available for the industry, the disposals 
were allocated to the concentrated group. This consisted of Food, 
Drink and Tobacco, Chemicals and Allied Industries, Metal Manufacture, 
Electrical Engineering and Vehicles. The remainder were allocated 
to the unconcentrated group.
With respect to the foregoing discussion of the determinants 
of scrapping, the possible variations between concentrated and non- 
concentrated industries are numerous. Not all of them point clearly 
to a priori expectations about the coefficients. For instance, con- 
centrated industries seem to be capable of faster adjustment to 
changing costs (Domberger, 1980), yet they may react more sluggishly 
to postulated scrapping determinants because of convex adjustment 
costs resulting from the monopsonistic nature of some of their factor 
markets (Nickell, 1978). In other words, such firms, if they engage 
more in one-off orders for capital goods, may face a price-delivery 
trade off, which would result in a less marked response of scrapping 
to determinants such as cyclical demand. In the discussion below 
some of the major differences between concentrated and non-concentra- 
ted industries are examined with respect to their likely influence on 
scrapping behaviour. /Capital .....
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Capital Intensity
This is a relevant consideration because it is correlated with 
concentration. The higher the capital intensity, the greater the 
replacement rate per unit of output and the easier it may "be to 
adjust the capital stock downwards in a shallow slump without varying 
the scrapping rate. However, this is only obvious if the capital 
stock is homogeneous. Under more realistic conditions, the replace- 
ment investment of specific items may be invariable.
Investment Stability
The latter conclusion would certainly follow for a firm with 
market share objectives to be met partly through non-price forms of 
competition. If, replacement investment is needed to improve or
maintain quality, one could argue that it will not be used to vary
11 the capital stock downwards as in option 'b 1 . This argument would
appear to imply that the more concentrated industries would be no less 
affected, in terms of scrapping variations in a shallow slump than 
less concentrated ones.
Capacity Utilisation
Offsetting the last observation is the fact that the more 
concentrated industries carry, as a matter .of routine, a margin of 
excess capacity. As this may not always correspond to desired excess 
capacity, scrapping may not respond to demand in any direct way.
Neither would it necessarily respond to capacity utilisation, as
12 
changes in this may merely reflect changes in its desired level.
Financial Constraints
In the absence of a perfect market for investment funds,
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financial constraints may force scrapping even where this may not be 
optimal in view of long-term expected demand. Such financial con- 
straints are less likely to apply to the concentrated industries where 
firms may have more reserves, in the form of near-liquid assets, or 
may be more diversified at home and overseas. The implication here 
is that the non-concentrated group would be more likely to exhibit 
cyclical behaviour in this regard than the concentrated group.
Sources of Finance
Firms in the concentrated group may be expected to rely less 
on bank loans (except perhaps for financing stocks) and more on 
internal finance and non-interest sensitive forms of external fi- 
nance such as new issues. Such firms may be expected to have a
measure of control over their cash flow through pricing policies
1 3 
operated so as to finance investment. If this is so, then, one
could expect replacement investment and scrapping to respond to in- 
terest rate movements only in the case of the non-concentrated group.
Non-Concentrated Industries Results
The best equation for the non-concentrated group is shown 
below. As before, the dependent variable is the real value of 
disposals of plant and machinery (S^). ! t' values are shown in 
parentheses.
St = -2.98 + 0.02Ct- O
(5.1+0) (5.06) (3.3U) (6-96)
R2 = 0.83 xw = 1 .97 x2 (3) = 5.95 S/ME = 0.13
The H2 (R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom) is virtually the 
same as for the total sample without the incentive variables. The
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o 
figure has improved and the X value is acceptable at the level.
At this stage, no incentive variables are reported on; they 
are considered later. The results above are not markedly different 
from total manufacturing, though the individual coefficients are 
more significant than before. Unlike the total manufacturing case, 
the current value of employee cost W, did not improve the results.
b
This could reflect a slower adjustment of scrapping for this group 
or, since employee cost was not disaggregated, it may reflect a lag 
of wage settlements in this group behind those in the concentrated 
group. Another point of difference with the total manufacturing 
results is that no role could be found for an investment variable, 
current or lagged.
Concentrated Industries Results
The results for the concentrated group are strikingly different 
from those of total manufacturing and the non-concentrated group.
- No significance could be found for the capacity or the interest 
rate variable. A subset of the results is presented below.
/TABLE 6.2
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TABLE 6.2 
Dependent Variable : Real Value of Disposals of Plant and Machinery
(Concentrated Industries)
A wt = wt - 
Equation (2) is the preferred equation. It has the highest
2 
adjusted R , only slightly lower than the result for the unconcentrated
group. The restriction of equal and opposite coefficients for the 
wage terms is favoured by the data. This formulation also avoids 
the problems evident in equations (3) and (U) of high multicolli- 
nearity between the W. and the I, 1 terms.
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The statistic implies zero autocorrelation at the 
level and, although this statistic is biased favourably in view of 
"the S^_.| term, the presence of the other two exogeneous variables
lessens the bias. The X value is acceptable at the 5% level.
The absence of the capacity variable would appear to indicate 
a greater stability of scrapping with respect to demand over the 
cycle. As mentioned previously, there may be two reasons for 
scrapping in concentrated industries to be invariant with respect 
to cyclical demand. Replacement investment may be postponed in a 
slump and/or the equipment that would be scrapped in a competitive 
market goes instead towards the building of excess capacity. If 
the former were the sole reason it would affect behaviour only in 
the neighbourhood of demand troughs. To test for this, trough and 
peak year dummy variables were defined as in Panic (1978). No 
significance could be found for these when entered either singly or 
together in the above equation. It appears then, that the apparent 
absence of a cyclical response to demand is not, or not solely, due 
to variation in the timing of replacement investment.
The absence of an interest rate variable confirms other studies 
that this is not an appropriate cost of capital term for this type of 
industry (Rockley 1973)* Rockley's survey suggests that firms 
evaluate their cost of capital in very different ways, sometimes 
identifying it as an average cost of funds.
Eichner's view also is that the marginal cost of capital does 
not act as a constraint for oligopolistic industries given that 
pricing and revenue are jointly planned with investment (Eichner
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1976). Some evidence for this theory is offered in Forman and 
Eichner (1978).
The lagged investment term, while significantly positive has 
a very small coefficient implying little dominance for the tech- 
nical change variable, if this is indeed what it is proxying.
The presence of the lagged endogenous term may reflect echo 
effects, which, in view of investment bunching, makes scrapping 
autocorrelated.
The significance of a first difference labour cost term, 
rather than a cost level term may reflect the ability of this type 
of industry to pass on costs through mark-up pricing. In such a 
case, it is the immediate effect of a change in labour costs, rather 
than the sustained level of such costs that is important, given the 
ability, ultimately to recover costs. It is also possible that the 
labour cost term is capturing the process whereby wages and scrapping 
are jointly determined by local and national union-employers nego- 
tiations (see footnote 10).
6.6 Effects of Incentives
Turning again to the non-concentrated group, higher incentives 
are found to have a significant negative effect on scrapping. The
best specification is that which contains the lagged value of the
15 incentive level.
St = -2.52 + 0.02Ct - 0.05RSt + 0.92Wt^ - 0.792.^ - O.USTJ^
(5.140 (7.010 (U.95) (8-10) (3.86) (1.87)
S/ME = 0.10,
where U represents the error term. /m,/ line  .
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gThe /ME figure is smaller, with fewer variables than the
2 
corresponding equations for total manufacturing. The X value is
again acceptable at the 5% level.
It is not possible to interpret the negative incentive effect 
as an expectations response as was tentatively suggested for the case 
of total manufacturing. It would seem that two explanations are 
possible.
(i) It may be that the incentive effect on investment is weak 
but positive giving a small boost to demand, so that the 
net effect is less scrapping as firms which have not res- 
ponded to incentives delay scrapping to meet the increased 
demand. To the extent that the demand boost is not fully 
captured by the capacity utilisation variable, it will be 
correlated with lagged incentive levels and explain the 
negative influence of scrapping.
(ii) This explanation relies on the fact that incentive changes
have a cash flow effect, even where no changes in investment 
are made. The rise in cash flow arising from increased 
incentives may prevent a squeeze on liquidity and prevent 
enforced scrapping. The opposite may happen following a 
reduction in incentive levels. The lag on the incentive 
variable may be capturing the delay in receiving the altered 
capital transfer, i.e. the tax payment delay.
No satisfactory incentive effect could be found for the con- 
centrated group, though incentive variables were generally negatively
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signed. The residuals of equation presented above for this 
group are dominated "by a large underprediction in 1970 and smaller 
underpredictions in 1971, 1976 and 1979- It is possible that the
underprediction in 1976 may be due to the Accelerated Project Scheme,
16 
a selective counter cyclical incentive scheme, set up in 1975-
The underpredictions of 1970 and 1971 may reflect the fact that after 
many years of financial surplus, the company sector moved into de- 
ficit in 1970, incurring a huge deficit approaching £1 bn., partly as 
a result of government contractionary measures.
6.7 Effects of Taxation
The ambiguous results of the debate on corporate tax shifting 
will not be rehearsed here. However, it is worth noting that full 
shifting for total manufacturing has been rejected in a comprehensive 
study by Coutts et al (1978). We may therefore expect that taxation 
would have soms effect on firms in the unconcentrated industries, a 
rise in taxation causing investment to drop and scrapping to accele- 
rate as the new post tax marginal revenue schedule was compared to the 
marginal cost schedules of the oldest vintage and the newest projected 
vintage. However, if planned investment were postponed, scrapping 
might temporarily slow down until the oldest vintage ceased to earn 
any return. It is not necessary here to assume that the oldest 
vintage was earning quasi rents before the tax increase: as in 
Mckell (1978)> price may adjust to the new capacity level following 
the shelving of investment plans and thus cause scrapping to be 
delayed. As with investment incentive levels, a sustained change 
in taxation may be expected to contribute to the general level of 
liquidity and we might therefore expect a positive relationship be- 
tween scrapping and taxation levels, tempered perhaps by an opposite
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response to a change in the level as new investment is postponed. 
The results below lend some credence to this view, though it was 
necessary to add a number of other first difference terms before the 
dynamic specification was in any way acceptable. Two of these first 
difference terms also have low t-values.
Writing the corporate tax rate as T,
= -3.97 + 0.03Ct - 0.003 A ct - 0.06RSt + 0.98^^ + 0.22 
(7.61+) (8.96) (1.31) (7.23) (11.33) (1.26)
_1 + 1.28Tt - 1.1+1 A Tt - 0 
(7.03) (U.UW (3.68) (U.66)
S/ME = 0.07 X2 (5) = 12.27
The S/ME figure is considerably lower than before and several
2 
of the previous 't 1 values have improved. The X value is only
acceptable at the 2-g% level and inspection of the unrestricted form 
suggests that further lags on the interest rate term might be appro- 
priate. However, in view of the small number of data points it was 
thought undesirable to further add to the set of variables. The 
results give some support to the hypothesised effects of taxation 
outlined above with the short-run effect being negative and the 
long-run (liquidity) effect on scrapping being positive. The positive 
first difference labour cost term is of similar magnitude to the un- 
lagged term for concentrated industry. The negative first difference 
capacity utilisation term has a very small coefficient and may re- 
present an expectations effect.
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For the concentrated group, no response to taxation levels or 
changes could be found, perhaps for the same reasons suggested earlier 
for a lack of response to investment incentives.
6.8 Conclusions
The theoretical prediction outlined earlier suggested that 
variation in scrapping, in so far as it reflected variation in the 
economic lifespan of equipment would vary directly with labour or 
maintenance costs, directly with technical progress and inversely 
with interest rates. A wide variety of possibilities existed for 
scrapping in relation to the cycle in demand.
These concluding comments will refer only to the two disaggre- 
gated sets of results as one of the strongest conclusions to emerge 
from the study is that the two groups of industries chosen differ 
markedly in terms of their scrapping behaviour.
The non-concentrated study confirms the role of the short-term 
money interest rate in determining scrapping (and thus, presumably 
the timing of new replacement investment). The fact that it is the 
short-term rate that works best may reflect the indirect effect on 
company cash flow and thus on the timing of replacement investment. 
The only proxy used for technical progress was gross investment and 
this does not feature in the unconcentrated industry results. How- 
ever this does not mean that technical progress is not implicitly 
present. If technical progress and its diffusion is smooth and equal 
to the trend growth in labour costs, its influence will be captured 
by this variable.
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A number of explanations have been put forward in this chapter 
to explain the pro-cyclical movement of scrapping with capacity 
utilisation, both in terms of physical and of economic life. We may 
note here one final and tentative possibility - that scrapping may be 
related not only to the cost of labour, but to its availability. 
Older, more labour (and skill) intensive machinery may become redundant 
due to a shortage of skilled operatives as capacity peaks and labour 
is 'poached 1 to the high-wage sectors.
The effect of incentives on scrapping within unconcentrated 
industries confirms that incentives do not produce a simple sub- 
stitution effect of old for new equipment. To the extent that 
incentives are effective, they lead also to delayed scrapping. But 
the results are consistent also with the view that the main effect 
of incentives for this group of industries is a. liquidity effect, 
raising or lowering scrapping levels in response to the effect of 
incentives on cash flow. This view was also consistent with the 
positive relationship found between the level of taxation and 
scrapping.
For the concentrated group, neither incentive levels nor 
interest rate levels seem to affect scrapping. However, this does 
not mean that scrapping is unaffected by cost conditions, as may be 
inferred from the labour cost change variable. The fact that some 
variations in cost seem to affect scrapping but not others is in- 
teresting and may be explained by the fact that a response to labour 
cost changes can be made without a change in gross investment, either 
by delaying scrapping, changing the composition of output, or changing 
the labour intensity of the capacity that is in use through varying
/in  ....
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in type and extent, the margin of unused capacity. Per contra, 
a response to interest rate or incentive changes implies a change 
in gross investment. If, as has sometimes been suggested (e.g. 
Porman and Eichner 1978) gross investment for this type of industry 
responds only to demand conditions and long-term shifts in expec- 
tations, it is not surprising that no role can be found for incen- 
tives or interest rates in the scrapping equation. However, some 
caution is warranted here as the incentive variables could partially 
operate through the lagged investment term included as a proxy for 
technical progress. The lack of significance for any corporate 
taxation variable is also in accord with the views above. Shifting 
forward of the tax may of course be mere prevalent for this type of 
industry.
The lack of significance for a cyclical capacity or demand 
variable for the concentrated group has been explained primarily in 
terms of the margin ?f unused capacity, which, if planned in advance 
can be maintained at a target level through cyclical additions to it 
as the economic life of the oldest vintages are, at least temporarily, 
exhausted. Other explanations are also possible: replacement 
policies may be such that equipment rarely becomes physically defunct; 
decommissioning and installment adjustment costs may be greater with 
more capital intensive industries leading to a smoothing of the 
scrapping cycle; finally the labour shortage question raised in 
respect of the unconcentrated industries may not apply to this group, 
given that its average wage level is likely to be higher.
Finally, it hardly needs pointing out that although policy 
questions have not been discussed in this chapter, the conclusions
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do not support the traditional view of the working of incentives 
-through substitution effects (e.g. Blake, 19?6). It may indeed 
be the case that incentives as presently designed, by delaying 
scrapping slow down technical progress, at least through one of 
the mechanisms by which they operate.
This chapter has once again given support to the concept of a 
dual economy. Orthodox theory - whereby a change in the cost of 
capital should lead to a similarly signed change in scrapping - 
has been rejected, even for the competitive (non-concentrated) 
sector. The important influences in this sector, apart from wage 
and capacity terms are cost effects as represented by the short- 
term interest rate, incentive levels and taxation. The fact that 
scrapping levels in the oligopolistic (concentra/ted) sector are un- 
affected by these latter variables is further evidence that the 
investment curve of this sector can not be shifted by orthodox 
short-term instruments. In the next and final chapter, the policy 
implications cf this, and of the conclusions of earlier chapters 
are discussed and assessed.
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GLOSSARY OF VARIABLES
Capacity Utilisation for total manufacturing and for con- 
centrated and unconcentrated groups, calculated for the 
disaggregated cases "by weighting the individual industry 
estimates "by estimated capital stock in 197C. Source, 
Panic (1978). The series was extended to 1979 using CBI 
data and regressions of Panic's series on CBI data.
Local Authority (short-term) nominal interest rates (June). 
Source, Bank of England.
Index of maintenance labour cost to employer in real terms. 
Calculated "by multiplying the nominal wage rate for 'all 
metals combined' , deflated "by the implicit price deflator 
for plant and machinery "by a correction factor obtain 
dividing cost to employers by gross average earnings for 
the economy as a whole. Sources : Department of Employment 
Gazette (various issues), National Income and Expenditure 
(various issues), National Institute Economic Review 
(November, 1981, p.11).
I , Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation, plant and machinery 
at constant prices. Source : National Income and Expen- 
diture (various issues)
Z,(ZR,) Present value of investment incentives, available nationally 
(in assisted areas) for plant arid machinery, averaged over 
the year, calculated using the technique of Meliss and 
Richardson (1976).
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S.J. Disposals of plant and machinery deflated by the implicit 
price deflator for plant and machinery. Sources : 
Historical Record of the Census of Production, Table 5; 
Census of production PA 1002, (various issues) and 
National Income and Expenditure (various issues).
T^. Overall tax on retained corporate earnings : Source : 
Meliss and Richardson (19?6).
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FOOTNOTES
1. does not mean that excess capacity is the norm, as is 
often argued in respect of concentrated industries. Option b may 
eliminate excess capacity.
2. This interpretation of variation in the scrapping rate lessens 
the simultaneity problem if it is desired to include gross investment 
as an explanatory variable. It is not clear why Nickell insists 
on the term 'unforseen 1 , since one of his models of scrapping con- 
tains a reference to a situation where 'the boom was expected 1 (p.13U) 
and where scrapping rises in anticipation of this. It would, perhaps, 
have been better to see scrapping as a decentralised decision with gross 
investment a centralised one.
3. It would appear from this that Nickell has no explanation for 
cycles in aggregate output which form a background to his work.
U. Some of this movement might be tracked by making scrapping 
depend, positively on a leading indicator of demand, and this might 
be an explanation for a positive sign for gross investment in 
scrapping studies.
£. See also Cowing and Smith (1977) and Bitros and Kelejian (1977).
6. These results also held for actual, realised retirement, 
except that the variable indicating pressures on capital spending was 
not negatively signed. This latter observation may reflect the 
peculiarity of a nationalised industry, with large de-commissioning 
costs, where the gain from scrapping would, at least initially, be 
offset by high costs.
7« A time trend was included as a proxy for expected retirements 
which could be theorised as proportional to the capital stock of 
retiring age. Presumably, this hypothesised proportionality is 
the justification for employing the ratio of scrapping to capital 
stock as dependent variable, as some researchers do. This is not, 
however an ideal procedure, even if the capital stock figures were 
known to be accurate. An obvious problem with using a time trend is 
that it could also represent a number of other trended effects, such 
as technical progress. However, it proved unsignifleant.
8. For details of the computer programm-* used and of the test 
statistics, see footnote 7 of Chapter 5»
9. Some of the regressions of the industry capacity estimates 
in Panic (1978) on the CBI sample figures for the same industry have 
low R2l s.
10. While this division is necessarily rather arbitrary, an in- 
dication that it is a reasonable one if given by comparing the 
weighted capacity utilisation mean over the period 1959-79 for the 
concentrated and non-concentrated groups. These figures were 90.2 
and 100.1}. respectively. Whilst it is true that the procedure adopted 
does not discriminate perfectly between concentrated and non-concen- 
trated industries the two groups have markedly different average levels 
of concentration.
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11   Sarantis (1978) provides some evidence that gross investment 
is more stable in the case of concentrated industries, if other 
factors such as capital intensity are allowed for.
12. ^ Desired capacity may be highest immediately after the intro- 
duction^ of new plant. Shone (1971) comments that the automation of 
steel mills was sometimes accompanied by the retention of old equip- 
ment and manning levels, partly due to trade union pressure and 
partly as a precautionary move by management to insure against the 
risk of breakdown with the new technology. (p.105).
13. This is the position advanced by Wood (1975) and Eichner (1976)
Aggregate output and first difference of this also proved 
insignificant.
National incentives only are reported on here in view of the 
high correlation between national and regional incentives.
16. The deadline for starting projects was originally March 1976, 
later extended to September 1976.
17. Alternatively, or in addition, firms may reason that labour 
cost changes are likely to be permanent, whereas changes in interest 
rates, incentives, or taxation may only be temporary. 'This expla- 
nation however ignores the marked cyclical i.e. non-permanent com- 
ponent of wage levels.
/GLOSSARY ...
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CHAPTER 7
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
7-1 Introduction
This chapter draws together the threads of the arguments 
presented earlier and ir> so doing, focuses on policy implications. 
It is now clear that the economy must be dichotomised into a com- 
petitive and an oligopolistic sector. The former is characterised 
by orthodox pricing behaviour, full capacity at the peak of the 
cycle, pro-cyclical import penetration, and investment behaviour 
that is sensitive to interest rate movements and possibly liquidity 
changes. The oligopolistic sector by contrast pursues mark-up 
pricing on cyclically averaged costs, carries a margin of spare 
capacity even at cyclical peaks, displays little tendency for cyclical 
variation in import penetration, displays little tendency for in- 
vestment to respond to interest rate or investment incentive move- 
ments, and experiences financial surpluses and deficits in the peak 
and trough of the cycle.
If the economy were to be stimulated with the aim of pro- 
longing a cyclical upturn, the effects would be felt differently in 
the two sectors. The competitive sector could be expected to be- 
have in the text-book manner - raising prices as it approached full
capacity, resulting in increased import penetration and a rising
2 balance of payments deficit. Price inflation in this sector would
only be mitigated by the retrenchment of marginally desirable indus- 
tries (where high wage rates experienced in cyclical peaks would 
squeeze profits, given consumer resistance to higher prices); and 
by the extent of import competition.
/To .....
To the extent that the competitive sector j.rovides inputs 
for the oligopolistic sector, prices in the latter might also be 
expected to rise somewhat with a lag, though these price rises would 
be tempered by the belief that the input price rises wore mainly 
cyclical, as discussed in Chapter 2. The case of the oligopolistic 
sector is discussed fully in section 7.3. Immediately below in 
section 7»2jthe policy implications for the competitive sector are 
examined.
7.2 The Competitive Sector
From the above sketch of the consequences of stimulating the 
economy in the upturn it might be thought that rising prices and dete- 
riorating balance of payments are inevitable, even if these dangers 
stem only from the operation of the competitive sector. Indeed the 
whole of this sector could be construed in this framework as a giant 
 bottleneck 1 , contradicting the Eichner proposition that the economy 
displays no capacity shortages. To be sure, Eichner's argument
{ 1
takes account of the fact that labour and productive capacity cannot 
be brought into operation immediately and that there may be limits 
on the rate at which expansion can proceed.
This, however does not quite seem to meet the point which 
is that the existence of even temporary bottlenecks at a cyclical 
peak creates inflation and balance of payments difficulties which 
trigger deflationary action. If such problems are to be avoided 
there must be an attempt to persuade the competitive sector to 
operate in a more stable manner with respect to prices and import 
penetration. Such stability can not be achieved by ireans of price 
leadership or other conventions adopted by the industries concerned.
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virtue of low concentratior and ease of entry and exit, these 
firms cannot be self-regulating. Only governiLent can implement a 
system of incentives and penalties which will effectively prevent 
the competitive sector from acting as a source of inflation and 
rising import penetration in the region of a cyclical peak.
It has already been noted (in Chapter 1) that measures 
aimed at encouraging stock-holding in advance of an expansion could 
mitigate inflationary pressures near the peak range of capacity. 
Clearly, such a system would have to be devised so that it en- 
couraged stockbuilding only in the period before the upturn. This 
could be achieved by discretionary timing of a subsidy on either 
finished stocks or raw materials. One of the chief dangers of such 
a scheme would be that it might discourage anticipatory investment 
in productive capacity in favour of investment in stocks. It 
would therefore be necessary to link such a scheme with a programme 
of counter-cyclical incentives for productive capacity.
The design of counter-cyclical investment incentive pro- 
grammes has been the subject of some discussion in the literature. 
Sweden has had such a system for many years (Apple, 1980; Taylor, 
1982; Butt-Philip, 1978) and it has been considered by the UK 
National Economic Development Council on five occasions, culminating 
in conditional support for the idea (NEDO, 19?8).
The basic approach of such incentive programmes - termed
investment reserve schemes - is to encourage companies to set aside
3
a part of their savings for future investment. Their primary pur- 
pose 'is to shift the timing of investment, which they do by creaming
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off funds during a boom and restoring then: vhen the economy is in 
recession. As a second-order effect, ... such a scheme may also 
increase the amour.x of investment over time.' (NEDO, 1978, P»2). 
Stabilising investment in this -way carries an implication for the cy- 
clical component of the government deficit in that smaller cyclical 
variation in aggregate output implies a smaller governner.it deficit in 
recession.
The success of the Swedish scheme in stabilising in- 
vestment has been established (Taylor, 1982), though it would need 
to be modified if it were to be applied to the LTC. The operation 
of the scheme is best represented by a diagram e.s in Figure ?.1
1  "*( !
below, adapted from NEDO (19?8).
Year 1
Company 
earns 
profits 
(100)
FIGURE 7-1 
Main Elements of the Swedish Scheme
Appropriation of 
Year 1 profits Some later period
Allocates 
up to 
to Invest- 
ment Fund
Remainder to 
taxable pro- 
fits (tax 
rate = 
(60)
to Central 
Bank at zero 
interest (cf 
tax ra.te of
retained 
(22)
Funds (18) either 
released for ap- 
proved investment 
(possibly plus bonus 
tax allowance (U) - 
no depreciation 
allowance); 
or withdrawn for un- 
approved investment 
(with a penalty in- 
crease in taxable 
inccme (1+1+) - ordi- 
nary depreciation 
allowances)
The size of the reserve fund is equivalent to about ten 
percent of annual industrial investment. The effect of the scheme
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be thought of as equivalent to a certain percentage depreciation 
allowance in the year that an investment is made. If neither the 
bonus, nor the penalty applies as depicted in the diagram, the scheme 
is equivalent to roughly one hundred percent (free) depreciation. 
The loss that the company incurs due to the non-interest bearing 
deposits is roughly compensated by the fact that only forty-six 
percent of profits has to be deposited as opposed to a tax rate of 
fifty-four and a half percent.
In Britain, free depreciation is already available for 
nearly all industrial investment. Accordingly, there would be 
little likelihood of companies participating in an investment reserve 
scheme, unless it were financed by additional taxation or unless it 
were compulsory. The alternative would, of course, be to modify or 
abolish the existing schemes of depreciation allowances, as NEDO 
recognised:- 'A voluntary scheme on the Swedish lines would, 
therefore not be widely attractive here unless its terms were made 
excessively generous or unless the existing allowances were with~' 
drawn or substantially reduced. 1 (NEDO, 19?8, p.15>)«
For understandable reasons, mainly concerned with business 
confidence, NEDO was reluctant to propose a compulsory scheme or a 
reduction in depreciation allowances. However, it seems that 
envisaged the scheme applying to large firms only in that it argued 
that the participation of the top 1100 manufacturing firms would 
account for eighty percent of gross investment. Now, while such a 
concentrated coverage may have its merits in stabilising oligopo- 
listic investment, it is not relevant to the case under consideration 
here viz., the encouragement of capacity building in the competitive
sector in off-peak periods of the cycle.
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The institution of a compulsory investment reserve scheme 
for the competitive sector would probably not be detrimental to busi- 
ness confidence. Indeed, the Machine Tools Economic Development 
Committee recommended such a scheme to help overcome the extreme 
cycles endemic to industries supplying engineering equipment. The 
representatives of the Machine Tools manufacturers association were 
not opposed to a compulsory scheme at the REDO discussions (NEDO, 19?8) 
Neither would the scheme be difficult to administer for a large number 
of firms, since it could be linked to the taxation system. The main 
problem might be the distortion in allocation of investment funds if 
the oligopolistic sector were entitled to free depreciation without 
participating in the scheme. However, the evidence presented in 
earlier chapters calls into question the effectiveness of general 
investment incentives in promoting investment in the oligopolistic 
sector. Sone reduction in these incentives could probably be made 
without any adverse effect.
The foregoing discussion has indicated the sort of measures 
needed to prepare the competitive sector for a sustained upturn, with 
the aim of removing inflationary pressures and balance of payments 
deficits. The importance of these measures lies in the capacity 
constraints which would otherwise be encountered close to a cyclical 
peak.
7.3 The Oligopolistic Sector
No such capacity constraints are met in the oligopolistic 
sector. But inflationary pressures still originate in this sector 
due to the dynamics of wage and price interaction as described in 
Chapter 1. Companies pass on the rise in wage costs that occur under
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collective bargaining- as reported profits rise on the upswing. As 
the oligopolistic sector regards this profit movement as a predicted 
deviation from trend, it will not absorb wage rise which might be 
thought of as permanent and therefore likely to cause an erosion of 
long-run profitability. The subsequent wage-price spiral could be 
prevented only by employers or unions or both agreeing to with-hold 
their pov?er to transmit inflation. Such agreement is only likely if 
it can be demonstrated that the parties are not involved in a zero- 
sum game.
.As was demonstrated in Chapter 1, the deficit of the govern- 
ment sector may be contained, either by shifting down the savings 
curve or by shifting up the investment curve of the oligopolistic 
sector. The discussion here will focus mainly on the savings curve 
in view of the empirical results of previous chapters which have borne 
out the difficulty broached in Chapter 2 of effecting short-term upward 
influences on oligopolistic investment by means of orthodox instruments.
The savings (s) function may be represented as in Eichner 
(1976) as depending on the average price level in the oligopolistic 
sector (P); the difference between the national wage rate (w) and 
output per worker in the sector (X); the corporate tax rate (T); 
and the sector's output (G). These variables may all be represented 
as growth rates, giving:
S = S (P,(W-X),T,G),
where the partail derivatives of S with respect to P,X and G are 
positive and are otherwise negative.
In order to shift the saving-output curve, P must be reduced;
T increased; or W increased, there being no instrument that can effect
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short-term changes in labour productivity X. Tax policy and price 
controls will be discussed below as possible ways of shifting the 
savings curve. Following this, the more difficult question of 
effecting changes in W through incomes policy will be examined.
Taxation
It is problematic to rely on the tax instrument to shift the 
oligopolistic savings curve downward. As noted by Eichner (19?6, 
P»255)» 'Any increase in the putative tax burden on megacorps is 
likely to be shifted to the household sector in the form of higher 
prices'. The arguments supporting this position are sound enough. 
Starting from the axiom that firms plan savings and investment so as 
to equalise ex ante, the only question is whether there are forces 
preventing the megacorps froze defending their planned cyclical sur- 
pluses in the face of a tax increase. In Eichner 1 s view, these 
forces consist of the threats of substitution, new entry and govern- 
ment regulation. But, as the increased taxation falls more or less 
equally on all firms (existing and potential) in a given industry, 
the first two threats are neutralised. The third threat is only 
rarely effective and in any case would require the use of additional 
instruments.
The empirical evidence for full tax shifting, as implied by 
the above view, is rather inconclusive. King (1975) and Beath (1979) 
argue in favour of the hypothesis that firms in oligopolistic indus- 
tries set prices so as to maintain a target share of profits in value 
added, after tax. But Coutts et al (1978) conclude that 'extremely 
little tax shifting occurs in the short-term (one year or less) (p.95) 
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Somewhat more tentatively, they suggest that 'about two thirds of 
the direct tax change is shifted into price, with a mean lag of 
three years' (p.96). If this 'guestimate' of the lag were correct, 
it would imply that changes in company taxation could have the 
effect of eliminating short-term surpluses unless the investment 
curve also shifted down.
The latter possibility is not unlikely however. While the 
imposition of increased taxation to redistribute the financial 
surplus of the oligopolistic sector might be effective the first 
time it was adopted, it could produce undersirable effects if it 
were subsequently to be anticipated by firms, perhaps leading to a 
lower average level of investment. Thus, the only context for 
effective tax policy in this regard is where firms agree to the 
redistribution of their financial surplus in the expectation of 
consequential faster growth. This case however is virtually indistin- 
guishable from that of an agreed incomes policy which is discussed 
later.
Price Control
Price control is another possible option to shift the savings 
curve downward. It has been difficr.lt to introduce flexibility 
into such controls and because of subsequent distortions in resource 
allocation, they have been applied rigorously only for relatively 
short periods. However, price control in the TJK became more sophis- 
ticated with the Price Commission Act of 1977. Large firms still 
had to give a months notification of their intention to increase 
prices, but the focus of control shifted to cases where market
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forces were seen as inadequate to ensure growth and efficiency. 
The Commission operated on the principle of allowing 'efficient 
firms to make adequate profits' (Gribbin, 1977, p.5). A sample of 
firms was monitored to ensure that this principle was observed.
It is questionable, however, to what extent price control can 
be completely effective. Grant (19?6) estimated that the controls 
in the early seventies only affected two-fifths of the profits of 
UK companies. The reason for this is probably that it is very 
difficult to judge when a price increase is warranted. As Fels 
(1972) has noted, 'to have discovered why and how firms actually 
arrived at decisions would have required the inspection of company 
minutes and internal documents ... and even such draconian investiga- 
tory procedures as the taking of testimony from executives. The 
NBPI (National Board for Prices and Incomes) appears to have been 
inhibited from taking these steps by the shortness of time available 
and the desire to obtain voluntary cooperation 1 (p.202). However, 
Coutts et al (1978) on the basis of an industry by industry study of 
the effects of price control in the UK in the sixties and early 
seventies, conclude that 'direct price controls did, at least have 
some temporary effect in restraining the rate of inflation, though 
this was sporadic in its incidence 1 (p.12i|).
The main objection to using price controls to achieve a re- 
duction in the cyclical financial surplus is the same as that men- 
tioned above in respect of taxation. Unless it is used as a once- 
off policy exercise, firms will come to anticipate a policy rule that 
redistributes the financial surplus by controlling price increases 
when the surplus develops. Unless the policy rule is part of an
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agreed understanding on both incomes and prices, it is likely to 
have an adverse effect on business confidence and investment.
Incomes Policy
The remaining parameter of the savings curve is the wages 
growth rate W. Trades Unions can be relied on to press for a redis- 
tribution of the oligopolistic sector's financial surplus by means of 
higher real wages. Transferring the surplus to the household sector 
in this way would probably encourage a swift increase in household 
investment in consumer durables, so that the overall effect would 
be an upward shift in the private sector's investment curve, reducing 
the government deficit. Of course, there is a danger that the wage 
bargain will produce too low a wage rate, leaving the surplus intact. 
Alternatively, there is a danger 'that corporations will be left with 
what they consider an insufficient growth of internal funds to finance 
their future anticipated investment needs ... one result is fairly 
certain : a wage-price inflationary spiral.' (Eichner, 1977» P«71).
The argument supporting the need for an agreed incomes policy 
hinges on the view that a balance has to be struck between the im- 
mediate expenditure of the surplus (household investment) and the 
delayed expenditure that will be needed (oligopolistic investment) 
to rebuild capacity margins in the face of a higher secular growth 
rate. Oligopolistic investment will not be made without altering 
expectations of demand. This cannot be done by government deficits 
as the company sector has learned to fear these as harbingers of infla- 
tion and subsequent deflationary measures. On the other hand, the 
process of altering demand expectations by redistributing the surplus
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must not be done in such a way as to leave the oligopolistic sector 
exposed to liquidity pressures when it attempts to invest in response 
to the new demand expectation.
In principle it would seem that an incomes policy agreed by 
unions a.nd employers could ensure a planned redistribution of part 
of the surplus towards household investment. Employers might con- 
cede this redistribution in return for union guarantees of responsible 
wage bargaining as the secular growth rate was propelled upwards and 
as oligopolistic investment increased along its investment curve. 
It is, however the long-run consequences that are most important 
here, given that any agreement has to be based on expectations about 
what will happen in the long-run. The long-run position is examined 
below.
Long-run Implications of Incomes Policy
The proposition that a downward shift in the S curve, or an 
upward shift in the I curve would raise the equilibrium growth rate 
at all is of course only true to the extent that the I curve and 
the S curve are not interdependent. Eichner's position on this is 
complex in that they are interdependent in the lorg-run (S and I are 
matched over the cycle by pricing policies), but they are not inter- 
dependent in the short-run. This is in contrast for instance to 
Wood (1975) who pursues a macro economic analysis which, while 
based on a similar micro analysis to that of Eichner, is almost 
entirely of a long-run equilibrium nature.
Some light can be thrown on the long-run implications of 
Eichner's position by comparing his approach with that of Wood.
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In Wood's theory, growth maximisation at the level of the represen- 
tative firm determines the mark-up and the capital coefficient. 
The macro-level capital coefficient can then be derived by aggregating 
over firms. The macro economic mark-up is determined by the prin- 
ciple that 'the company sector profit margin is uniquely determined
7 
by the need to finance company sector investment 1 (Wood, 1975, p.109).
The two theories are therefore very similar. It is especially 
significant that both agree that savings and investment are jointly 
planned so as to equalise in the planning period. But Wood ab- 
stracts from the possibility of surpluses and deficits within the 
planning period. By ignoring these short-term factors he is forced 
to argue that the only potential for faster growth lies in raising 
productivity or by increasing the savings ratio or the borrowing ratio.
As an example of the difference which this long-run theorising 
implies for the analysis consider the case of a rise in the capital 
coefficient. For Wood this means a fall in the growth rate and the 
share of profits (p.11$)» since a fall in the output capital ratio 
at full capacity must imply via the multiplier a lower growth rate. 
However there is no full capacity assumption contained in the short- 
term partial model proposed by Eichner where the growth rate is not 
determined by a multiplier relationship. Thus a rise in the capital
o
output ratio allows faster growth by absorbing the surplus.
Similarly, a fall in the savings curve, in the context of Wood's 
macro economic analysis would have to lead to a lower growth rate, or 
be accompanied by a parameter change such a rise in the retention rate
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or in the gearing ratio. In Eichner's short-term analysis however, 
where savings are unused, the effect of a drop in the savings curve 
is to increase growth.
The relevance of Eichner's theory depends, therefore on the 
existence of excess capacity and the existence of a financial surplus 
within the planning period. Wood's long-term analysis ignores "both 
of these characteristics of the oligopolistic sector because he 
regards them as short-run phenomena.
These reversals of long-term and short-term conclusions raise 
the intriguing question of the long-term implications of growth 
stimulus along the lines suggested by Eichner, even if the short-term 
effects are as hypothesised.
Given a drop in the savings curve which sustains a new equi- 
librium at a higher growth rate, firms will be operating in the 
peak ca.pacity range. ' But once firms are convinced that the secular
growth rate has been raised, will they not wish to return to a lower
9 
rate of capacity utilisation so as to maintain entry barriers?
Restoring excess capacity will involve a rise in the investment
function which would be difficult to finance, given the previous
10 
fall in the savings function.
The firm will thus be caught between a downward-shifted 
savings curve and an upwards shifted investment curve partly caused 
by the necessity to maintain expenditures aimed at securing its 
market dominance. The market leaders will have most to lose from 
this situation. As resources are put into servicing current demand
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to prevent loss of market share, the target rate of return will rise, 
squeezing marginal and risky projects which help to secure the future 
technological lead of the firm.
It is easy to understand how leading firms would resist such
a development, inhibiting faster aggregate growth by cautious defence
11 
of cyclical surpluses. Caution on the part of the market leaders
would be reinforced by the prospect of future governments, perhaps
uncommitted to maintaining profitability, being in power during the
12 
critical payback period of the investments.
It seems, therefore that certain employers might well oppose 
an expansionary incomes policy, even if the unions were willing and 
able to negotiate long-term wage agreements. While it would be 
conceivable to envisage a scheme with compulsory elements, for 
instance where the surplus was reduced through selective price 
control, the result might only be a greater climate of uncertainty 
and an investment strike by sections of capital.
7.U The Investment Curve Reconsidered
The difficulties encountered in eliminating the cyclical 
financial surplus of the oligopolistic sector by shifting the sav- 
ings curve demonstrate the importance of a further consideration of 
the possibility of effecting short-term control of oligopolistic in- 
vestment. The traditional instruments of monetary policy, taxation 
and general investment incentives have already been surveyed and re- 
jected as ineffective. What has not been analysed so far, however, 
is the experimental policy rules adopted in the UK in the mid- 
seventies to alter the cyclical timing of investment. Two such
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schemes were adopted: the Accelerated Projects Scheme (APS) intro- 
duced in 1975 and the Selective Investment Scheme (SIS) introduced 
a year later.
The APS was designed to encourage investment that would not 
otherwise take place or would be deferred, but for government assis- 
tance. It was, therefore similar to the type of counter-cyclical 
investment reserve schemes outlined earlier, but with a crucial 
difference: it was intended to accelerate investment in the latter 
stages of an expansion. The effects of the APS and later the SIS 
were felt most strongly towards the end of the decade.
It is important to assess the success of these schemes since 
they constitute a potential resolution of the difficulties involved 
in reducing the cyclical surplus. It is not easy, however, to 
provide a convincing test of their success. The key question is whe- 
ther the projects promoted constituted genuine additional or accelera- 
ted investment or whether the cost of the subsidies were nugatory.
Any such investigation needs to proceed on the lines of a 
counter-factual model, forecasting the level of investment in the 
absence of the schemes and comparing with the actual level achieved. 
This procedure raises the same problems that were met in assessing the 
various formulations for investment models in Chapter U*
One possibility is to use survey methods to ascertain the 
effect of selective assistance. Grant (1982) reports on two such 
studies. The first by Walker and Krist (19$0) which concerned
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regional selective aid found that only a minority of medium-sized and 
larger firms who had received or were applying for selective finan- 
cial assistance incorporated it into their investment appraisal. 
In other words, the assistance was regarded as a bonus rather than 
a sine qua non. The second study by the Department of Industry (1978) 
concerned the assistance given under the Wool Textile Industry Scheme. 
Of the firms surveyed who received assistance U0% would have carried 
out the investment in any case, another 1+0% would have partially done 
so, and less than 20% would have deferred investment or not under- 
taken it at all.
The usefulness of these surveys depend on the confidence that 
can be placed in the honesty of the replies. In the above cases, 
where the assistance was not conditional on whether it constituted 
additional investment relative to planned investment, there was little 
incentive to hide the truth. However, no such honest disclosure
could be expected in relation to the APS or the SIS and other methods
  i 
must be used to study the effectiveness of these schemes.
According to NEDO (1978), a full review was intended to be 
carried out to evaluate the benefits and procedures of the APS (p.30). 
However, the Industrial Development Unit of the Department of Industry 
has informed me that no such review was ever undertaken. Evaluation 
of the scheme must, therefore be attempted without the aid of an 
official investigation.
Some attempt has already been made, in Chapter £, to interpret 
residuals between planned and actual investment (after accounting for 
other variables) as due to the operation of the APS. However, the
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result there was very tentative; the framework of the model was 
intended to capture the influence of short-run changes in variables, 
but the response to the APS seems to have been distributed over a 
fairly lengthy period from its announcement (HMSO, 1977 b, Appendix H), 
The effects of the scheme could only be ascertained in the context of 
the Chapter 5 model, in so far as realised investment increased in 
relation to the level forecast in the immediately preceding year.
The exact timing of the APS announcement and the take-up of 
the subsidies is important if an assessment is to be made of its 
effect, without recourse to a full time-series model of investment
behaviour.
Although the APS was first introduced in April 1975> "the flow 
of applications was low, and it was modified and relaunched in 
October that year. The closing date for projects was July 1976 
and the starting deadline was September 1976. It seems likely 
therefore that most assisted investment took place in 1977 and the 
effect would be evident in the discrepancy between investment 
planned at the end of 1975 for 1977 and that actually undertaken in 
1977» Fortunately such forecasts are available from the preliminary 
survey on investment intentions carried out by the Department of 
Industry.
Payments under the APS were only made when the company concerned 
had paid its suppliers. By March 197$ payments under the APS 
totalled £22.6 million (HMSO, 1978). The ratio of subsidy to invest- 
ment was approximately one to eight, so the additional investment, 
mainly in 1977 should have amounted to about four per cent of annual
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investment in manufacturing. Since the scheme was concentrated in 
a few sectors, the effect should have been even more marked.
The approved grants, broken down in percentage terms by the 
five EEC industry groups described in Chapter 5 were as follows: 
Basic Products (62%); Engineering (29%); Metal Manufacture (6%); 
Food, Drink and Tobacco (2%). Thus, the only two industry groups 
to benefit significantly were Basic Products and Engineering. 
(HMSO, 1980, Appendix 9).
Table 7«1 below shows the ratio or actual investment to fore- 
cast investment as obtained in the preliminary enquiry of the Depart- 
ment of Industry survey. This forecast is obtained at the end of 
year t-2 for year t (e.g. at the end of 1975 for 1977). The 1975-7 
discrepancy should include a definite APS effect since companies would 
probably not have had time to readjust their investment plans and 
forecasts between the relaunching of the APS in October 1975 and the 
' 'Department of Industry enquiry in November/December of that year.
The table also contains the ratio of actual to forecast in- 
vestment for the forecast years 1975 and 1976, made respectively at 
the end of 1973 and 197U. These are included as a guide to the kind 
of discrepancies experienceu in previous years.
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TABLE 7.1
Ratio of Actual (A) to Forecast Investment (All Assets)
Total Basic Metal 
Manuf. Pro due t s Manuf,
Engine- 
ering
Process- 
ing
1.22^
Food, Drink 
& Tobacco
1.131
1976(A) 1.062 1.003 1.362 
197U(F)
0.995 0.91U 1.167
1977(A) 1.050 1.173 
1975(F)
0.701 1.089 1.3UU
Source: Department of Industry
In interpreting these figures the bottom line is the most 
important. For the Basic Products group which received the bulk of 
APS aid, actual investment is 17«3% higher than planned. For 
;T£ngineering, which received about a third of the aid, investment is 
8.9% above that planned. In both cases, the percentage discrepancy 
is higher than for either of the previous years. It is higher also 
than the discrepancy for total manufacturing or for any group in 1977 
with the exception of Food, Drink & Tobacco. The strong rivalries 
induced in the latter industry by static domestic demand and the 
consequent need for innovation probably accounts for the increasing 
discrepancies over time and also for the low level of aid granted 
(Burns et al, 1983).
Statistical tests would not be appropriate without constructing 
a more complete model, but it would appear at least plausible to inter- 
pret the above figures as indicating substantial success for the APS
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approach, in contradistinction to the effect of general investment 
incentives analysed in previous chapters.
Analysis of the Selective Investment Scheme is much more 
difficult because although announced in December 1976, the flow of 
applications was more steady than with the APS and projects were com- 
pleted over a longer period. This may have been because firms 
(rightly) believed that the starting deadline would be continually 
extended. By March 1980, payments of only £11;. 1 million had been 
paid out of a total approval of over £100 million and the effect of 
this scheme was clearly distributed over a number of years. How- 
ever, there is no reason to doubt the view of Department of Industry 
officials who have repeatedly reported success for the scheme in 
annual reports of the Industry Act.
Nevertheless, a question which requires consideration is the 
extent to which a policy rule, triggering the operation of accelerated 
project aid could come to be anticipated by companies in a way that 
would frustrate the policy. Projects that would normally have been 
undertaken may get delayed and shelved until the operation of the aid 
scheme if there seems some chance that they could be represented as 
non-viable without subsidy. This problem could only be avoided by 
ensuring that the officials administering the scheme are highly
conversent with industry practices and have considerable powers of
16investigation. Were these conditions not satisfied, the propor- 
tionate value of the subsidy would have to be low so as to discourage 
abuse. One further possible method of ensuring that investment in 
marginal projects is not discouraged before the triggering of the
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scheme would be to raise the level of uncertainty surrounding its 
operation. This could "be done in several ways: by varying the 
exact point in the cycle at which it was introduced; by varying 
the period between the announcement and the starting deadline; or 
by varying the proportionate value of the subsidy. Most importantly, 
it would be possible to vary the proportion of aid, not only in re- 
lation to the desirability of the project, but also in relation to 
the estimated probability that it constituted genuine additional or 
accelerated investment.
7«5 Conclusions
In order to achieve faster growth, different policies are 
needed in the competitive and in the oligopolistic sectors. The 
former needs to be encouraged to build up its stocks and capacity 
in advance of an upturn so as to prevent price inflation and rising 
import penetration. The oligopolistic sector needs to be encouraged
to release its financial surplus accumulated during the upturn.
; >
In the case of the competitive sector, the above objectives 
can be met by the operation of subsidies in the form of a compulsory 
contra-cyclical reserve scheme; the subsidies would be paid in a 
downturn or in a cyclical trough and investment in the peak would be 
discouraged by creaming of funds into the reserve. The experience 
of the Swedish scheme would seem particularly relevant to this sector.
As regards the oligopolistic sector, several instruments aimed 
at redistributing the cyclical surplus have been investigated. The 
problem with many of them, in particular price control and taxation 
is that although the short-term effects may be as desired, they may
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meet with resistance "by industry and may lead to a reduction in the 
overall level of investment. Nor, it was argued, is it realistic to 
expect a voluntary incomes policy agreement which could effect a 
downwards shift in the oligopolistic savings curve. The subsequent 
operation of the economy at near full capacity would create problems 
for dominant firms in terms of maintaining their market share; but
rebuilding spare capacity to restore entry barriers would be diffi-
1 7 cult in view of the terms of the incomes policy. '
It seems therefore that none of the above policies are realis- 
tic within a voluntary or cooperative framework. They could pro- 
bably only be made effective within a context of far-reaching controls 
on investment, through measures such as compulsory planning agree- 
ments.
In the absence of such radical policies, the only solution is 
to persuade the oligopolistic sector to effect an upward shift in 
its investment curve. This cannot be achieved by traditional instru- 
ments such as variation in interest rates or general investment incen- 
tives. However, it seems that selective incentives, such as the 
Accelerated Project Scheme are capable of achieving a swift increase
in investment expenditure, or at any rate of bringing forward projects
1R 
planned for a later date.
The final conclusion, therefore, is that counter-cyclical 
schemes can usefully be applied in both the competitive and the oligo- 
polistic sectors, though they need to be phased differently in keeping 
with the fundamental behavioural differences of the two sectors. 
The competitive sector scheme needs to operate subsidies in the
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downturn, whereas the oligopolistic scheme of subsidies should not 
commence until its financial surplus begins to increase in the upturn. 
Sensible policy rules can only be designed when the reality of a 
dual economy is recognised.
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FOOTNOTES
1. This follows from the results of Chapter £, where an interest 
rate effect was found in total manufacturing, "but not in two of three 
of the concentrated groups. A liquidity effect was observed in 
Chapter 6 for the non-concentrated group only, reflecting the survi- 
val of marginal plants and, by implication influencing investment. 
Chapter 3 results also revealed a tendency for small firms to adjust 
investment to past profits.
2. The shortage of capacity might be aggravated by speculation 
on rising prices, resulting in a hoarding of stocks. Labour short- 
ages could also be expected as workers were 'poached 1 by the higher- 
wage oligopolistic sector.
3. The Swedish scheme included investment .in stocks (Butt-Phillips , 
1978). However, the whole scheme is now no longer operated in a 
counter-cyclical manner in view of the general recession. See also 
footnote 7 to Chapter 1 .
U. Of course, to the extent that firms believe that the higher 
operating level is not merely cyclical, but implies a rise in the 
secular growth rate they are less likely to raise prices. But 
pessimistic expectations are likely to be self-fulfilling.
£. Martin and O'Connor (1981) note that, 'there is amoungst eco- 
nomists no more consensus about the incidence of corporation tax than 
there is about the evolution of its effective rate' (p.5>7)»
6. Note, however, that savings may continue to rise dispropor- 
tionately with demand for some time, following a stimulus.
7. In this Wood is following the Kaleckian-Cambridge tradition 
that the main causal relationship is from investment to profit and 
not vice versa. Wood is at pains to stress that his theory is not 
a 'degree of monopoly' theory of the type advanced by Kalecki. 
Firms are impelled by competition to faster growth which depends via 
the Harrod equation on the predetermined capital coefficient and the 
(partially endogenous) savings ratio. But unlike Kaldor's theory, 
the adjustment of actual to warranted growth does not necessarily 
involve a change in the warranted growth due to changes in distribu- 
tion (though the savings ratio may be made a function of distribution). 
There is, thus, no mechanism for equating warranted and natural rates 
of growth and no pre-supposition of full employment.
8. See the discussion in Wood (1975) p. 100 ff. where he realises 
that the pattern of causation is different in the short-run. Note 
also that Wood's long-run analysis, at least in so far as the capital 
coefficient is concerned, is not very satisfactory in that the embodied 
technology effect on productivity is not considered separately from 
additions to the capital stock when discussing changes in the capital 
output ratio i.e. the mechanism of change in this variable is unarti- 
culated.
9. It is frequently argued, e.g. Spence (1977) that low capacity 
utilisation dominates other strategies of maintaining entry barriers.
/10. Furthermore,
10. Furthermore, as growth of output and of capital goods increases, 
the incremental capital output ratio will tend to rise if capital goods 
are produced with more capital intensive technology than aggregate 
output. This is so for two reasons as Wood makes clear (Wood, 1975» 
p. 122). Firstly, an increase in the proportion of capital goods in 
total output, caused "by the fact that investment goods are produced 
by more capital intensive methods than other goods, will raise the 
aggregage incremental capital output ratio directly. Secondly, there 
is a valuation effect - a negative Price Wicksell effect - which 
occurs as faster growth induces the higher profitability to finance 
it. As distribution changes in favour of profits, the value of 
capital increases. (Harcourt, 1972, pp.UO-U3, p. 135). Thus, both 
of the above effects ensure that the capital output ratio rises with 
growth. The value of capital would decrease with rising profitabili- 
ty (positive price Wicksell effect) if investment goods were produced 
on average by less capital intensive methods than other goods. Wood 
(1975, p. 122) does not consider this likely, but it may be noted that 
vehicles and electrical engineering are both highly labour intensive 
industries. At the end of the day this is an empirical question that 
depends on the dividing line chosen between capital and consumer goods.
Prais (1981) has divided industries on the basis of the medium 
capital expenditure per employee (p.ll^). More capital intensive 
industries are Metal Manufacture, Chemicals, Oil Refining, Cement, 
Glass, Rubber Artificial Fibres, Office Machinery, Motor Vehicles, 
Food, Drink and Tobacco, Paper and Printing, and Plastics. Less 
capital intensive industries are Textiles, Leather, Clothing, Footwear, 
Timber, Furniture, Bricks, Metal Articles, Engineering, Data Proces- 
sing Equipment, Aerospace, Shipbuilding, and Other Manufacturing.
Capital goods are likely to have a heavy input of the first 
six categories of the capital intensive industries. Less capital 
intensive industries - Timber, Aerospace and Shipbuilding will also 
enter disproportionately into capital goods but the weight of these 
is much less than the first group. It seems, therefore, on casual 
inspection, that Wood is correct to argue that capital goods are 
produced with more capital intensive techniques than other goods.
11. This does not necessarily contradict growth maximisation at 
the level of the individual firm, but it implies that market leaders 
can coordinate their response to growth, perhaps through forms of 
implicit collusion.
12. There must also "be some question as to the ability of the trade 
union side to implement its side of any bargain on wages, especially 
as the exact operation of new work-practices cannot be predicted in 
advance and management will, given fixed wage agreements attempt to 
increase work intensity which may lead to industrial action and calls 
for the renegotiation of wage agreements.
13- Bean (1981) obtained underprediction in investment equations 
for 1976 which was attributed to selective schemes. This seems too 
early to be attributed to the APS.
Annual investment in manufacturing in 1977 was approximately 
four and a half "billion pounds. Note, however, that some projects 
will have been completed at the end of 1976 or the beginning of 1978.
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15. It should also be noted that the APS was but one^of the 
selective aid programmes operated by the government, mainly under 
section 8 of the 1972 Industry Act. Individual firms were given 
assistance and over a dozen sectoral schemes were also in operation. 
Selective assistance, apart from regional-specific aid, National 
Enterprise Board expenditure and the long-standing shipbuilding and 
tourism programmes, averaged over £100 million a year in the late
1970's. (HMSO 1979).
16. See Hughes (1983) who comments on the operation of the APS : 
"The bargaining over such projects was very detailed; many company 
proposals were rejected. In other very tight conditions (what one 
might call payments by results) were negotiated. The process could 
work quite swiftly and on a large scale 1 (p.5>0).
17. In the absence of selective import controls, excess capacity 
of large firms acts as a surrogate form of protection which may not 
be displeasing to governments.
18. The finance of such schemes - whether it comes from general 
taxation or from an increase in tax rates on oligopolistic firms 
during the period of operation of the scheme is largely a pragmatic 
matter connected with repercussions on business confidence.
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CHAPTER 8
Summary and Conclusions
This thesis has drawn certain key features of modern capitalist 
economies on a large canvas. The "brush has sometimes "been "broad - 
to indicate the sweep of the argument - but detail has been filled in 
for the most important features, those with policy implications. 
The two main themes have been those of cyclical behaviour and the 
duality of behaviour between competitive and oligopolistic sectors.
Attention to cycles is often considered an unnecessary embel- 
lishment in economic theory, the argument being that short-run cycli- 
cal behaviour does not determine the evolution of long-run trends, 
given the stable behaviour of economic agents. Wood (1975) puts 
this point rather forcibly arguing that short run fluctuations, 
except in so far as they alter firms views of the secular trend will 
simply be absorbed by fluctuations in stock levels and the degree of 
capacity use. On the other hand, Kalecki (1968) refers to the 
long-term trend as f but a slowly changing component of a chain of 
short-period situations' (p.263). The truth probably lies between 
these positions, at any rate for the evolution of aggregate variables. 
But what is important from the standpoint of this thesis is not what 
has, in a positive sense, been the case but rather, what implications 
cyclical behaviour has for the possible future upward revision of the 
secular growth trend.
It is in this regard that the division of the economy into 
competitive and oligopolistic sectors is important. The cyclical 
behaviour of the former is that of the classic boom and slump.
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Smoothing this cycle, as in stabilisation policy, particularly of 
the type pursued in post-war Sweden, may encourage higher growth by 
reducing uncertainty. However, the small weight of this sector in 
a modern capitalist economy reduces the overall significance of such 
measures. The cyclical behaviour of the oligopolistic sector is a 
far more important question to consider.
Given that firm objectives in the oligopolistic sector have been 
shown to be long-run, and given also that the sector is not characte- 
rised by price-taking firms, it follows that the investment and 
pricing decisions must be jointly made. The implication of this is 
the emergence of a planned financial surplus, beginning in the first 
stage of an upturn. The timing of the accumulation of these inter- 
nal funds has implications for the macro-economy, especially in view 
of the weight of this sector in the whole economy.
The government budget deficit reflects, to an extent, the 
oligopolistic sector surplus that arises due to the interaction of 
the latter f s rising savings with stable investment during the boom. 
The consequent acquisition of financial assets has a certain corres- 
pondence in the amount of debt issued by the government, the corres- 
pondence being direct when oligopolistic firms purchase gilts and 
treasury bills. In general, however, the surplus is recycled in a 
complex way through many sectors. Most of the liquid assets of 
Industrial and Commercial Companies (about two-thirds) are held as 
deposits with banks or financial institutions, while the financial 
sector is often a large holder of government debt.
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The behaviour of the oligopolistic sector thus has two con- 
sequences. It is inflationary in that its savings (pricing) policy 
causes prices in the boom to rise faster than warranted by costs 
(including normal profit for that point in the cycle). It also 
results in a hi^ier government budget deficit in so far as other 
sectors are unwilling or unable to incur a hi^ier debt position.
It has been shown in Chapter 1 that under plausible assumptions, 
the government budget deficit mounts as the boom develops, notwith- 
standing the fact that government revenue rises disproportionately 
with aggregate output. In so far as economic agents view the 
secular growth of the economy to be unaltered, the mounting deficit 
will only be approved by financial markets for a finite time period. 
The government therefore faces pressure, for both budgetary and in- 
flationary reasons to curb growth at this stage of the boom. Of 
course, to the extent that the oligopolistic financial surplus is 
channelled into short-term capital movements, pressure on the balance 
of payments will also be intensified, thus reinforcing the arguments 
for deflationary action.
It is important to stress that the developments outlined above 
are independent of capacity constraints in the economy, though defla- 
tionary action is often presented as a response to overheating pro- 
blems that attend 'full 1 capacity - inflation, or balance of payments 
difficulties. It has been argued in this thesis that capacity and 
trade constraints are rarely of a binding nature.
The pressure for deflationary action would be removed at 
first source if either the savings curve of the oligopolistic sector
/could .....
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could be shifted down, or the investment curve shifted up. The 
argument that some other sector (apart from the government) could 
compensate for the oligopolistic sector surplus is true in principle, 
but in practice, only the personal sector is likely to fill this role 
and its borrowing behaviour will be tempered by a reluctance to exceed 
targets for net indebtedness. These targets are determined by cul- 
tural factors and can only be slowly changed.
Considerable effort has been directed in this thesis to identi- 
fying the effect of policy instruments on short-run oligopolistic in- 
vestment behaviour. Traditional instruments were found to have 
little or no effect, though the longer term effects of investment 
incentives were not directly tested for and can be assumed to be 
positive, as old vintages of capital stock face 'natural 1 retirement. 
The analysis of scrapping behaviour for this sector showed that if 
substitution does occur as the cost of capital is varied, it must be 
of the long-run putty-clay type.
Still, it is the short-run effects that are of interest if 
the upswing is not to lose momentum. The impotence of traditional 
instruments in this respect forces a consideration of policy measures 
to shift the savings curve. Among various measures considered, the 
most promising seemed to be a voluntarily agreed social contract 
covering incomes and prices. However, while this may well be in the 
short-term interests of both capital and labour, it is not clear 
that it serves the long-run interests of the dominant oligopolistic 
firms in that a sustained period of full capacity operation would 
impair the entry barriers that protect their dominance.
/The ..... 
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The fact that one can foresee difficulties in instituting a 
planning agreement along the above lines does not, of course mean 
that it is useless to attempt it. But it seems clear that voluntary 
agreement cannot be relied on in this matter. In the absence of 
the desire or capacity to impose institutional reform along these 
lines, the best strategy may be to experiment with new policy in- 
struments of a selective type, aimed at shifting the oligopolistic 
investment curve. The results surveyed in Chapter 7 are encourag- 
ing in this respect. Perhaps it is in this area that further re- 
search could most usefully be concentrated.
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APPENDIX 1 TO CHAPTER 2
This Appendix locates the theories of Wood and 
Eichner in the general theoretical framework of Harris 
(1964).
Consider Harris Hodel 1
8d = 8d 
(2) gg = ot
or, (2a) g = c< ;
s
= c(d) 
(4) gs - gd
where, t is gross profit share; d diversification; 
EJ» S » growth in demand and demand for investment finance 
(or assets) respectively; c the capital output ratio, v 
the minimum valuation ratio and the proportion of 
profits that can be committed to investment. The model 
with g = g, is balanced growth and therefore at any
o Q
equilibrium, c is fixed and equal to the incremental
capital output ratio k. Accordingly, equations (2a) and
(4) combine to give Wood's finance constraint: g, = oC
Equations (1) and (3) give a variant of Wood's 
opportunity function: g, « g, (k, It ). The only 
difference in interpretation is that Harris (following
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PenroseTft sees c responding inversely to d, as efficiency 
falls under diversification. Harris shows the interaction 
of the finance and opportunity frontiers in d - g space 
(equivalent to k - g space, since k is monotonic with d) 
with ft as parameter. Wood shows the interaction in 
TC - g space with k as parameter.
In the p (rate of profit) - g space, the diagram 
collapses to movement along the line p = o£ g, with a 
maximum at same point A. Wood's model does not therefore 
deal with a trade off between g and p. [Figure 2A.1]. 
Unlike Wood, Harris (Hodel 2) allows 06 or (v) to vary, 
giving a trade off between 'optimal 1 points, the chosen 
point depending on the desired risk of takeover. [Figure 
2A.2],
FIGURE 2A.1 FIGURE 2A.2 FIGURE 2A.3
Harris Hodel 2 is of interest in terms of Eichner's 
analysis, since it allows for a positive relationship 
between p and g in the initial stage of diversification. 
The positive slope arises because (1) the capital output
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ratio is allowed to fall for small rates of 
diversification. This is due to an inverse Penrose effect 
- managerial efficiency prompted by change. (2) The 
profit margin may rise because of the existence of 
transitory monopoly profits which are easy to earn on new 
projects. Thus p ( = -^) may rise unambiguously with g 
for a limited range.
Thus, Eichner (1976) is not totally correct when he 
identifies the ' principle difference between the model of 
the firm developed by Harris and the model on which this 
treatise is based.....Harris assumes that the price level 
is exogenously determined, and that what needs to be 
explained is...the valuation ratio 1 (p.311).
Eichner f s innovation of course is that the mark-up is 
theorised as varying not only on new products but across 
the firm's range of products.
Harris suggested that firms as growth maximisers 
might operate on the downward sloping part of the p - g 
curve up to the point of maximum retention rate r 
consistent with safety. The problem then was to explain 
the empirically observed positive relationship. This was 
explained by the existence of different opportunity in 
product markets for different firms resulting in a scatter 
along CAB in Figure 2A.3. Harris argued that this scatter 
would be greater than the scatter along the curve because
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firms vere likely to be in the same financial market but 
different product markets.
APPENDIX 2 TO CHAPTER 2
Criticisms of the Eichner-Wood Model of the Firm
Prais (1976) has provided figures which indicate that 
some of the assumptions on which the Wood model is based 
are very questionable. In particular, the proposition 
that 'new issues of shares are a very minor source of 
finance 1 is not supported by Prais who shows new issues to 
be approximately 10% of gross income from 1950 to the 
mid-seventies (p.129, table 5.9). He states that in 1970, 
f a not untypical year for new issues', as many as half of 
the hundred largest companies issued new capital for cash 
(p.129). Prais also argues that the extent to which 
companies are self-financing is overstated in that if 
depreciation is excluded, the contribution of retentions 
to net asset growth ranges from about 60% to 30% with a 
downward trend from 1950 (table 5.8 p.126). This 
variability is damaging to Wood on account of his 
assumption of stability in the external borrowing ratio.
Eichner's theory is immune from these criticisms, 
since it entails no presupposition of long-run stability. 
It has, however, attracted criticism of a different sort. 
Hazledine (1974) has attempted to make Eichner's model 
ineffectual by arguing that firms always have the option 
of investing in liquid assets at the prevailing rate of 
interest on long-term securities. The argument is that
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firms will always, therefore, increase the mark-up to the 
point where the implicit interest rate equals the external 
long-term interest rate. Eichner (1974) has replied to 
this criticism, referring to it as a 'logically 
irrefutable but none-the-less empirically insignificant 
refinement 1 (p.976). The point he makes is that the 
return on money lending, to a firm without specialised 
banking skills, is likely to be considerably less than the 
marginal efficiency of investment in its own line(s) of 
business. It is '...only when there are so few investment 
opportunities offering prospective rates of return in 
excess of what can be earned by lending money out to 
others that the Hazledine dynamic will come into play 1 
(p.976).
Harris (1977) has attacked Eichner on two counts, 
firstly, he argues that 'by fixing the minimum dividend 
the author has fatally reduced his degrees of freedom. 
The established theories, by contrast treat the proportion 
of the current levy devoted to future levy-enhancing 
activities as instrumental variables and are therefore 
able to provide families of internally consistent size 
paths mapping families of dividend paths' (p.1342). The 
point here surely is one of level of abstraction. Since 
most evidence of dividend behaviour (see for instance Hay 
and Morris 1979 pp.347-8) suggests that dividends are 
stable, it is surely not unrealistic to construct a model 
without this particular degree of freedom. Harris* second 
criticism is that Eichner displays a tendency to
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'over-generalise from the case of a single industry firm; 
the conglomerate case is treated quite shortly and with 
no real understanding of the distinction between those 
parts of economic theory that apply properly to the 
subordinate divisions of a conglomerate and those 
appropriate to headquarters' (p.1340). Harris seems to 
have pricing behaviour in mind here, for he later remarks 
that *Your typical conglomerate delegates pricing 
decisions to its product-organised operating divisions 1 
(p. 1342). This view has been contradicted in the text of 
this chapter with evidence from various sources. It is 
true however that Markham (1973) finds evidence for 
decentralised pricing in what appear to be pure 
conglomerates, but this form of enterprise is not, by any 
means the norm.
Shapiro (1981) has extended Eichner's theory by 
suggesting that price formation is dichotomised by firms 
into pricing of old and new products. Mature products 
such as food or steel have relatively inelastic industry 
demand curves and although ease of entry may result in 
limits to possible price rises here, revenues can be 
gained and redirected (e.g. through allocation of 
overheads) to subsidising the penetration of new more 
vibrant industries. For these new products pricing has 
initially to be low (though perhaps with a trial period at 
high prices) either because they must capture a space on 
the income allocation, vacated by old products or must 
contribute to cost reduction, or capture a part of
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uncommitted income in periods when savings are rising, 
e.g. when new entrants join the labour force at times of 
growth.
This notion of 'cross-subsidisation 1 has been mooted 
in the academic literature since Edwards (1955) first 
articulated it. In the U.K., the reports of the 
Monopolies Commission confirm the practice for market 
leaders in matches, industrial gases, electrical equipment 
for motor vehicles, cellulose fibres, librium and valium. 
These instances were of firms in a near monopoly position 
using cross subsidisation to protect that specific markets 
(Utton 1982 pp.103-4). It seems likely that 
cross-subsidisation may also exist in relation to the 
transfer of funds to growing industries via non cost-based 
pricing policy, a practice that fits in with product-cycle 
theory. <>
Such practices have been confirmed by the former 
Chairman of the National Enterprise Board (Knight 1980). 
He has argued that f the risks of dependence on one product 
require firms to have strategies, a portfolio of products 
at different stages in their life cycles and the cash 
flows from products at the peak or in decline provide the 
cash to finance new initiatives ....each product success 
cannot be achieved without aggressive investment aimed at 
capturing market share 1 (p.13).
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Shapiro's theory is not growth maximising in the 
sense that a single industry market share is being 
maximised. Indeed such a practice might be inimical to 
overall corporate growth, and this latter variable is the 
maximand of her theory. This theory provides a unifying 
shell for the strands of post-Keynesian theory represented 
by growth maximisers on the other hand (Eichner, Wood) and 
stagnationists on the other (Cowling, Kalecki, Steindl). 
Both sets of theories can agree that growth maximisation 
is not pursued for mature products. Rather the mark-up is 
raised, accompanied by cut backs in investment and output 
to facilitate this. (Of course to the extent that this 
may lead to cutbacks in actual profit margins as an 
uncontrolled spiral downward develops in capacity 
utilisation, the process is self defeating, and cross 
subsidisation will fail).
While the Eichner-Wood approach needs to be expanded 
to deal with the distinction between mature and new 
products, the Cowling-Steindl approach needs to be 
modified to take account of diversification. The 
underconsumptionist notion of a rising surplus with no 
outlet fails to focus on the extent to which profits are 
transferred from mature to fast growing product areas.
Cowling (1982) has criticised Eichner 1 s inclusion of 
capacity costs in the pricing decision, arguing that 'even 
in a world of managerialism, corporations will choose 
price output policies to maximise profits 1 (p.24).
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Nevertheless, he later accepts that 'current price....[is] 
set with an eye to future as well as present sales 1 
(p.54). This, however merely begs the question of how the 
capacity to meet future sales is to be financed. If it is 
financed internally, pricing policy will have to take this 
into account.
Finally, it may be noted that Harcourt and Kenyon 
(1976) have provided an added complication to the 
Eichner-Wood theory by making the scrapping decision (and 
consequently the replacement-investment decision) depend 
on the output price. A vintage model is proposed where 
rising marginal cost (with vintage) intersects a downward 
sloping opportunity curve. The price chosen determines 
scrapping (of all equipment vintages with marginal cost 
greater than the price) and hence the amount of 
replacement investment. The price-investment finance 
locus so obtained is then combined with a finance 
constraint to give a determinate price-investment 
solution. While this model can be criticised by giving 
primacy to a scrapping rule rather than to strategic 
investment planning, as in Eichner (1976), it does address 
the relation between price and replacement investment 
providing an additional element to the price-investment 
decision.
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APPENDIX 1 TO CHAPTER 3
Graphs of Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.8, 3.9 
and 3.11, showing cyclical peaks (P) and troughs (T).
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